THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL ALARCON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal by appellant Daniel Alarcon from the judgment of the third
division of the People’s Court, that convicted the appellant of the crime of
treason and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.

After a careful consideration of the facts and the law of the case, we are of
the opinion and hold that the trial court did not err in finding the appellant
guilty of the crime charged and in sentencing him to suffer the penalty imposed
in its judgment.

As to the first count, the finding of the lower court that during the month
of December, 1944, the defendant joined the military organization called
Makapili, which had its headquarters in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija; received an
army rifle from the enemy; stood guard every morning at said headquarters;
underwent military training under a Filipino and a Japanese instructors; and
accompanied patrols of Japanese and Makapili soldiers in search of guerrillas,
is supported by two witnesses, Pedro B. Tolentino (pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10,
t. s. n.) and Sotero Domingo (pages 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 29 and 37, t. s. n.).
The appellant upon being asked “what he had to say to the charge of the
government’s witnesses that he was a member of the so-called Makapili, instead
of denying it, he merely said ‘I have nothing to say about that'” (p. 11, t. s.
n.).

With respect to the third count, the testimony of two witnesses Lorenzo
Sampang (80-83, t. s. n.) and Felizardo Sampang (95 to 98, t. s. n.) support the
conclusion of the trial court to the effect that, on January 11, 1945, a group
of Japanese and Makapili soldiers arrested Lorenzo Sampang, his two sons
Benedicto and Felizardo, and his son-in-law Manuel Villar, and took all of them
to the Makapili headquarter in Cabanatuan; that the persons arrested met the
accused with other Makapilis at said headquarter, and were submitted by the
latter to a rigid examination about their connection with the guerrillas; that,
as Manuel Villar refused to answer questions propounded to him by the appellant,
the latter took him to a room, and so maltreated and tortured him that when
Villar came out of the room, his face was bloody, his arms swollen, and he could
hardly walk; and that they were released on January 13, except Villar whose
whereabout until the date of the trial was unknown.

And the finding of the trial court, in connection with the fourth count, that
the accused in the month of December, 1944, retreated with the Japanese forces
towards Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, before the arrival of the American forces in
Cabanatuan, is also supported by the testimony of two witnesses, Pedro B.
Tolentino (p. 12), and Sotero Domingo (pp. 18 and 19, t. s. n.). But the
conclusion of fact of the trial court that the appellant with some other
Makapilis and Japanese soldiers went to the market place of Cabanatuan, and
there commandeered vehicles, foodstuffs, and animals for the Japanese, can not
be taken into consideration, because it was not alleged in the information, and
only one witness testified to the said fact. Sotero Domingo (p. 18, t. s. n.).
And the other conclusion of the lower court that while the appellant was coming
down from the mountain, he was apprehended by the witness Simeon Sami, is
supported only by the latter’s testimony (pp. 117, 118, t. s. n.).

The trial court did not err in not giving any weight to the testimony of the
witnesses for the defendant, Leoncio Ramos, Juan Esteban, and Bernardo Hilario,
because their testimonies consist in merely denying to have seen the acts
attributed to the appellant by the witnesses for the prosecution, and at dates
different from those referred to by the latter (pp. 130, 133, and 138, t. s.
n.).

Attorney for appellant contends that the testimonies of the witnesses Pedro
Tolentino and Sotero Domingo are incredible, because they say that the appellant
was the only one recognized and pointed out by them among those who had been
drilling in front of the Kempei’s and Makapili’s headquarters, and who retreated
with the Japanese forces to Bongabon before the arrival of the American forces.
There is nothing incredible in that said witnesses were unable to tell who were
the other persons, and recognized only the appellant among them, because the
appellant was formerly a friend of Domingo (p. 22, t. s. n.) and a leader in the
neighborhood association under the control and supervision of Pedro Tolentino
(p. 13, t. s. n.).

The so-called discrepancies and contradictions of the witnesses for the
prosecution pointed out by the attorney for the appellant, are not real
contradictions and discrepancies, and therefore they can not affect in any way
their credibility.

In effect, attorney for defendant says that Domingo asserted that when he
saw, “the group of Filipino and Japanese with the accused going toward Bongabon,
they carried carts, foodstuff, animals together with their relatives;” while
“Tolentino testified they only carried rifles when he saw them going to Bongabon
on the same occasion.” In the first place, Domingo did not say that the accused
and Makapili soldiers were carrying those things while going to Bongabon; what
he testified is that when the Americans were approaching, the Makapilis went to
the market and carried them away. And in the second place, Tolenthio did not
testify that the accused and the Makapilis did not take with them carts,
foodstuffs, and animals in going toward Bongabon (p. 12), because he was not
asked about it; what was asked of him was “When the Americans were approaching
Cabancalan, do you know what the accused did?”, and he answered: “Yes, sir, I
saw him together with the Makapilis and the Japanese going toward Bongabon, they
had rifles with them” (p. 12, t. s. n.).

