G.R. No. L-26442. August 29, 1969
MANUELA S. FORMENTO AND RODOLFO L. FORMENTO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO HERAS, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NAME AND STYLE JD TRANSIT, GRACIANO GUARIÑO AND THE FIE…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Plaintiffs Manuela S. Formento and
Rodolfo L. Formento seek the review of a decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Manila
and absolving the defendants from plaintiffs’ complaint.
Late in 1962, defendant Graciano Guariño was accused, in Criminal Case No. 67117 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, of damage to property and less serious
physical injuries through reckless negligence, in that, being the driver of JD
passenger bus bearing plate No. PUB-154 Mla. ’62,
which was owned and operated by Antonio Heras, on
September 5, 1962, Guariño drove said bus so
recklessly and imprudently that the vehicle hit and bumped a motorcycle driven
by plaintiff, Rodolfo L. Formento, with his co-plaintiff
and wife, Manuela S. Formento, as a backseat rider,
in consequence of which both sustained less serious physical injuries and the
motorcycle was damaged in the total sum of P163. Having pleaded guilty to the charge, upon
arraignment, on January 28, 1963, Guariño was
forthwith sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto
mayor and to indemnify the offended parties in the sum of P163 – representing the amount of the
damage caused to the motorcycle – with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
On March 29, 1963, plaintiffs commenced the present civil action,
against Heras and Guariño,
for damages allegedly sustained by the former by reason of said negligence of Guariño.[1]
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground that plaintiffs’
cause of action is barred by the decision in the criminal case. The court deferred action on the motion to
dismiss and directed the defendants to answer the complaint, whereas the
defendants filed a third party complaint, against Fieldmen’s
Insurance Co., on a common carrier’s accident insurance policy covering the bus
involved in the accident. Defendants,
likewise, filed their answer, admitting that the JD transit belongs to Heras and that Guariño was
driving the bus aforementioned, but denied the other averments of the
complaint, and pleaded res adjudicata,
based upon the judgment in the criminal action. Upon the other hand, in its answer to the
third party complaint, the insurance company admitted its third party liability
under said insurance policy and adopted, by reference, the defenses set up by
the defendants against plaintiffs’ complaint.
In due course thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, sentencing Heras
and Guarino, jointly and severally, to pay to the
plaintiffs the sums of P464, as compensatory damages – for medical treatment,
transportation in the course thereof and medicine – P1, 000, as moral damages, P500, as attorney’s fees, all with
interest at the rate of six per centum (6%) per annum, from March 29, 1963,
until fully paid, and the costs of the suit.
It likewise sentenced the insurance company to reimburse Heras the amounts he had been sentenced to pay to the
plaintiffs. On appeal, taken by the
three (3) defendants, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower
court and absolved said defendants from the complaint, with costs against the
plaintiffs. Hence, this appeal.
The main issue before us is whether the present action is barred by
the decision in the criminal case, considering that plaintiffs had not
reserved therein the right to recover damages in a separate proceeding. Defendants maintain the affirmative view for
the reason that their civil liability for said damages is deemed settled by
the decision in the criminal case, under the principle of res
adjudicata.
Upon the other hand, plaintiffs urge a negative answer, upon the ground
that their complaint in the present case seeks to enforce a liability arising,
not from a crime, but from a quasi–delict.
The latter theory is supported by our decision in De Leon
Brokerage Co. vs. Court of Appeals,2 in which,
speaking for this Court, then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon expressed himself as follows:
“The court of origin and the appellate court correctly
considered respondent’s complaint to be based on a quasi-delict. She alleged that she suffered injuries
because of the carelessness and imprudence of petitioner’s chauffeur, who was
driving the cargo truck TH-776 belonging to petitioner, which truck collided
with the passenger jeepney wherein she was
riding. Since averment had been made of
the employer-employee relationship and of the damages caused by the employee
on occasion of his function, there is a clear statement of a right of
action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. x x x .”3
The parity between that case and the one at bar becomes more
apparent when we consider that, in the former, we held that “whatever
doubts remain as to the nature” of the action filed by the injured party
“are resolved by the prayer” that the employer and the employee
“be held solidarily liable” – which is,
likewise, made in the complaint of plaintiffs herein – because the employer’s
liability under the Revised Penal Code4 is merely
subsidiary in nature, whereas that arising from a quasi-delict
is solidary in character;5 that in
both cases the criminal conviction of the employee was alleged in the civil
complaint, and this fact was considered insufficient, in the De Leon
Brokerage case, to detract from the nature of the cause of action set up in
said pleading, as one based upon
a quasi-delict; and that, in both, the employer
clearly understood that such was the foundation of the liability exacted by
the injured party, in as much as the former alleged that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection of, and exercise of supervision over, his employee,
a defense available under the Civil Code,6 but not
under the Penal Code.7
The plea of res adjudicata set up by the defendants is anchored upon
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
“Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions.
– When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately.
