JUAN YSASI, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (BACOLOD CITY, BRANCH V), ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Ysasi versus Fernandez

The Case

This is the case of Ysasi versus Fernandez, a sequel to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court. Juan Ysasi, the petitioner, had won a judgment from this Court directing the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, sitting in Bacolod City, to issue a preliminary mandatory injunction placing Ysasi in possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A and its properties. Instead of obeying, the private respondents refused to turn over the hacienda, and the respondent judge dissolved the very injunction this Court had ordered him to issue, upon the mere filing of a counterbond. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must know: that a husband's statutory right to administer conjugal property cannot be taken from him by a bond, and that a continuing mandate of the Supreme Court may be enforced, and disobedience to it punished, in the very same proceeding in which it was issued.

Procedural History

The case began as a petition for certiorari filed by Juan Ysasi before the Supreme Court against the orders of the respondent judge in the civil case below. In June 1968 this Court granted the petition, struck down the challenged orders as null and void, and directed the respondent judge to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction compelling the private respondents to turn over the hacienda and its properties to the petitioner upon approval of a bond. The private respondents moved for modification of that judgment; the motion was denied, and the judgment became final in July 1968. The petitioner then filed his bond, and the respondent judge approved it and issued the order of August 1968. The private respondents refused to comply, moved to dissolve the injunction, and the respondent judge dissolved it upon a counterbond. The petitioner returned to the Supreme Court, not by a new petition but by urgent motions in the same case, asking the Court to set aside the dissolution and to cite the respondents for contempt. The Court ordered the respondents to show cause, temporarily restrained the respondent judge from enforcing the dissolution, heard the parties, and resolved the matter in the same proceedings.

Facts

In June 1968 the Supreme Court rendered judgment sustaining the petitioner's right to administer the conjugal properties, particularly Hacienda Manucao-A, in the absence of evidence of maladministration. The judgment directed the respondent judge to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi and Jon Ysasi to turn over to the petitioner the possession and control of the hacienda, its machinery, implements, work animals, records, papers, documents, and books of accounts, upon the petitioner's filing of a bond of 50,000 pesos. The private respondents sought modification, failed, and the judgment became final in July 1968.

The petitioner filed the required bond, and in early August 1968 the respondent judge approved it and ordered the turnover. The order was served on Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who refused to comply, saying that her son Jon Ysasi was not present. Before the order could be enforced, the private respondents moved to dissolve the injunction, invoking the same grounds they had earlier raised before the Supreme Court, and offering a counterbond. Over the petitioner's objection that the lower court had no power to dissolve an injunction commanded by this Court, the respondent judge lifted the injunction upon a counterbond of 60,000 pesos.

The petitioner came to this Court by urgent motion. The Court restrained the respondent judge from enforcing the dissolution, yet the private respondents still refused to turn over the hacienda, even after the sheriff served the injunction and the restraining order upon them. At the hearing, their own counsel admitted having told Jon Ysasi that the properties should really be delivered to the petitioner. The transcript of the hearing below also showed the respondent judge suggesting the counterbond himself and remarking that the case was before him, not before the Supreme Court, and that the parties should forget about the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner's urgent motions in the same case are the proper vehicle to enforce the Supreme Court's mandate and to punish disobedience to it.
• Whether or not the respondent judge had authority to dissolve, upon mere counterbond, the preliminary mandatory injunction which this Court had directed him to issue.
• Whether or not the private respondents are guilty of contempt for refusing to turn over the hacienda and its properties.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of contempt for his conduct and remarks in the proceedings below.

Applicable Provisions

Article 165 of the Civil Code provides:

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.

This is the substantive right of the petitioner which the injunction was meant to protect, and which the dissolution set aside.

Article 167 of the Civil Code provides:

In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on application of the wife, may adopt such measures as may be necessary to protect the conjugal property.

This shows that deprivation of the husband's administration requires proof of abuse, not the mere filing of a bond.

Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

If granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause great damage to the defendant while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.

This was the provision invoked by the private respondents, and the Court measured the dissolution against it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner's urgent motions were properly brought in the same case. The decree directing the respondent judge to issue the injunction is a continuing mandate, and any violation, disobedience, or obstruction may be dealt with by this Court in the same proceeding in which it was issued. The respondent judge's compliance did not terminate the Court's control over its order, and the dissolution was not a new and separate matter, because its impact was to destroy the effectiveness of the Court's directive. A fresh suit would only offend the principle that multiplicity of suits is odious in law.

On the second issue, the Court held that the dissolution was a grave abuse of discretion. The grounds invoked were the very same reasons earlier raised and rejected in the original petition, and no new facts had surfaced. The husband's right to administer is conferred by substantive law, and it cannot be taken away by his wife upon mere filing of a bond. The Court put the rule sharply: bond is no substitute for proof of maladministration. The Court recalled the teaching that if every Court of First Instance could overrule the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation and judicial chaos would result.

On the third issue, the Court cited the private respondents for contempt on both counts. Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi had custody and control of the properties and could have complied; Jon Ysasi was informed of the order, as shown by his own motion to dissolve filed two days after its issuance. It is no reason for refusing obedience that no service is made on a party who is otherwise informed of the injunction. Their refusal persisted even after this Court's restraining order, and their own counsel had advised delivery. Contumacious disobedience was clear.

On the fourth issue, the Court held the respondent judge accountable for contempt. His remark that the case was before him, not before the Supreme Court, and that the parties should forget about the Supreme Court, spoken at a public hearing, tended to produce the dispiriting thought that a judge of first instance may take the Supreme Court so lightly as to ignore its pronouncements. His apology extenuated but did not excuse the harm. The Court restated that the Supreme Court has the last word on what the law is, and that no official, no matter how high, is above the law.

Doctrine

First, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership under Article 165, and this right may be removed only upon proof of abuse of administration under Article 167. A counterbond is no substitute for that proof.

Second, a decree of the Supreme Court directing a lower court to issue an injunction is a continuing mandate. Disobedience to it may be corrected and punished in the same proceeding, and a lower court cannot dissolve the injunction upon the same facts already rejected by the Supreme Court.

Third, every court must respect the orders and decisions of appellate courts; the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of justiciable controversies, and no official is above the law.

Disposition

The petitioner prevailed: the Court set aside the respondent judge's order dissolving the injunction, directed that the mandate of June 1968 be carried out, and cited the private respondents and the respondent judge for contempt.

Remember This

Memorize the line: bond is no substitute for proof of maladministration. Examiners use this case on the husband's right of administration under the Civil Code, on the continuing mandate of the Supreme Court enforceable in the same proceeding, and on contempt by a judge who disregards a superior court's order.