G.R. No. L-28593. December 16, 1968
JUAN YSASI, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (BACOLOD CITY, BRANCH V), ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
When we decided this case last June, we thought that the explicit
mandate of this Court would readily be complied with, and that we had written finis to the question of possession pendente lite
of Hacienda Manucao–A and
other properties, between petitioner and private respondents. For, we made it clear that a husband had the
statutory right to administer conjugal properties and
that administration could only be removed from him after proof of abuse of
administration.
As it turned out, the preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
respondent judge, rooted on a specific directive by this Court, was disobeyed
by private respondents. Then, it was
dissolved by respondent judge himself upon the mere filing of a counterbond. Thus,
we have before us a sequel to that judgment brought about by charges lodged by
petitioner of: first, contumacious conduct on the part of private respondents in
disobeying a lawful judicial order; and, second, acts
attributed to respondent judge that impair the respect due this Court.
The following are the background facts:
On June 25, 1968,
this Court rendered judgment herein sustaining petitioner’s right to administer
conjugal properties, particularly
Hacienda Manucao-A, in the absence of evidence of maladministration thereof. The judgment runs thus –
“For the reasons given –
We vote to grant the petition for certiorari;
We strike down the orders of respondent
judge of December 22, 1967 and January 17, 1968 complained of, in Civil Case
8306, and declare them null and void; and
We direct respondent judge to issue a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering and compelling respondents Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi and Jon Ysasi to turn over to petitioner the possession and control
of Hacienda Manucao-A, and all the agricultural machinery,
implements, work animals, and other properties used in the operation of the
hacienda, as well as its records, papers, documents and books of accounts, upon
petitioner’s filing, and said judge’s approval, of a bond in the sum of
P50,000 to answer for any and all damages which private respondents or any of
them may suffer by reason of the issuance of said injunction.”
On July 9,
1968, private
respondents moved for the modification of the aforesaid judgment. Motion was denied. The judgment became final on July 23,
1968.
On July 26,
1968, petitioner
Juan Ysasi submitted for approval in the court below
the requisite bond, and moved for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction called for in our aforesaid judgment. Resolution on this motion was deferred
pending receipt by the court of our resolution on private respondents’ motion
for modification of judgment.
On August 5, 1968,
respondent judge approved petitioner’s bond of P50,000
and directed Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi
and Jon Ysasi to turn over to Juan Ysasi “the possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A, and all the agricultural machinery, implements,
work animals, and other properties used in the operation of the hacienda, as
well as its records, papers, documents and books of accounts.” This order
was served on August 6, 1968 upon Maria Aldecoa
de Ysasi but she “refused to turn over the
possession and control of Hacienda Manucao–A x x x
as she said, her son Jon Ysasi is not here.”
On August 7, 1968, but before the lower court’s order of August 5
could be enforced, private respondents moved to dissolve the injunction,
alleging that: (1) continuance thereof
will cause damage and irreparable injury to them; (2) the injunction will avail
Juan Ysasi of an easy means to destroy or conceal the
records constituting the evidence against him to prove abuse of administration;
and (3) the lifting of the injunction will cause no damage to Juan Ysasi. They invoked
Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Juan Ysasi opposed, challenged the lower
court’s power to dissolve the mandatory injunction directed by this Court and
presented a counter-motion to hold private respondents in contempt for refusal
to comply with the lower court’s order of August 5. To enable respondent judge to promptly rule
on the motion to dissolve, the counter-motion was thereafter withdrawn.
On the day the motion to dissolve was heard – August 10, 1968 – respondent judge
lifted the injunction upon a counterbond of P60,000.
Juan Ysasi came up to this Court on
August 21, 1968 upon an urgent motion asking us to overturn the lower court’s
order of August 10, 1968 dissolving the injunction, and to cite respondents for
contempt.
On August 26, 1968,
by resolution, we ordered respondents to reply and show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt.
On September 17, 1968,
after hearing the parties, this Court resolved to temporarily restrain respondent judge from
approving private respondents’ counterbond, or if
the same had already been approved, from enforcing
his order of August 10, 1968.
This Court’s restraining order was issued on September 20, 1968. On October
4, 1968, private
respondents moved to lift the restraining order. We denied.
On October 11, 1968, Juan Ysasi again
filed with this Court another urgent motion alleging, amongst others, that on
October 1, 1968, his lawyer demanded from private respondents, through their
counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Herman, compliance with the preliminary mandatory
injunction issued upon this Court’s order; that on October 2, 1968, the Chief
Deputy Sheriff of Bacolod served upon private respondents
copies of the lower court’s order of August 5, 1968, and this Court’s
restraining order of September 20, 1968, but that said respondents refused to
receive the same, which the sheriff thereupon left with them without an
acknowledgement receipt therefor. Petitioner reiterated his prayer that private
respondents be held in contempt.