“Section 2. – Independent civil action. – In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency
of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. “
These provisions are, however, inapplicable to the case at
bar, inasmuch as the former form part of the revised Rules of Court, which
became effective on January 1, 1964, and the present civil action was
commenced over nine (9) months prior the reto, or on March
29, 1963. Accordingly, in Reyes v. Dela Rosa,8 it was
held that, in view of Article 33 of the New Civil Code, which provides that:
“In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”9
a civil complaint, filed in 1955, for the
recovery of damages arising from physical injuries inflicted and slander or
defamation committed by the defendants, was not barred by the judgment in the
criminal action against the latter for said acts, despite plaintiff’s failure
to reserve, in said criminal action, the “right to institute a separate
civil action for damages.” This view was reiterated in Ortaliz
v. Echarri10 involving another case of
physical injuries through negligence committed by the driver of a motor
vehicle.
Besides, owing to the policy set forth in the above-quoted Art.
33 of the Civil Code, it has been consistently held, not only that “the
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in quasidelicts
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code”11, but,
also, that – at least, in cases instituted before January 1, 1964 – the failure
to make, in the criminal action, the reservation required in said Rule, will
not bar a separate civil action for quasi delict,
provided that the injured party has not intervened “actually” or actively
in the prosecution of said criminal action.
Hence, in Parker v. Panlilio,12 we said:
” x x x
The failure, therefore, on the part of the petitioner to reserve her right to
institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be deemed as
a waiver on her part to institute a separate civil action against the
respondent company based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code.
“It should be here emphasized that these two actions are
separate and distinct and should not be confused one with the other. In the supposition that the one accused in
the criminal case is a driver, employee, or dependent of the respondent
company, the failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
in the criminal case would not necessarily constitute a bar to the
institution of the civil action against said respondent, for the cause of
action in one is different from that in the other. These are two independent actions
based on distinct causes of action.
This distinction is aptly stated in the Barredo
case (Barredo‘ vs. Garcia and Almario,
73 Phil. 607). This Court said: ‘There
are two liabilities of Barredo; first, the subsidiary
one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter’s
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo’s
primary liability as an employer under Article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing they were acting within their
rights’ (pp. 614-615, id).
‘A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and responsibility for cuasi–delitos
or culpa extra–contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi–delito
or culpa extra–contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to
choose which remedy to enforce’ (Barredo vs. Garcia
and Almario, 73 Phil. 607). “13
In Azucena v. Potenciano,14 the language used was:
“This Court in Dyogi vs. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, stated that Article 33 constitutes a
partial amendment of Rule 107. In Calo vs. Peggy, G.R. No. L-10756, March 29, 1958, substantially the same situation
as the one now before us was passed upon by this Court. A minor son of the defendant there, while
driving a jeep belonging to the father, bumped and injured plaintiff Romeo Calo. A criminal
action for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was
instituted. While it was pending a civil
action to recover damages on the theory of quasi-delict
was filed against the father of the accused.
After a judgment of acquittal was rendered, where it was intimated that
the victim of the accident was the one at fault, the defendant in the civil
action moved for its dismissal, alleging that since in the criminal case there
was no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action for damages
the judgment of acquittal operated to extinguish the civil liability of the
defendant based on the same incident.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but on appeal this Court reversed
the ruling on the ground that the civil action was entirely independent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can indeed be no other logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution -whether it be
conviction or acquittal – would render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action ‘may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter. To be sure, an exception
to this principle of separation and independence of the two classes of actions
from each other has been recognized, namely, when the offended party not only
fails to reserve the right to file a separate civil action but intervenes
actually in the criminal suit by appearing through a private prosecutor for
the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages therein, in which case a
judgment of acquittal bars a subsequent civil action. Maria Roa vs. Segunda dela Cruz, et al., supra. The case at bar, however, does not fall under
the exception, for the plaintiff here did not so intervene in the criminal
action against defendant Potenciano.
“Appellees contend that the civil
action referred to in Article 33 of the Civil Code is that which arises ex–delicto, or from the commission of the offense involving
defamation, fraud or physical injuries, and consequently, pursuant to Rule 107,
Section 1(a), the right to file it must be expressly reserved in the criminal
action if it is to prosper at all. The
contention is erroneous Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Gamboa. It
presupposes that there must first be a conviction for the crime, for without
conviction there can be no offense to speak of from which civil liability could
arise. Article 33 contemplates a civil
action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely
criminal aspect of the case. This is
the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt is deemed sufficient.
“Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case
is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings, x x x .”15
We quote from Meneses v. Luat:16
“It appears that a criminal case for damage to property with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Estanislao Luat in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. Herein plaintiffs, as the offended parties
in that case, were represented by counsel, who entered their appearance as
private prosecutors. Upon arraignment
the accused entered a plea of guilty and was accordingly sentenced to suffer a
term of imprisonment and to pay a fine.
x x x. The decision became final, the accused having
started to serve his sentence immediately.
