G.R. No. L-41808. March 18, 1979
ENGRACIA B. AMBERTI AND MINOR MARIA TERESA AMBERTI, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), ROMEO D. ZAMORA AND ESTELA LLENADO ZAMORA…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court upholds respondent appellate court’s decision setting
aside the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to allow
respondents-defendants to adduce their evidence and reiterates once more that
hasty disposal of cases to the extent of denying an urgent and justified motion
for cancellation of a scheduled hearing date and for the early resetting
thereof (based on defendants’ counsel’s physical disability to attend the
hearing duly certified under oath by his physician and on both counsels’
agreement) are not a panacea nor solution to the congestion of court
dockets. Judicial discretion must be
exercised wisely and not capriciously and it is sound judicial discretion to
allow a reasonable transfer of hearing when no substantial rights are affected
and the intention to delay is not manifest.
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed on August 17, 1970 with the court
of first instance of Rizal at Makati[1]
their complaint against private respondents, the spouses Romeo D. Zamora and
Estela Llenado Zamora, for recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees from said respondents for alleged criminal and libelous
intrigue and conspiracy to take over the marble business and hasten the death
on June 11, 1970 of the late Piero Amberti, husband and father of petitioners
Engracia and Maria Teresa, respectively.
Respondents as defendants filed their answer on August 31, 1970
traversing the allegations of the complaint as “absolutely false and
malicious” and averring that respondent as Piero’s physician “was
mainly responsible for prolonging [his] life and bringing him along the road to
recovery by correct diagnosis and treatment of his lung cancer” and that
respondent Estela L. Zamora’s alleged libelous letters (which allegedly enraged
Piero when the opened and read them and caused his collapse into
unconsciousness and death) were private, and privileged communications
addressed to her husband and intended for him only. Respondents spouses, as a well-known thoracic
surgeon, and doctor of science in chemistry and dean of the Graduate School of
the University of Santo Tomas, respectively, filed a counterclaim for
respondent Dr. Zamora’s medical fees in the total amount of P86,400.00 and for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees which was answered and
traversed in due course by petitioners.
Pre-trial proceedings were held and thereafter the case was set
for trial on the merits which commenced on June 14, 1971 with petitioner Maria
Teresa and her “yaya” Yolanda Salgan testifying as witnesses for
petitioners-plaintiffs. Hearings
continued on July 26 and July 28, 1971 with petitioner Engracia testifying on
direct examination and on August 17, 1971 respondents’ counsel, Atty. Ricardo
J. Francisco, commenced his cross-examination, which he continued on September
14, 1971 until he was “exhausted” and asked for continuance and the
trial court reset the continuation thereof on September 23, 1971, as previously
scheduled, remarking that there were many other cases set for that day anyway
with a witness from Hongkong scheduled to testify on the same day. There were also a number of scheduled hearing
dates in June, July and August, 1971 that were cancelled for apparently valid
reasons either at respondents’ counsel’s instance without objection of
petitioners’ counsel or by agreement of both parties’ counsels.
On September 22, 1971 or one day before the scheduled date, Atty.
Francisco filed an urgent motion for postponement and resetting of the hearings
to October 7 and 14, 1971 on the ground that he was “presently suffering
from hypertension accompanied with dizzy spells and has been advised by his
physician to rest for at least two (2) weeks” and stating that he had
communicated with petitioners’ counsel who had “sportingly agreed” to
the postponement and the resettings. The
trial court nevertheless denied the postponement, directed petitioners to
proceed with the presentation and termination of their evidence ex parte
and rendered its decision and judgment dated October 6, 1971, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the latter, jointly and severally,
to pay the former the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12, 000. 00) for death
indemnity, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for compensatory damages
and lost earnings, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000,00) for moral damages,
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000,00) for
attorney’s fees. With costs.
“Defendants’ counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.”
On appeal, reconsideration having been denied by the trial court,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision of August 21, 1975, wherein
it set aside the appealed decision and remanded the case to the trial court
“with instructions to allow the defendants [respondents herein] to adduce
their evidence,” as follows:
“According to the transcript, on September 23, 1971 the
following proceedings took place:
‘ATTY. DE LOS REYES:
For the plaintiffs, your
Honor please.
