ROSAURO M. TANINGCO AND SIMPLICIA RAMOS, PETITIONERS, VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.

On August 10, 1958 the spouses Rosauro M. Taningco and Simplicia
Ramos took a mortgage, for a loan of P9,000 extended by them to Nieves
Mediarito, on all the “rights, interests, and participation” of the
latter in six parcels of land registered in the land records of Laguna
as conjugal properties of herself and her husband Salvador Roxas, then
already deceased. The properties were under judicial administration in
the corresponding intestate proceeding and had not yet been liquidated
and partitioned between the widow and the heirs. The deed of mortgage
was duly signed by the mortgagor and otherwise appears to have been
executed with the requisite formalities. When presented to the Register
of Deeds for Laguna, however, it was denied registration on two
grounds, of which only the first is now in issue, namely, that
“mortgagor Nieves Mediarito, the surviving spouse of Salvador Roxas,
alienated her one-half (1/2) conjugal share without previous
liquidation of the conjugal properties.” The matter was elevated en consulta
by the mortgagees to the Land Registration Commissioner, who sustained
the action taken by the Register of Deeds by resolution dated November
22, 1958. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, and
petitioners have come to this Court on appeal from both the resolution
and the order of denial.

The Land Registration Commissioner does not question the legality or
validity of the mortgage, but excepts to its registrability because the
mortgagor “does not appear yet to be the registered owner of the
property being mortgaged.” The suggestion is that there must first be a
settlement and distribution of the conjugal estate because before then
the interest of the wife therein is merely inchoate. The premise of the
reasoning is inaccurate. The interest of the wife is registered, the
titles to the lands being in the names of the spouses. After the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, as by death of the husband,
this interest ceases to be inchoate and becomes actual and vested with
respect to an undivided one-half share of the said properties. It is
one thing to say that the widow’s share, being undivided, does not
consist of determinate and segregated properties and an entirely
different thing to consider her interest as still inchoate. The
partnership having been dissolved, if the deceased husband leaves heirs
other than the wife, as in this case, the properties come under the
regime of co-ownership among them until final liquidation and
partition. In the language of Chief by the death of one of the spouses,
ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the property of a
community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower
or the widow if he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse.” Article
484, Civil Code. And as provided in article 493 of the same Code, each
co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, although the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. The application of this article, which
was taken from article 399 of the old Civil Code, has been elucidated
in the case of Maria Lopez vs. Magdalena Gonzaga Vda. de Cuaycong, et al., 74 Phil. 601. Citing Manresa, Volume 3, pp. 486-487, 3rd. ed., this Court said:

“‘Each co-owner owns the whole, and over it he exercises rights of
dominion, but at the same time he is the owner of a share which is
really abstract, because until the division is effected, such share is
not concretely determined. The rights of the co-owners are, therefore,
as absolute as dominion requires, because they may enjoy and dispose of
the common property, without any limitation other than that they should
not, in the exercise of their right, prejudice the general interest of
the community, and possess, in addition, the full ownership of
their share, which they may alienate, convey or mortgage: which share,
we repeat, will not be certain until the community ceases. The
right of ownership, therefore, as defined in Art. 348 of the present
Civil Code, with its absolute features and its individualized
character, is exercised in co-ownership, with no other differences
between sole and common ownership than that which is rightly
established by the Portuguese Code (Arts. 2175 and 2176), when it says
‘that the sole owner exercises his rights exclusively, and the co-owner
exercises them jointly with the other co-owners’; but we shall add, too each co-owner pertains individually, over his undivided share, all the rights of the owner, aside from the use and enjoyment of the thing, which is common to all the co-owners.’ (Italics supplied.)”

In the case at bar the mortgage sought to be registered by
appellants does not refer to any specific portions of the six parcels
of land described in the mortgage instrument but to the
mortgagor-wife’s rights, interest and participation therein—whatever
they may actually turn out to be upon liquidation and partition. If
such mortgage is legal and valid, as the law says it is, there can be
no justifiable reason why it should not be registered, registration
being an essential requirement in order that the mortgage may be
validly constituted. Article 2125, Civil Code. The registration will in
no way affect the rights of the deceased husband’s creditors, if any,
or of his heirs, for their interest is limited to the husband’s half of
the estate not covered by the mortgage. As far as the debts, if any, of
the conjugal partnership are concerned, their payment is provided for
by law before the one-half share of the wife-mortgagor is finally
determined, and therefore would not be affected by the mortgage.
Articles 182 and 185.

A roughly analogous case is Gotuaco & Co. vs. Register
of Deeds of Tayabas, 59 Phil. 756, where a levy of execution was sought
to be inscribed in the registry against the share of a judgment debtor
in several tracts of land registered in the name of a deceased of whom
he was one of the heirs. The inscription was denied by the register of
deeds; the question was elevated en consullta to the Fourth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and then appealed therefrom to
the Supreme Court. In ordering the acceptance of the levy of execution
for inscription in the Registry, this Court said that “although the
value of the participation of the (judgment debtor) in the estate of
the (decedent) was indeterminable before the final liquidation of the
estate, nevertheless, the right of participation in the estate and the
lands thereof may be attached and sold, the real test being, as laid
down in Reyes vs. Grey, 21 Phil. 73, 76, whether or not the
judgment debtor holds such a beneficial interest in the property that
he can sell or otherwise dispose of for value.”

Wherefore, the resolution and the order appealed from are set aside
and respondent-appellee Register of Deeds of Laguna is ordered to
register the document in question upon compliance with the legal
requisites concerning the payment of taxes and registration fees. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion. Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ. concur.