“The civil action was filed thereafter against both the driver
and owner of the truck, obviously on the theory of quasi-delict
and specifically on the basis of Article 33 of the Civil Code, which
states that in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be
brought by the injured party, and the same shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss was predicated and upheld on
the ground that the action was barred by the judgment in the criminal case, on
the authority of our decision in Maria C. Roa vs. Segunda dela Cruz, et al., G. R.
No. L-13134, promulgated February 13,
1960. In that case we said:
‘In the instant case it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa – upon whose initiative the criminal action for
defamation against the defendant Segunda dela Cruz was filed – did not reserve her right to
institute an independent civil action.
Instead, she chose to intervene in the criminal proceedings as
private prosecutor through counsel employed by her. Such intervention, as observed by the court below, could only be for the purpose of
claiming damages or indemnity, and not to secure the conviction and punishment
of the accused therein as plaintiff now pretends. This must be so because an offended party in
a criminal case may intervene personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of
the offense, only if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved
his right to institute it, subject, always, to the direction and control of
the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in
connection with Section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek
Goan vs. Yatco, G.R. No.
L-6386, December 29, 1953). The reason of the law in not permitting the
offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived
or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by such action her
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe et al.,
vs. Gatmaitan, et al., G. R. No. L-9609, March 9, 1956.) The rule, therefore,
is that the right of intervention reserved to the offended party is for the
sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and
not of demanding punishment of the accused.
(People vs. Orais, 65 Phil. 744; People vs. Veles, 77 Phil. 1026; People vs. Flores et al., G. R. No.
L-7528, December, 1957; see also U.S.
vs. Malabon, 1 Phil. 731; U.
S. vs. Heery, 25
Phil. 600.)’
“In a number of cases decided prior to Roa
vs. Dela Cruz, it had been held that upon the
institution of a criminal action for physical injuries the offended party need
not reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising on the same
injuries, for the reason that the law itself (Art. 33 of the Civil Code already
makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so
does not bar him from bringing such action.
(See Estrada v. Briones, 56 O.G. No. 12 p.
2041, Aug. 28, 1959, and cases cited.) In these instances, of course, the
offended parties did not intervene actively in the criminal prosecution
through private counsel.
“The issue now before us is whether or not the rule laid down
in the Roa case should govern this one. We are of the opinion that there is a
demonstrable material difference between
the circumstances of the two cases. In
the first not only was the offended party represente
by a private prosecutor in the criminal action but the action went through
trial on the merits. In fact it
was the private prosecutor who actually handled the case. He therefore had sufficient opportunity
to claim and prove damages, for which purpose alone, according to the
decision of this Court, his active intervention was allowed. For if that had not been the purpose, or if
the offended party had reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
such intervention would not have been justified.
“In the instant case the criminal action against defendant Luat did not proceed to trial, as he pleaded guilty upon
arraignment. The mere appearance
of private counsel in representation of the offended party did not
constitute such active intervention as could only import an intention to
press a claim for damages in the same action.
It is as reasonable to indulge the possibility that the private
prosecutors appeared precisely to be able to make a seasonable reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action which, even if unnecessary at the
time (1), would nevertheless have been the prudent and practical thing to do
for the purpose of better protecting the interests of their clients. But as matters turned out, the accused
pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced. Thereafter there was no chance to enter a
reservation in the record.
“We do not believe that plaintiff’s substantive right to
claim damages should necessarily be foreclosed by the fact – at best equivocal
as to its purpose – that private prosecutors entered their appearance at the
very inception of the proceeding, which was then cut short at that stage. It cannot be said with any reasonable
certainty that plaintiffs had thereby committed themselves to the submission of
their action for damages in that action.
x x x.
“The order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded
for further proceedings, with costs.”17
It should be noted that
counsel for the injured party was present at the arraignment of the accused in
the criminal case, although, in view of the plea of guilty entered by the latter, there was neither a trial,
nor a reservation of the right to file a separate
civil action. Yet, the injured party was
not deemed barred from instituting the same.
In short, the plaintiffs herein, who were not even notified of the
arraignment, have a stronger case than Meneses.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals should be, as it is hereby, reversed and another one shall be entered
affirming that of the Court of First.
Instance of Manila, with costs against the defendant-appellees.
Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
P5,000 as actual or compensatory damages, P10, 000 as moral damages and P5,000
as attorney’s fees, in addition to the costs of the suit.
2
G.R. No. L-15247, February 28, 1962
3
Underscoring supplied.
4
Arts. 102 and 103.
5
Art. 2194, Civil Code of the Philippines.
6
Art. 2180, last paragraph.
7
Arambulo v. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 75.
8
99 Phil. 1013, 1015.
9
Underscoring supplied.
10
101 Phil. 947, 951.
11
Dionisio v. Alvendia,
102 Phil. 443, 447.
12
91 Phil. 1, 4-5.
13
Underscoring supplied.
14
G. R. No. L-14028, June 30, 1962.
15
Underscoring supplied.
16
G.R. No. L-18116, November 28, 1964.
17
Underscoring ours.