‘ATTY. GONZALEZ:
There is an urgent
motion for postponement your Honor please.
‘ATTY. DE LOS REYES:
I would like to make a
record that this is the fourth postponement it the continuation of the cross
examination of my client Mrs. Amberti.
While he truthfully called me up asking me for postponement on the
ground that he has hypertension and sick of kidney trouble, I would like to
request, your Honor, in order to meet any technicality he may later on make,
that the two dates being asked be intransferrable in character and the
cross-examination of the witness be considered terminated.
‘COURT:
Call the defendants.
‘ATTY. GONZALEZ:
Dr. Romeo D. Mendoza,
Mrs. Estela Mendoza. (nobody answered
the call) [sic] They are not around, your Honor.
‘COURT:
At what stage are we
now?
‘ATTY. DE LOS REYES:
My witness, Mrs.
Amberti, is still in cross, your Honor.
‘COURT:
Are you ready to rest
your evidence?
“ATTY. DE LOS REYES:
I still have another
witness, your Honor, please,
‘COURT:
All right, considering that
this is the fourth postponement filed by counsel for the defendant always at
eleventh hour and taking into account that there is no medical certificate
attached to the motion for postponement, the same is hereby denied. Ready with your evidence?
‘ATTY. DE LOS REYES:
Yes, your Honor. May we make of record that the defendants
have been represented by the three (3) counsels Atty. Francisco, Atty. Acuña
and Ex-Judge Francisco Geronimo who were supposed to represent them also in the
other case and have not appeared in today’s hearing.’ (t.s. n., pp. 2-5, Sept.
23, 1971)
“It is thus seen that the counsel for the plaintiffs did not
oppose the urgent motion for postponement.
In fact, he asked that ‘in order to meet any technicality he may later
on make, that the two dates being asked be intransferrable in character x x x.’
“It was shown later by a medical certificate attached to the
motion for reconsideration that the counsel for defendants, Atty. Ricardo
J. Francisco, was suffering from
hypertension and he could not have appeared in court on September 23, 1971 without
endangering his health. The motion for
postponement, therefore, was not for the purpose of delay. The effect of the denial of the motion for
postponement was to deprive the defendants of their day in court inasmuch as
they were not able to adduce their evidence.
“Considering all the circumstances of the case and the fact
that large sums of money are involved, it is in the interest of substantial
justice that the decision be set aside and that the defendants be allowed to
adduce their evidence. However, the
evidence of the plaintiffs already on record shall remain without the necessity
of recalling the witnesses for purposes of cross-examination by
defendants.”
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
respondent appellate court per its Resolution of October 15, 1975, petitioners
filed on November 4, 1975 the petition at bar.
The Court per its Resolution of January 19, 1976, after receiving the
parties’ pleadings, granted due course and resolved to treat the petition as a
special civil action and to require concise memoranda strictly confined to the
issues from the parties.
The Court finds no error nor grave abuse of discretion in respondent
court’s decision setting aside the trial court’s decision and remanding the
case for the reception of respondents’ evidence in supports of their defenses
to the action and their counterclaim.
1. Although left unsaid by respondent court, the crucial issue
that it resolved was that raised by respondents in their first assignment of
error, to wit, that they had been denied of their day in court with the trial
court’s denial of their counsel’s urgent motion for postponement or
cancellation of the September 23, 1971 hearing and its resetting for October 7
and 14, 1971 as agreed upon with petitioners’ counsel. This hinges on whether the trial judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying the postponement and reconsideration
notwithstanding its having called counsel’s physician who testified to
counsel’s physical disability to appear at the scheduled hearing. The facts of record so indicate, as may be
seen from the following:
(a) The undisputed transcript of the proceedings on September 23,
1971 as reproduced in respondent court’s decision (and also in petitioners’
opposition[2]
to respondents’ motion for reconsideration dated October 7, 1971 of the trial
court’s Order of September 23, 1971 denying respondents’ urgent motion for postponement
of the scheduled hearing on said date which order was received by Atty.
