THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENEE PAROJINOG Y NAMUAG, RONIE ALJO ALIAS COMMANDER TIKO, BERT DINGDING, FE MULO, MIRIAM MULO AND 18 JOHN DOES, ACCUSED, …

The accused-appellant, Renee Parojinog
y Namu-ag, was
charged, together with his co-accused Ronie Aljo alias Commander Tiko, Bert Dingding, Fe Mulo, Miriam Mulo and eighteen (18) John Does for the crime of triple
murder before the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch XV, Ozamis City, in an information which reads:

“That or about the 31st day of March, 1984, in the boundary of Sangay
Daku and Sangay Diot, City of Ozamiz,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused- twenty three (23) persons in all; the two women armed with .38 caliber pistols and the rest,
with Armalite and Garand
Rifles, conspiring and helping one another in planning and hatching and/or
carrying into fruition a common design, lay in ambush- waiting for the combined
INP-PC operative(s) who were
in the actual performance of their duties and that upon the arrival of the lawmen in the
place where they were hiding, the said twenty-three accused did then and there
willfully, feloniously and unlawfully open fire at the lawmen, as a consequence
of which, P/Sgt. Alex Velasquez, P/Cpl. Antonio Carreon,
both of the INP, Ozamiz City Station and Sgt. Aludio Torres of the PC, were fatally hit and who died
almost instantaneously.

“That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, considering that they used means and methods, in the execution
thereof, tended directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
themselves arising from the defense which the victims might have made, and the
aggravating circumstance of ‘band’, since more than three (3) malefactors (and in fact, 23 in
this case) acted together in the commission of the offense.

“CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in
connection with Article 14 of the same code.” (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

Upon his arraignment on January
29, 1988, appellant Parojinog pleaded not
guilty.  Trial then proceeded against him
alone as the other accused remained at large.

After trial, the lower court promulgated its challenged decision
on September 1, 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this
Court is of the opinion and so it holds that the guilt of accused Renee Parojinog has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and
pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, taken in relation to Article
14 of the same Code, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
left, as the aggravating circumstance of ‘band’ having been offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, hereby sentences the accused,
Renee Parojinog, to suffer an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from TEN (10) years and ONE (1) DAY, of Prision Mayor, as its minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as its maximum period,
together with the accessory penalties provided for by law: to indemnify the
heirs of the victims, namely: P/Sgt. Alex Velasquez, P/Cpl. Antonio Carreon and Sgt. Aludio Torres the sum of P30,000.00 for each
victim; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.

“The accused must be credited of the time he was placed under
preventive imprisonment.

“Without prejudice to the other accused who are not yet
apprehended whose case is hereby ordered archieved
(sic).

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 7-8,
Decision)

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid decision, appellant appealed to
the Court of Appeals.

On October 31, 1990,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the
modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties
of reclusion perpetua for
the murder of P/Sgt Alex Velasquez, P/Cpl Antonio Carreon
and Sgt. Aludio Torres.

“The Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to refrain from
entering judgment, and forthwith to certify the case and elevate the entire
record thereof to the Supreme Court for review. 
(Sec. 13, Rule 124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511).

“SO RDERED.” (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

The facts of the case are as follows:

On March 31, 1984,
Corporal Godofredo Gallardo, then the designated
Chief of the Integrated National Police of Ozamiz
City, accompanied by Pat. Alex Velasquez, Cpl. Antonio Carreon, Cpl. Wilfredo Garces, Pat. Branco Erquita, Pat. Dario Vente, Pat.
Edgar Dalaygon, Cpl. Romulo
Abellanosa, Tech. Sgt. Aludio
Torres and PC and CIC Charlieman Bation,
went to Barangay Sangay Daku, Ozamiz
City.  Along their way, they were ambushed by the
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the New People’s Army.  Torres,
Velasquez and Carreon died on the spot (pp. 2-13, tsn, October 14,
1988, pp. 10-11, tsn, June 24,
1988).