Another hearing was had before this Court on November 7, 1968.
1. Respondents challenge the propriety of bringing the instant
matter before this Court by a mere motion.
They contend that the certiorari proceedings here started by petitioner
have terminated; because, so they claim, the lower court had issued the preliminary
mandatory injunction in implementation of this Court’s judgment. They maintain that respondent judge’s
dissolution of said injunction is a new matter distinct and separate from the
issuance thereof. They draw attention to
the fact that petitioner’s position is that respondent judge, in so dissolving,
acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. They thus submit that a motion before this
Court is not the vehicle for relief; that petitioner must avail of some other
proper remedy under the Rules of Court.
We think it quite evident that these statements do not add up to a convincing
whole. The decree of this Court
directing respondent judge to “issue a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering and compelling” private respondents “to turn
over to petitioner the possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A”
and other properties, is a continuing mandate.[1]
Any violation thereof or disobedience or obstruction thereto may be dealt with
by this Court in the same proceeding in which it was issued. Respondent judge’s compliance with it by
issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction did not automatically
terminate this Court’s control over said order.
Enforcement thereof is part and parcel of the certiorari proceedings. It is inherent upon any court to see to it
that its orders are obeyed to the full extent.[2]
The dissolution by respondent judge of the injunction this Court
ordered him to issue is not an act new, distinct or separate from the previous
proceedings had before this Court. It
cannot be gainsaid that the impact of that dissolution was to destroy the
effectiveness of our directive.
Obviously, to compel respondent judge to keep on abiding by our
judgment, the remedy must be here, in the same proceedings where the mandatory
injunctive order was directed to be issued.
Petitioner’s urgent motions before this Court, therefore, should be
sufficient to enable us to take action.
It is not contended, nor
could it be, that a fresh suit or a separate proceeding – not a motion before
this Court in this case – could better advance the cause of justice. Respondents’ protestation – that petitioner’s
urgent motions here should be thrown overboard – seems pointless when pitted
against the fundamental principle that multiplicity of suits is odious in law.
We, accordingly, rule
that petitioner’s urgent motions to compel obedience to our mandate issued in
this case and to declare respondents in contempt for refusal to abide thereby
are properly before this Court in this very same case.
2. We now come to grips with respondent judge’s alleged authority
to dissolve – upon mere counterbond – the preliminary
mandatory injunction which, by mandate of this Court, he had to issue.
Justification for such dissolution below, respondents aver, is to
be found in Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which states, inter
alia, that preliminary injunction “if
granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the
plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof,
as the case may be, would cause great damage to the defendant while the
plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the
defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will
pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction.”
In his order of dissolution, respondent judge gave as bases therefor the bare allegations in private respondents’
motion below that continuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction would
result in great damage and irreparable injury to them and that said injunction
would avail Juan Ysasi of an easy means to destroy or
conceal the records constituting the evidence against him which respondents
would utilize to prove abuse of administration. To be stressed, however, is that these
were the very same reasons earlier advanced
by respondents in their answer to Juan Ysasi’s
original petition before this Court – the petition for certiorari which
resulted in the grant of the mandatory injunction.
It is quite obvious that so long as the same facts prevail, this
Court’s directive stays. Of course,
should new facts be established such that continuance of the injunction would
impair private respondents’ rights, then the same may be dissolved.[3]
No such new facts have surfaced.
To be considered is that Juan Ysasi’s
right to administer conjugal properties is conferred upon him by substantive
law. Article 165 of the Civil Code is
explicit. It provides that “(t)he husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership.” This right cannot be taken away from him by his wife upon mere filing of a bond.[4] Because, the Civil Code, in its Article 167,
bestows the right of administration to the wife only “(i)n case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband.”[5]
It was, indeed, with the
foregoing precepts in mind that in our judgment herein, we said: “At stake here is the husband’s power of
administration and the wife’s right to be protected from abuse thereof. x x x. Absent
that proof, the wife’s right does not exist.” And we there concluded
that: “Petitioner may not be forced
to surrender his statutory right to administer the conjugal properties by the
simple expedient of merely charging him with the naked averment that he has
forfeited that right.” In short, evidence of abuse of administration is a
condition precedent to deprivation of the husband’s right of
administration. Respondent judge’s dissolution
of the injunction in question produced exactly the effect of what this Court
ruled out in the aforesaid decision: It
allowed administration by the wife upon mere filing of a bond pending
presentation of evidence on maladministration by the husband. Bond is no substitute for proof of
maladministration.
