G.R. No. L-6740. April 29, 1955
LUCIO DIMAYUGA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO J. DIMAYUGA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
of Batangas against defendant praying that the latter be ordered to deliver to
the former the possession of a parcel of land situated in barrio San Roque, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, and to pay as damages the following items: P300 a month from
November 12, 1951, should he fail to deliver the possession of the land; P99 for
the galvanized iron sheets taken by defendant; P250 for trees allegedly cut; and
P2,000 for moral damages, plus the costs of action.
On April 8, 1952, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint does not state a cause of action, to which plaintiff filed a
written opposition. The motion was denied on April 21, 1952. On May 3, defendant
filed a second motion to dismiss practically based on the same ground, and on
May 19, the motion, was denied. On May 23, defendant filed an answer. Upon
plaintiff’s motion, the court admitted the second amended complaint filed by him
in its order of July 7. On July 25, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint based on the same grounds upon which he predicated his two
previous motion to dismiss. The court again denied his third motion to dismiss
in its order of August 1, 1952.
The case was set for hearing on August 13, 1952 and on August 9, defendant
filed a motion to postpone the hearing on the ground that he, or his counsel,
needed time to prepare his “responsive pleading.” No action was taken on this
motion, and, when the date for hearing came, the court denied the motion and
ordered plaintiff to present his evidence. Neither defendant, nor his counsel,
appeared. On August 14, 1952, the court rendered judgment as prayed for in the
complaint, whereupon the defendant interposed the present appeal.
In this appeal, appellant pretends that the lower court erred: (1) in not
dismissing the complaint for want of cause of action, or for being premature;
(2) in not granting his petition for ocular inspection to better appreciate the
merits of his petition to dismiss; and (3) in not granting his petition for
postponement of the hearing of the case set for August 13, 1952.
The motion to dismiss filed by appellant is mainly predicated on the ground
that the complaint does not state a cause of action for the reason that the
period stipulated in the contract of lease on which plaintiff bases his right of
possession has not yet expired in view of a condition therein contained. This
condition recites that if at the expiration of the contract there should exist
on the land some sugar cane to be cut it shall be understood as extended until
after the cane had been cut.[1] It is
contended that there was still some standing sugar crop upon the expiration of
the ten-year period agreed upon in the contract and, hence, the same cannot be
deemed to have expired when this action was instituted. This claim is disputed
by the appellee who reasons out that the same does not appear in the
complaint.
The ground for dismissal being that the complaint does not state a cause of
action, the facts that may be considered to test its sufficiency are only those
alleged therein, and no other, and it appearing in the complaint that the
contract of lease is for a term of ten years from November 12, 1941 and that
said term had expired on November 12, 1951, without being renewed or extended,
the appellee contends that his right to possess the land has already
accrued.
The claim of appellee is well taken. When the ground for dismissal is that
the complaint states no cause of action, the rule provides that its sufficiency
can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the complaint, and no
other. “It has been said that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the petition. [Paminsan vs. Costales, 28
Phil., 487, 489; Blay vs. Batangas Transportation Co.,[*] 45 Off. Gaz., (Supp. to No. 9) 1.] * * *
If the court finds the allegations to be sufficient but doubts their veracity,
it must deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and then
proceed to try the case on the merits (Pinero vs. Enriquez, 84 Phil.,
774).” (See Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 ed., p. 170.)
Such is what the trial court did. It tested the sufficiency of the complaint by
considering its factual allegations and found them to be sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. We find no error in this respect.
It is true that the appellant has invoked in his motion to dismiss the
condition in the contract of lease to the effect that if at the expiration of
said contract there Would exist on the land sugar crop to be cut it shall be
deemed extended until after the same had been cut, and to substantiate his claim
he asked the court that an ocular inspection be made of the property so that it
may see for itself the truth of such allegation, but such claim cannot be
entertained for the reason that such condition does not appear in the complaint.
At best, this is a matter which the appellant could establish by proper evidence
when the time for trial comes, and not at this stage of the proceeding. The rule
is that, when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground above invoked, no
evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of
the allegations of the’ complaint [Asejo vs. Leonoso,[**] 44 Off. Gaz. (No, 10) 3807]. The lower
court, therefore, did not err in denying the petition for ocular inspection.
Even if we consider the petition on its merits, we doubt if appellant has
acted properly considering that, as he claims, he planted the sugar cane in the
month of October, 1951 knowing fully well that the contract of lease was to
expire on November 12, 1951. If such were allowed we would be placing in the
hands of appellant the termination of the lease. The condition regarding implied
extension must have been predicated upon the theory that the crop must be
planted in its proper season according to the custom or practice of the place
and not at the pleasure of the appellant. The planting invoked by appellant
cannot therefore be considered as the one contemplated by the parties.
Counsel also claims that the appellant is not the proper party to be sent
because the lessee is Prospero Dimayuga who is already dead and appellant is
merely the special administrator of his estate. Such allegation is not correct
for the complaint states that the appellant is the only son and heir of the
deceased and he is being sued in that capacity. He has therefore personality to
be sued as party defendant in this jurisdiction. (Baun vs. Heirs of
Baun, 54 Phil., 65).
The remaining question to be determined refers to the order of-the trial
court denying the motion of appellant to transfer the hearing of the case upon
the ground that he needed more time to present his responsive pleading. It
appears that the court set the case for trial on the merits on August 13, 1952,
and on August 9, appellant filed his motion for continuance. The court did not
act on the motion immediately, but when the date of trial came, neither the
appellant nor his counsel appeared. For this reason, the court denied the motion
and received the evidence of the appellee. This is now assigned as error on the
ground of abuse of discretion.
The matter relative to the postponement of a trial lies generally within the
discretion of the court and such discretion should not be interferred with
unless a grave abuse of discretion is shown.[2] It has been held that a party moving for
postponement should be in court on the day set for trial if the motion is not
acted upon favorably before that day. He has no right to rely on the liberality
of the court (Macondray & Co. vs. Paradies, G. R. No. 38255,
September 5, 1933), or on the generosity of the adverse party (Sunico
vs. Villapando, 14 Phil., 352). In the instant case, the trial court
denied the motion for postponement because appellant or his counsel failed to
appear and, as the court said, “he has no right to presume that his motion for
postponement could be granted.” (Order of August 13, 1952.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
[1] This condition reads: “Tambien es
condicidn de este contrato la de que si al tiempo de la expiracion de este
contrato, o sean a los diez anos exactos, todavia existen en el terreno cañas
sin cortar, este contrato se entendera prorrogado hasta despues del corte de
dichas cañas.”
[*] 80 Phil., 373.
[**] 78 Phil., 467.
[2] Lichauco vs. Lim, 6
Phil., 271; Go Changjo vs. Roldan Sy Changjo, 18 Phil., 405; Lino Luna
vs. Arcenas, 34 Phil., 80; Rivera vs. Ong Che, 37 Phil., 355;
Babillo vs. Tiongko et al., 43 Phil., 317; Philippine Guaranty Co.
vs. Belando, 53 Phil., 410; Corp. de PP., Agustinos vs. Del
Rey, 55 Phil., 163; Lirio vs. Rovira, 61 Phil., 137.