On August 1, 1987,
appellant was investigated by Pcpl. Benjamin
de los Santos
at the INP station in Ozamiz
City.  During which investigation, he confessed that
he surrendered to Governor Fortunato Sagrado of Misamis Occidental in connection with the ambush of a group of police and PC soldiers at
Barangay Sangay on March
31, 1984 which resulted in the death of two policemen and a PC soldier (Exh. A, Records).

In his extra-judicial confession, he admitted that he was a
member of the NPA, having joined the same on December 5, 1982; that while a
member of the NPA, he was assigned to collect rice from people in the barrio;
that in March, 1984, his group consisting of 23 persons, two of whom were women,
staged an ambush of the PC soldiers and the police at Barangay
Sangay, Ozamiz City; that
the ambush was planned by Bert Dingding and Ronie Aljo; that the men carried
armalite or garand while the
women carried .38 caliber guns; and that he learned that PC Sgt. Torres was one
of the casualties.

The records show that before the start of the investigation, Pcpl. Santos apprised appellant of his constitutional
rights to counsel of his own
choice and if he did not have one a certain Atty. Fernando Fuentes III of the
CLAO will be his lawyer who will help him. 
He agreed to have Atty. Fuentes as his lawyer.  Thereafter, he was informed of his right to
remain silent or not to answer any questions if he did not like to answer or if
he had nothing to answer.  Finally, he
was warned that his statement may be used as evidence against him before the
court (Exhibit “A,” pp. 4-6, tsn, September
16, 1988).

The records also show that Atty. Fuentes III assisted appellant
during the entire investigation which lasted for about an hour (pp. 5-6, tsn, September 16,
1988; p. 7, tsn, February 17, 1989).  After the investigation, appellant signed his
extra-judicial investigation.  Atty.
Fuentes III also signed the document (Exh. “A,” p. 6, tsn, September 16, 1988).  Thereafter, two
policemen escorted appellant to the Office of City Fiscal Luzminda
Uy for him to swear to his written confession.  Before swearing in appellant, Fiscal Uy verified whether the statements therein were indeed his.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses,
Benjamin delos Santos,
Luzminda Uy, Magdaleno Velasquez, Teresa Carreon,
Atty. Fernando Fuentes III, and Cpl. Godofredo
Gallardo and offered Exhibit “A” which was the affidavit executed by
appellant.

On the other hand, the defense evidence consisted only of the
testimony of appellant who said that he was in his house and worked on his
cornfield the whole day of March 31,
1984.  He alleged that
although he was given a lawyer before the investigation, he had none during the
investigation because Atty. Fuentes went out. 
Besides, he claimed that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice but the
policemen’s choice.

In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, appellant raised the following errors:

I

The Lower Court
erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on Exhibits “A” and “A-1” alleged
extra-judicial confession of accused during the investigation at the
city jail.

II

The Lower Court
erred in relying on the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution instead
of weighing the evidences adduced during the trial in favor of appellant.  (Rollo, p. 30, pp.
2-3, Appellant‘s Brief)

Before this Court, he reiterated the following assignment of
error:

Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals
grievously erred in affirming the decision appealed from and in admitting and
giving credence (to) the extrajudicial confession, marked (as) Annexes
“A” and “A-1” (Rollo, p. 50).

It is evident that the fate of the appellant in this case lies
with the admissibility or non-admissibility of his extra-judicial
confession.  Appellant impute
involuntariness to said confession because he was allegedly denied his
constitutional right to counsel during his custodial investigation by the
police.  He claims that the lawyer
assigned to him did not actually attend the investigation as the latter went
out and that said lawyer was not his choice and was only forced on him.

The records of the case belie this claim.  Atty. Fuentes III, who was presented by the
prosecution, categorically testified:

FISCAL YBANEZ:

x x
x.

Q:   Atty.
Fuentes III, before affixing your signatures, do you remember if the accused in
this case was ever asked some questions with respect to this affidavit taken?

A:    Yes,
sir.

Q:   Will you kindly tell the Honorable
Court as to what was asked?

A:    Before
the investigation started there
in the City Jail, the investigating officer inquired to the accused his right
and that he was asked if he is willing to be assisted by counsel of the
government and he said yes.  So that person subject of that
investigation whose name Parojinog, assisted by this
representation was then investigated.  In
fact the confession of the accused was typewritten (pp. 3-4, tsn, September 16,
1983).