Appropriately to be recalled at this point is the teaching
sounded in Shioji vs. Harvey[6]
that: “If each and every Court of
First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would
result. Appellate jurisdiction would be
a farce if the Supreme Court did not
have the power of preventing inferior courts from meddling with decisions when
sent to them for compliance.”
There is, therefore, grave abuse of discretion which this Court
is now permitted to correct. In consequence,
respondent judge’s order of August 10,
1968, directing the dissolution of the preliminary mandatory
injunction, should be set aside.
3. Private respondents are cited for contempt of this Court on
two counts, namely: (1) for refusing to
turn over to Juan Ysasi Hacienda Manucao-A
and other properties upon being served on August 7, 1968 with the lower court’s
order of preliminary mandatory injunction of August 5, 1968; and (2) for
persisting in their refusal after service
by the deputy sheriff on October 2, 1968
of said order, together with the September 20 restraining order issued
by this Court.
Non-compliance with the
preliminary mandatory injunction is not denied. Private respondents, however, set up the
following defenses: On the first count,
Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi
allegedly could not comply because her son and co-respondent, Jon Ysasi, was not around.
On the second count, they maintain that there is no order to be complied
with. They reason out that this Court’s
restraining order is not directed to them for compliance; that this Court or
the lower court has not ordered the sheriff to serve on them on October 2, 1968
the preliminary mandatory injunction and this Court’s restraining order, or to
effect the transfer of the litigated properties. Their thinking is that since it was the lower
court – not this Court – which issued the injunction, they are insulated from
the contempt charge before us.
The preliminary mandatory injunction of August 5, 1968, it is well to remember, was issued
by the lower court upon a directive from this Court. Accordingly, violation thereof or
disobedience thereto is an affront directly against the lower court and indirectly
against this Court. For, to reiterate,
the aforesaid injunction came to be by specific command of this Court in
implementation of our holding that petitioner is entitled to
administration. Non-compliance with the
lower court’s order is no more than non-recognition of this Court’s directive.
To make matters difficult, respondent judge which issued the
injunctive order has shown indifference in enforcing the same or compelling
mother and son to abide by it. Worse,
said court aborted compliance by dissolution.
It thus behooves this Court to take action with the end in view of
insuring that our judgment of June 25,
1968 is carried out.
Maria Aldecoa
de Ysasi cannot be heard to say that she could not
comply with the injunctive order of August 5, 1968 when served for the first time on August 6,
1968 because her
son, Jon Ysasi, was not in. She had at the time custody and
control of the properties. She could
have kept faith with the court’s order had she wanted to. But, she chose to shunt it aside upon the
pretext of Jon Ysasi’s absence.
As for Jon Ysasi, the sheriff’s return
of August 7, 1968, it is
true, does not state personal service of the order upon him. However, the events which transpired
thereafter show that he was informed of the mandatory injunction to surrender
possession. Suffice it to mention that
on August 7, 1968, two days
after the order therefor was issued, he and
Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi
moved for the dissolution of the same.
It is no reason for refusing obedience to the injunction that no service
at all is made on the party, if he is otherwise informed of its issuance.[7]
Private respondents’ adamant refusal to honor and carry out the
injunctive order is brought clearer to the open when we consider that this
Court has, on September 20, 1968,
restrained the lower court from enforcing its dissolution order. Yet, up to now, respondents have not turned
over Hacienda Manucao–A and
other specified properties to Juan Ysasi. Written demand so to do upon their counsel
and personal service upon them of the injunctive order below and this Court’s
said restraining order were unavailing.
Immaterial it is that the October 2 service on them of said orders was
allegedly effected at the behest of petitioner’s
counsel. Important is that by such service,
private respondents were notified that the injunctive order was still
operative.
There is good reason to believe that their own lawyer
communicated to and advised them of the acts required to be done under the
order as well as the consequences of refusal to abide thereby. In the course of the oral arguments before
this Court on November 7, 1968, there emerged a significant fact: Before October 3, but after the sheriff had
gone to private respondents in the morning of October 2, Atty. Rodolfo J. Herman,
private respondents’ counsel, told his client, Jon Ysasi,
that the properties involved should really be delivered to petitioner in
obedience to the court order. Their duty
then was to comply. No compliance was
made. But no justifiable reason there
is. Their pattern of conduct does not
sit well with a desire to submit to the injunction. Contumacious disobedience is clear. These respondents must know that this Court
is not expected to yield to assaults of disrespect. Punishment for contempt is in order.[8]
4. We now direct attention to the contempt charge against
respondent judge.