Francisco on October 6, 1971) shows quite clearly, contrary to the pretensions
of petitioners’ counsel now, that he made no objection to the postponement but
confirmed to the trial court that he had in effect acceded to the postponement
requested by Atty. Francisco “on the ground that he has hypertension and
(is) sick of kidney trouble” and agreed with him on the resetting thereof
to October 7 and 14, 1971 and expressly requested of the trial court “that
the two dates being asked be intransferrable in character and the
cross-examination of the witness be considered terminated;”
(b) The same transcript records no objection on petitioners’
counsel’s part nor mention thereof by the trial court in denying the
postponement, but its formal Order of denial served of September 23,
1971 as served on Atty. Francisco on October 6, 1971 recites that the court
“(took) into account the vehement objections made by counsel for the
plaintiffs in open hearing this morning” which not even petitioner’s’
counsel now claims to have made occassion.
What appears quite clearly is
that it was after such denial by the trial court of the postponement of
the September 23, 1971 hearing and its rendition of the October 6, 1971
decision against respondents that petitioners’ counsel then
“vehemently” opposed respondents’ motions for reconsideration of the
denial order and of the decision itself in an obvious effort to uphold the
decision which abruptly cut off respondents’ right to present their evidence;
(c) The trial judge’s actions were erratic in this regard. When Atty. Francisco attached to his motion
for reconsideration of the denial order the supporting medical certificate, of
his physician, Dr. Benjamin M. Limson, the trial judge required Dr. Limson to
appear before him, thus making it understood that Dr. Limson’s testimony as to
physical condition of Atty. Francisco was vital to his action on the pending
motion for reconsideration. Dr. Limson
did appear on October 22, 1971 before the trial judge who examined him under
oath and he affirmed under oath that Atty. Francisco was in his clinic on
September 21, 1971 because of dizzy spells and with very high blood pressure
(160/105). Despite his having received
the doctor’s undisputed assurance under oath that Atty. Francisco was really
physically unable to appear at the September 23, 1971 hearing, the trial judge
nevertheless by order of November 13, 1971 denied reconsideration of the denial
order “for lack of merit, it appearing that a decision had already been
rendered in this case on October 6, 1971;” and
(d) The trial court’s adverse decision dated October 6, 1971 was
served on Atty. Francisco on November 2, 1971 and he filed on November 26, 1971
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision and for New Trial. The motion for reconsideration assailed point
by point the conclusions of fact as “baseless and unfounded”, arguing
inter alia that there was no competent evidence to justify the trial
court’s conclusion that Piero Amberti died of heart disease by reason of
“extreme anger” and that the alleged libelous letters were written by
respondent Estela L. Zamora to her husband and that Piero had no right to open
and read them and further submitted an affidavit of merits that respondents
“have a good and meritorious defense consisting of oral and documentary
evidence showing that they are not responsible for the death of plaintiff Piero
Amberti, and that the letter alluded to in the complaint is not libelous and
otherwise is not actionable, as averred in defendants’ answer to the
complaint. “
The trial judge issued under date of January 12, 1972 his Order
denying reconsideration (copy whereof was received by Atty. Francisco on
January 18, 1972) on the ground “that the reasons alleged in said motion
are a mere reiteration of the grounds averred in defendants’ Motion or
Reconsideration dated October 7, 1971, and, it appearing that no new matters
have been raised therein other than those which have already been taken up and
considered by the court in its order of November 13, 1971.” This was patent error on the trial judge’s
part, because the grounds in respondents’ first motion of October 7, 1971 dealt
exclusively with asking for reconsideration of the court’s order of September
23, 1971 denying postponement of the hearing scheduled on said date and
submitted the medical certificate supporting his physical inability to attend
the scheduled hearing. On the other
hand, the grounds in respondents’ second motion of November 26, 1971 dealt
mainly with seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s decision of
October 6, 1971 and presented completely different grounds to obtain the
reconsideration of the decision, viz, that it had no factual basis
and/or was contrary to law, while praying for a new trial and opportunity to
cross-examine petitioners’ witnesses and present respondents’ evidence and for
a new decision dismissing the complaint.
Contrary to the statement in the January 12, 1672 Order, these were
entirely new matters which had not been taken up in the November 13, 1971 Order
which had peremptorily denied reconsideration of the September 23, 1971 Order
denying postponement of the September 23, 1971 hearing on the bare ground
“that a decision rendered had already been rendered in this case on
October 6, 1971”.
