MANUELA S. FORMENTO AND RODOLFO L. FORMENTO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO HERAS, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NAME AND STYLE JD TRANSIT, GRACIANO GUARIÑO AND THE FIE…

Formento versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the spouses Manuela Formento and Rodolfo Formento against the Court of Appeals, the bus operator Antonio Heras, his driver Graciano Guariño, and the Fieldmen's Insurance Company. The spouses sued for damages after a passenger bus driven by Guariño struck the motorcycle Rodolfo was driving, with Manuela riding at the back. The case matters because it draws the line between two liabilities that spring from one negligent act: the civil liability arising from a crime, and the civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The Court tells us when the injured party may still bring a separate civil action for damages even after the driver has been convicted in a criminal case, and even without reserving that right.

Procedural History

Guariño was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with damage to property and less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence. He pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was at once sentenced to imprisonment and to indemnify the offended parties for the damage to the motorcycle. The spouses then filed a separate civil action for damages against Heras and Guariño in the same court. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the criminal judgment, and they pleaded res adjudicata, which means the matter was already adjudged. The trial court denied the dismissal, and after trial it rendered judgment for the spouses, holding Heras and Guariño solidarily liable for compensatory damages, moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs, and ordering the insurance company to reimburse Heras. All three defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and absolved the defendants. Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Late in 1962, Graciano Guariño was driving a JD passenger bus owned and operated by Antonio Heras. On the fifth of September, 1962, he drove the bus so recklessly that it hit a motorcycle driven by Rodolfo Formento, with his wife Manuela as a backseat rider. Both spouses sustained less serious physical injuries, and the motorcycle was damaged in the total sum of 163 pesos.

Guariño was charged with damage to property and less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence. Upon arraignment, on the twenty-eighth of January, 1963, he pleaded guilty and was forthwith sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended parties in the sum of 163 pesos representing the damage to the motorcycle, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

On the twenty-ninth of March, 1963, the spouses commenced the present civil action for damages against Heras and Guariño. The defendants set up res adjudicata based on the criminal judgment, and the insurance company, impleaded on a common carrier's accident insurance policy, adopted the same defenses. The spouses had not reserved in the criminal case the right to recover damages in a separate proceeding, and they were not even notified of the arraignment.

Issues

• Whether or not the present civil action is barred by the decision in the criminal case, considering that the plaintiffs had not reserved therein the right to recover damages in a separate proceeding.
• Whether or not the plaintiffs' cause of action is one arising from a quasi-delict rather than from the crime, such that it may be enforced independently of the criminal judgment.

Applicable Provisions

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides:

In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

This is the provision on which the spouses' separate action rests, and it is the provision the Court uses to defeat the plea of res adjudicata.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

The defendants anchor their plea of res adjudicata on this rule, but the Court holds it inapplicable because it took effect only on the first of January, 1964, while the civil action was commenced on the twenty-ninth of March, 1963.

Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

This provision is likewise inapplicable for the same reason, being part of the Rules that took effect after the civil action had already been filed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the present action is not barred by the decision in the criminal case. The plea of res adjudicata is anchored on Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111, but those provisions became effective only on the first of January, 1964, and the civil action was commenced over nine months earlier, on the twenty-ninth of March, 1963. The Court therefore applies Article 33 of the Civil Code, under which a civil action for damages in cases of physical injuries may proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.

On the second issue, the Court holds that the complaint sets up a cause of action based on a quasi-delict, not on the crime. Following its earlier ruling in the De Leon Brokerage case, the Court notes that the spouses alleged the employer-employee relationship and the damages caused by the employee on the occasion of his functions, which is a clear statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The prayer that the employer and the employee be held solidarily liable confirms this, because the employer's liability under the Revised Penal Code is merely subsidiary, whereas that arising from a quasi-delict is solidary. The employer's defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee is available under the Civil Code but not under the Penal Code, showing that the employer understood the action to rest on a quasi-delict.

The Court also holds that the failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action does not bar the action, provided the injured party did not intervene actually or actively in the prosecution of the criminal case. The spouses did not so intervene, and were not even notified of the arraignment. The Court notes that in the Meneses case, counsel for the injured party was present at the arraignment, yet the injured party was not deemed barred, because the accused pleaded guilty and there was neither a trial nor a chance to enter a reservation. The spouses here have a stronger case.

Doctrine

First, the civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under the Civil Code. The same negligent act may give rise to either, and the injured party is free to choose which remedy to enforce.

Second, in cases of physical injuries, Article 33 of the Civil Code allows a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, which proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.

Third, for actions instituted before the first of January, 1964, the failure to reserve in the criminal action the right to file a separate civil action does not bar a separate civil action for quasi-delict, provided the injured party did not intervene actually or actively in the prosecution of the criminal action.

Fourth, the employer's liability for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is solidary, while the employer's liability under the Revised Penal Code is merely subsidiary, and this distinction helps identify the nature of the action.

Disposition

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, with costs against the defendants.

Remember This

One negligent act can give rise to two liabilities, and the injured party may choose the civil action for quasi-delict under Article 33 of the Civil Code even without reserving that right in the criminal case, so long as he did not actively intervene in the criminal prosecution. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from a quasi-delict, and the effect of the failure to reserve a separate civil action.