At the hearing below on August
10, 1968 of the motion to dissolve injunction, the following
dialogue took place:
“COURT: x x x
x x x But is it not in effect that what you are asking is a reversal of the decision of the Supreme Court?
ATTY. HERMAN:
We
do not ask for a reversal, Your Honor.
COURT:
But
the effect is the same.
ATTY.
HERMAN:
We
propose to introduce evidence to prove abuse of administration. That is why we ask this Honorable Court to
set a date.
COURT:
Why
don’t you go to the Supreme Court and tell them they make a little mistake so that they will have a chance to
correct themselves?
ATTY.
HERMAN:
We
do not say there is a mistake.
COURT:
Inadvertence,
not mistake.”[9]
From a reading of the transcript, it is not hard to come to a
deduction that at that time respondent judge knew and fully realized the import
of the dissolution of the preliminary mandatory injunction. His words – “in effect x x x a reversal of the decision of the Supreme
Court” – are meaningful. His frame
of mind though was set on one thought:
that this Court committed “a little mistake” or lapsed into “inadvertence”. And, to cure such supposed mistake or
inadvertence, he motu proprio
suggested a solution – the filing of a counterbond. Which, in an afterglow, is but a flanking
movement in a deft sidestep of this Court’s clear mandate. Thus:
“ATTY.
HERMAN:
Probably
we might admit the Supreme Court was right in issuing that order requesting for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in view of the fact
that there was no hearing on the allegations of the wife. But Your Honor, we propose to present
evidence to prove and establish abuse of administration. We can prove that this Court can lift the
injunction.
COURT:
In
effect it is like a boy, a son, hitting the back of his father saying, father you made a mistake.
ATTY. HERMAN:
This
is another. If we are asking for the
lifting of the injunction we propose that we now …
COURT: (Cutting in)
To
bypass that crisis, why don’t you file a counter bond?
ATTY. HERMAN:
That
is why, in addition …
COURT:
How
much bond, counter bond you are willing to file?
ATTY. HERMAN:
P50,000.00.
COURT:
All
right, I am not very sure if the law does not require double the amount.
Mr. Hilado, what do you say?”[10]
But as respondent judge overruled counsel for petitioner on the
issue of the judge’s jurisdiction to lift the injunctive order, His Honor gave
the impression that he, not the Supreme Court, had the last word on the
matter. We continue to quote from the
transcript:
“ATTY. HILADO:
With
all due respect, we maintain that this Court has no more jurisdiction, even ten times fixed by the Supreme
Court.
COURT:
Why?
ATTY. HILADO:
Because
they are asking now that the injunction order by the Supreme Court be lifted.
COURT:
Because they made a mistake. But we are bypassing
that. He is proposing to file a
counter bond.
ATTY. HILADO:
I did not say they made a
mistake. I contend this Court has no
jurisdiction.
COURT:
But the case is back to this
Court. Since the receipt of this Court
the case comes back here. It’s newly born again.
ATTY. HILADO:
This
is a continuation of the proceedings of the Supreme Court.
COURT:
Insofar
as the approval of your bond in support of the preliminary mandatory injunction
is concerned but the counter bond is a new matter.
ATTY. HILADO:
The
very same arguments of the Compañero today were
raised by them before the Supreme Court. Atty. Herman and I were
there. They contend in their motion that if the injunction that was ordered by the Supreme Court is not lifted it would cause great damage
and irreparable injury.
COURT:
Suppose
we make this a test case. I will allow
the approval of the counter bond then go to the Supreme Court.
ATTY. HILADO:
I
would like to complete my argument.
COURT:
To my satisfaction?
ATTY. HILADO:
It
is for the satisfaction of the Supreme Court.