On cross-examination,  Atty.
Fuentes III reiterated:

COURT: (to witness)

Q:   You
said you assisted a person during the investigation, were you asked by the
accused to assist him?

A:    Because
according to the policemen, there was somebody who was willing to give
confession, so when I arrived there, the accused in this case was introduced to
me so I inquired them whether the accused was willing to be assisted by
counsel.

COURT:

Q:   What
did they say?

A:    They
said, yes, he agreed.

Q:   You did not advise him what to do as
assisting counsel under custodial investigation?

A:    I
told him that he has the right to remain silent but the accused told me that he
was willing to give his confession voluntarily,
so they proceeded the investigation in my
presence.  (p. 5, tsn,
ibid)

The above testimony sufficiently discredited appellant’s denial
that he agreed to be assisted by
Atty. Fuentes III during his custodial investigation and his claim that Atty.
Fuentes III was not present during said investigation.

Fiscal Luzminda V. Uy
before whom accused-appellant
swore his testimony declared in court that she first informed him of his
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel to which appellant replied that
he was assisted by Atty. Fuentes III during the investigation.  She then read the contents of the affidavits
in the dialect one by one and asked appellant if all the answers given were
his, to which appellant answered yes.  (p. 9, tsn, June 24, 1988).

Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section
12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Sec. 12(1).
— Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.  If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel he must be provided with one. 
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.”

It is very clear from the aforequoted
provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense
may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one.  While the
initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject
the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one.  In the instant
case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout
the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity
before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy.  Thus, he
apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators.  He complained for the first time that Atty.
Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. 
Thus, it was too late.

Worthy of note is the fact that accused did not categorically
claim that he was intimidated or forced to give his extra-judicial
confession.  Neither did he claim that he
was promised any reward or leniency.  The
settled rule is that a confession is admissible
until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency (People v. Francisco, et al., G.R. No. L-4258, May 15, 1953; People v. Candava, G.R. L-18517; March 31, 1964;
People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October 31, 1969). 
For failure of the accused to successfully assail the voluntariness of his confession, this Court cannot set it
aside.

Besides, accused’s uncorroborated alibi
that he was elsewhere at the time of the ambush could not prevail over his own
admission that he was one of those who ambushed the group of police and PC
soldiers in March, 1984.  Alibi is a weak
defense in the light further of the fact on record that accused himself
surrendered to Governor Fortunato Sagrado
of Misamis Occidental in connection with the aforesaid ambush.  The accused did not assail this fact nor explain that he came into the fold of the law in some other way.  This circumstance serves to underscore the veracity of the voluntary
confession.  The defense of alibi
apparently is due to the change of heart of the accused
upon learning of the afflictive penalty for such a grievous crime.

The trial court convicted the accused to only one crime of murder
and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as its minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
its maximum, together with the accessory penalties provided by law.  The
respondent court found the
penalty erroneous.  It said that
appellant should be found guilty of three murders as charged in the information.  The penalty for murder, without any modifying circumstance is reclusion
perpetua. 
Thus, it held that appellant should be sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua for the murder of P/Sgt. Alex Velasquez,
P/Cpl. Antonio Carreon and Sgt. Aludio
Torres, correctly refraining from entering judgment and forthwith, certified
the case and records for review of this Court.

We agree with the foregoing observations of the respondent court
anent the penalty to be imposed on appellant. 
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of murder
is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death.  Considering that the aggravating
circumstance of band has been offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the penalty that should be imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua, conformably with People v. Munoz, et
al., G.R. Nos. L-38969-70, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 107. 
Additionally, the civil indemnity for the death of the three lawmen
should be increased to P50,000.00 each, conformably
with the latest policy of the Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of conviction against
accused-appellant is AFFIRMED with the modifications that the accused-appellant
is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua for the murder of P/Sgt. Alex Velasquez,
P/Cpl. Antonio Carreon and Sgt. Aludio
Torres and to pay P50,000.00 each to the heirs of the
victims as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Feliciano,
and Grino-Aquino,
JJ., concur.