It is true that Domingo assured that in the vicinity of Sangitan there was
only one headquarter (referring to Makapili headquarter) where the appellant and
his companions used to drill (p. 25, t. s. n.), but said testimony is not in
contradiction, as contended by attorney for the appellant, with that of
Tolentino to the effect that there were two headquarters in Sangitan: one where
the Makapilis were drilling, and the other is the headquarter of the Philippine
Constabulary (p. 11, t. s. n.). And the testimony of Lorenzo Sampang that he
woke up his sons and son-in-law when he heard the Japanese and Makapili soldiers
shout “this is the house, this is the house, open the door” (p. 78, t. s. n.),
is not necessarily contradictory to that of his son Tolentino Sampang who said
lie woke up because of Japanese soldier gave him a kick (p. 99, t. s. n.), for
the words or act of his father might not have been sufficient to wake him
up.

The first question of law to be determined in this appeal refers to the
admissibility of Exhibit A for the prosecution as corroborative evidence of the
overt act alleged in count No. 4. Said exhibit is a confession or rather an
admission in writing signed by appellant that “he went with the Japanese when
they retreated from Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija as a soldier of the Japanese Army.”
The lower court admitted it as a corroborative evidence of the testimonies of
Domingo and Tolentino which established the overt act charged in the fourth
count, and we agree with the defense that the trial court erred in this regard.
An extrajudicial confession or admission made by a defendant of having committed
an overt act charged is a proof of the said act or fact, and as such it must be
proved by two witnesses to be admissible as evidence by way of corroboration
only. Although proved by two witnesses is not sufficient to support a
conviction, because according to law a confession in order to sustain a
conviction must be a judicial confession or made in open court. As there was
only one witness, Simeon Samin, who testified to the making of the admission, it
is not admissible even as a corroborative evidence of an overt act, but it may
be admitted to corroborate the proof of appellant’s adherence to the enemy,
implied in the overt acts committed by him, and we consider it as such.
(Respublica vs. Roberts, 1 [U. S.], Law. ed., 39; 3 Wharton Criminal
Evidence, 2d ed., section 1396.) The testimonies of Domingo and Tolentino are
sufficient to prove the overt act of having the appellant joined the Makapili
organization charged in the first and fourth counts, and therefore the error of
the lower court is not a reversible one.

There is no doubt that, under the law, the overt acts alleged in the second
count and borne out by the testimony of two witnesses, constitute adherence to
the enemies giving them aid and comfort. Because the appellant in furtherance of
the hostile design of our enemies aided them to look for and liquidate the
guerrillas, to the extent of torturing and detaining civilians, among them one
Manuel Villar, who never returned to his home and whose whereabouts until the
date of the trial, was still unknown. Of course this overt act is independent
from that charged in counts one and four, for it could have been committed
without committing the latter.

The facts alleged in the fourth count and established by the evidence or
testimony of two witnesses, constitute only a part of the act charged in the
first count against the appellant, of having joined and acted as a member of the
military organization called Makapili, since the appellant, as one of the
members of said organization, had to retreat with the Japanese soldiers and
other Makapilis to the mountains. Said organization was created, according to
Exhibit D, to “accomplish the fulfillment of the obligation assumed by the
Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan, to shed blood and
sacrifice the lives of our People in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in
East Asia, to establish unreservedly and uninterestedly with the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines, and to fight the common enemies;” and
therefore, unless the appellant was forced to join or joined the Makapili
organization against his will, of which there is no evidence in the record, by
joining and acting as a member thereof he adhered to and gave the enemy aid and
comfort, regardless of whether the motive prompting him to do so was merely
sympathy or pecuniary gain. As rightly stated by Lord Reading in the Casement
trial “an act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemies of the King
in the conduct-of war against the King, that is, in law giving of aid and
comfort,” and “an act which weakens or tends to weaken the power of the King and
the country to resist or to attack * * * is * * * giving aid and comfort.” It is
not essential that the effort to aid be successful, provided overt acts are done
which if successful would advance the interest of the enemy. (See Cramer
vs. United States, 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)

In view of all the foregoing the judgment appealed is affirmed with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I reserve my vote. The decision in the Laurel
case is not as yet final.