COURT:
The
case is before me now, not before
the Supreme Court. Forget
about the Supreme Court.”[11]
The last remark – “The case is before me now, not before the
Supreme Court. Forget about the Supreme
Court.” – was spoken in court at a
public hearing. By itself alone,
such remark certainly is not an expression
of respect for this Court. Taken in context,
it has a tendency to produce in the minds
of the listeners the dispiriting
thought that a judge of first instance may take the Supreme Court so lightly
that he may brush aside or even ignore a judicial pronouncement of the highest
tribunal. Of course, he apologized for
said remark when this Court heard this case on November 7, 1968. But
the harm is there. It intrudes deep into
the respect due this Court. Want of
intention to offend is no excuse; at best, it extenuates liability.[12]
In Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Cloribel,
L-24139, August 31, 1967,[13] this Court, in a per
curiam resolution, spoke vigorously on the importance of a judge’s obedience to lawful processes:
“3. As early as 1903, Weigall
vs. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340, 354, has reminded us that ‘maintenance
of public order and the existence of the commonwealth itself, depend upon the
enforcement of the mandates of the courts and require prompt obedience to them,
not only by private citizens, but in a special manner by the Government
officers who are particularly charged with a knowledge of the law and with the
duty of obeying it.’ Respondent is a judge of a superior court. But his official character will not insulate
him from punishment for insubordination of an order of the highest Tribunal of
the land. When he took his oath of
office as a judge, he swore that he
would ‘obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.’ Canon 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics should have
reminded him that ‘(t)he judge should be studiously
careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a
demoralizing example to others.’ As Mr. Justice Malcolm once
said: ‘It would seem hardly necessary to
add that judges should respect
the orders and decisions of an appellate court.’ A fundamental
principle in our democratic system of government is that no official, no matter
how high, is above the law. It is in
this context that we say that respondent judge is accountable for the contempt committed by him.”
It would not then be out of place to restate a truism long
accepted: “(T)he
Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has
the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts
should take their bearings.”[14]
Accordingly, respondent judge should have known that “(a) becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands realization of the position that they occupy
in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the
nation.”[15]
In the end, we say that it is not impermissible for a judge of
first instance to impress upon lawyers and the public the weight of his
authority in court. It should be evident, however, that he may not do so at the expense of
the dignity of a higher tribunal. We
prefer to think that restraint still is a trait desirable in those who dispense
justice.
Upon the view we take
of this case, we vote –
(1) To set aside the
respondent judge’s order of August 10,
1968;
(2) To direct private
respondents Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi
and Jon Ysasi to promptly comply with the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the respondent judge on August 5, 1968 and
forthwith to turn over to petitioner the “possession and control of
Hacienda Manucao-A, and all the agricultural
machinery, implements, work animals, and other properties used in the operation
of the hacienda, as well as its records, papers, documents and books of accounts”;
(3) To declare private
respondents Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi
and Jon Ysasi in contempt of this Court and,
accordingly, to sentence them to pay a fine each in the sum of P1,000; and
(4) To warn respondent
judge that further commission of any act in derogation of the dignity of this
Court will be dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
[1]
See: Dimaunahan vs. Aranas, 74
Phil. 455; 28 Am. Jur. 485.
[2]
See:
Harden vs. Peña, 87 Phil. 620, 624.
[3]
See: Canlas
vs. De Aquino, L-16815, July 24, 1961.
[4]
De la Cruz vs. Tan Torres, L-14925, April 30, 1960.
[5]
Not in any way operative here is Article 168 of the
Civil Code where the husband expressly authorizes the wife in a public
instrument to administer the conjugal properties; or Article 178(3) of the same
Code where the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least
one year, in which case the wife may ask for administration
of the conjugal properties; or in cases enumerated in Article 196 of the same
Code.
[6]
43 Phil. 333, 337.
[7]
28 Am. Jur.
504, citing cases.
[8]
Mendoza vs. Parungao,
49 Phil. 271, 275; Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 211; Leuterio
vs. Municipal Councils of Pinamalayan, 57
Phil. 1003; Director of Lands vs. Abarca, 57
Phil. 1014; Diwa Ng Pagkakaisa-PAFLU
vs. Filtex International Corp., L-23960,
February 20, 1968, 1968A Phild. 616, 618-619.
[9]
Tr., August 10, 1968, pp. 4-5, Annex G to
petitioner’s Urgent Motion; emphasis supplied.
[10]
Tr., August 10, 1968, pp. 5-7, Annex G to petitioner’s
Urgent Motion; emphasis supplied.
[11]
Tr., August 10, 1968, pp. 7-9, Annex G to petitioner’s Urgent Motion; emphasis
supplied.
[12]
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 729-730;
Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Ferrer, In re Contempt Proceedings Against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al. (Resolution), L-22979, June 26, 1967, 1967B Phild. 638, 642, citing In re
Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 316, and Paragas vs.
Cruz (Resolution), L-24438, July 30, 1965.
[13]
In re Contempt Proceedings Against Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, 1967C Phild. 575, 580.
[14]
Albert vs. Court of First Instance, L-26364, May 29,
1968, 1968B Phil.
857, 870.
[15]
People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82, cited in Albert vs. Court of First
Instance, supra.