2. The above facts fully support respondent court’s conclusions
that opposing counsels had agreed on transferring the scheduled September 23,
1971 hearing to two early dates in the following month which petitioners’
counsel requested that the trial court set with an “intransferrable
character”, that the motion for postponement was not dilatory but due to
Atty. Francisco’s serious ailment and that the trial court therefore wrongfully
deprived respondents of their day in court in denying the postponement and
instead terminating the case.
Petitioners’ counsel is as much to blame, for had he but maintained his
“sporting” posture in agreeing to the postponement and asked that the
next two hearing dates be intransferrable in character, respondents would have
had to adduce their evidence on said dates and if they failed or asked for
further postponement, then they would no longer be able to complain of not
being afforded their day in court – and in any case, this case would have been
adjudicated much earlier. After all, the
case was but a year old and the hearings had progressed quite satisfactorily
and at a pace beyond the average case.
After respondent court per its decision of August 21, 1975
Ordered the setting aside of the lower court’s decision and the remand of the
case for the reception of respondents’ evidence, petitioners still insisted on
coming to this Court and delaying the remand and presentation of evidence in
the lower court with averments that respondents had no valid defense and
”resorted to dilatory postponements” and that respondent court had
”ignored the facts, law and jurisprudence …. to favor the private
respondents for no cogent, legal reasons” and ”disregarded and skipped
decisive issue of decisive importance, like the issue of finality of the
judgment appealed from which would render unnecessary resolution of all other
issues,”[3]
which after the Court’s scrutiny have been found to be without basis.
3. The Court has consistently maintained that although a speedy
determination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief
objective of a trial. Careful and
deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect
for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process
and an adherence to the Court’s standing admonition that the discretion granted
judges in the granting or denial of motions for postponement and the setting
aside of denial orders previously issued “should always be predicated on
the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the
parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby”[4]
are more important than a race to end the trial.
The Court thus stressed in Macasa vs. Herrera[5]
that “(I)nconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not
constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets; while
they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they
merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of a clear lack of merit or
intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on
the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.” As
reiterated in Cucio[6]
“it is sound judicial discretion to allow a reasonable transfer of
hearing ‘when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is
not manifest'” in line with the established rule that “the
discretion of trial courts (and of all courts for that matter) ‘must be
exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial
justice.
4. Petitioners’ claim that the lower court’s judgment had already
become final – which was not passed upon by respondent court – is manifestly
untenable. The Record on Appeal shows
that: Respondents through counsel received a copy of the decision dated
October 6, 1971 on November 2, 1971.
They filed their motion for reconsideration and new trial on the
24th day, i. e. November 26, 1971. The lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration and new trial in its order dated January 12, 1972, a copy
whereof was received by respondents on January 18, 1972. Upon receipt of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration and new trial on January 18, 1972, they
perfected their appeal on the same date January 18, 1972, when there
were yet six (6) days remaining of the reglementary 30-day period to appeal.
Petitioners’ premise for its claim that respondents motion for
reconsideration and new trial was a pro forma motion which did not toll
the period for appeal is just as manifestly untenable as shown hereinabove.[7]
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
petition. As directed in respondent
court’s decision, the case shall be forthwith remanded to the trial court for
the reception of respondents’ evidence in the case below and for continuation
of the trial therein as provided in the Rules of Court.[8]
No costs.
Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
* Composed of
Ramon C. Fernandez, ponente, Efren I. Plana and Venicio Escolin,
JJ.
[1]
Then presided by Judge V. M. Ruiz as trial judge; now retired.
[2]
Annex DD, Rec. on Appeal, pp. 133-141.
[3]
Petition, pp. 25-26.
[4]
Cucio vs. Court of Appeals, 57 SCRA 64, 68 (1974) citing Limon vs.
Candido, 27 SCRA 1166 (1969) and Piedad vs. Batuyong, 55 SCRA 763
(1974). See also Gapoy vs. Adil,
81 SCRA 739 (Feb. 28, 1978).
[5]
101 Phil. 44 (1957), per Reyes, J.B.L., J.
[6]
See footnote 4.
[7] Supra,
Paragraph 1, sub-par. (d) hereof.
[8]
Rule 30, section 1.