CESAR DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PASTOR L. DE GUZMAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction,
seeking to annul the order and decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Third Regional. District, San Fernando, Pampanga, in CAR
Cases Nos. 865-P and 913-P.

It appears that the two cases above referred to are interrelated
because they concern the same parties and involve the same piece of
land. In CAR Case No. 865-P, Jose Miranda was petitioner and Cesar de
Guzman the respondent; In CAR Case No. 913—P, Cesar de Guzman was
petitioner and Jose Miranda was the respondent.

When the two cases were called for joint hearing on April 6, 1961,
there was appearance only for Miranda, and upon verbal motion of his
counsel, the Court of Agrarian Relations, on even date, issued an order
dismissing Case 913-P for lack of interest on the part of petitioner
therein to prosecute the same, and allowing petitioner Miranda in Case
865-P to present his evidence, ex parte.

In his testimony, Miranda declared that de Guzman has been his
tenant over a parcel of agricultural rice land situated in the barrio
of Balete, Arayat, Pampanga, pursuant to a contract of lease entered
into between them, whereby de Guzman would occupy 29,000 square meters
of the land and to pay as rental thereof 42-1/2 cavans of palay a year;
that in 1959 de Guzman did not fully pay his obligation because there
was an unpaid balance of 13 1/2 cavans; that Miranda tried to collect
said balance but de Guzman neglected and refused to pay; and that his
petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations was to enforce the
provision of section 50, sub-section (c) of Republic Act 1199.

After hearing, the Agrarian Court, on the same date, April 6, 1961,
rendered a decision giving Miranda the authority to eject de Guzman
from the landholding in question and to appoint another tenant to work
the land. On April 21, 1961, counsel for de Guzman moved for
reconsideration of this decision and also the order of the court, both
dated April 6, 1961. On May 20, 1961, the motion was denied. Hence, the
present petition alleging abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge in issuing the said order and decision.

As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court on August 5, 1961, restraining respondents from enforcing the
order and decision complained of.

On August 14, 1961, counsel for Miranda filed a motion for
reconsideration of the last mentioned order of August 5, 1961,
requesting for the recall of the writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that the orders supposed to be restrained had been executed.
This motion for reconsideration was denied.

Meanwhile, on August 21, 1961, de Guzman filed here, before the
Supreme Court, a petition for contempt against Jose Miranda, alleging
that on the 16th of that same month, the latter willfully and
intentionally disobeyed the resolution of this Court dated August 5,
1961, restraining the execution of the order and decision complained
of, by forcibly taking possession of his landholding.

In his answer to the petition for contempt, Miranda denied having
disobeyed the aforesaid order, the truth of the matter, as alleged by
him, being that as early as August 2, 1961, the writ of execution in
CAR Case 865-P had been implemented and that de Guzman was taken out of
possession from the landholding in question. Since the execution of the
judgment in said agrarian case, there has been no order revoking or
nullifying the writ of execution.

Action on the contempt case has been deferred by resolution of this
Court dated September 18, 1961, until this case is considered on the
merits.

We have gathered from the record the following uncontroverted facts:
that the April 6, 1961 hearing in question was not an initial hearing
but a continuation of a series of scheduled hearings on the agrarian
cases above-mentioned; that counsel for de Guzman received notice or
summons for said hearing on April 6, 1961 only in the afternoon of the
previous day, therefore, it was impossible for him to notify his client
de Guzman because the latter resides in a remote barrio of Arayat,
Pampanga; and that said counsel had another trial in San Pablo City
also on April 6, 1961.

The dismissal of Case 913-P for lack of interest on the part of
petitioner de Guzman, and declaring him in default in Case 865-P,
clearly deprived him of his day in court thru no fault or negligence on
his part. This Court is not unmindful of the fact that the matter of
adjournments and postponements of trials is within the sound discretion
of the court. But there is, however, a fundamental principle at stake
in this case. It is the belief that a man who has filed a case in court
should be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial and to
obtain due process of law and proper protection under the law. (Cing
Hong So vs. Tan Boon Kong, et al., 53 Phil., 437.)

We have already held in several cases that “when a party, without
malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not really prepared for
trial, the court would be abusing its discretion if a reasonable
opportunity is denied him for preparing therefor and for obtaining due
process of law.” (Cing Hong So vs. Tan Boon Kong, et al,, supra, citing Lino Luna vs. Arcenas, 34 Phil., 80; Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al. [107 Phil., 512; 55 Off. Gaz (52) 6372.]

It has been proven that the petitioner de Guzman’s counsel received the notice of hearing at 3 p.m. of the day preceding
the day of hearing. And as already stated, a motion for postponement to
be filed by the counsel for petitioner would not reach the court a quo
nor the adverse party in time. It is only proper to give said
petitioner a day in court to present his defense, for the case involves
no less than his means of livelihood.

Furthermore, in the complaint which he filed (Case 913-P), de Guzman
maintained that the amount of 42 1/2 cavans which he was paying to
respondent Miranda was in excess of the amount fixed in paragraph (a)
of Section 46 of Republic Act No. 1199, known as the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, as the land in question is only a second class
agricultural land. The plaintiff should then be given an opportunity to
present evidence to show that the land in question is, in fact, a
second class agricultural land.

It should be noted that when these cases were first called for
hearing on March 16, 1961, Miranda did not appear, and they were
postponed to March 28,1961, and later again set for hearing on April 6,
1961. It is difficult to see why de Guzman should be presumed to lack
interest in his case against Miranda by his mere failure to appear in
court on April 6, 1961.

Coming now to the question of contempt, it seems that the petitioner
has not put up a convincing case, because from an examination of the
record, the orders of the lower court dated April 6, 1961 had really
been executed before respondents received the writ of preliminary
injunction restraining them from said execution. At any rate, we are
now making the said writ permanent and the result would be to disallow
Miranda from possession of the premises.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. The
order and decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations complained of are
hereby annulled and this case is remanded to said court for further
proceedings. Costs against respondents.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.