MARCELA N. GONZALES, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, CITY JUDGE OF DAVAO CITY (BRANCH III), ALFREDO M. CELI, FIRST ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL OF DAVAO CITY, REPRESE…

This is an appeal from
the Decision dated 7 June 1967 of Branch III of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Davao in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition (Special Civil Case No. 5270) which granted the petition and
enjoined permanently both the City Judge and City Fiscal from taking further
cognizance of a criminal case for slander (Criminal Case No. 2273-B) in the
City Court of Davao City because said case was not
brought at the instance and upon complaint of the offended party, respondent
City Fiscal had no authority to file the information, and the City Judge had no
jurisdiction over the case.^[1]

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

On 17 February 1966,
an information for slander against accused Marcela N. Gonzales (hereinafter
referred to as the appellee) was filed before the
City Court of Davao by Assistant City Fiscal Alfredo Celi.  The
information reads:

“That on or about December 19, 1965, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused with intent to cast dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon one Filipinas
Ordoñez, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and in the heat of anger uttered publicly in the presence and within the
hearing of several persons the following defamatory
words, to wit:  ‘MANG-AAGAW NG ASAWA NG
MAY ASAWA! TIBIHON! PUTANG INA MO! WALANG HIYA! PATAY GUTOM’, which when
translated to English runs (sic) as follows: 
‘Seducer of wives of other husbands or adulteress.  Consumptive. 
Your mother is a prostitute.  You do
not have a sense of shame.  You
are a glutton,’ to the dishonor, discredit and contempt of said Filipinas Ordoñez.”

On 5 August 1966,
the appellee moved to quash the information asserting
that the City Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the
officer who filed the information had
no authority to do so.  She claims
therein that the alleged defamation imputes the crime of adultery and thus
cannot be prosecuted de oficio.  The other remarks, however, do not charge a
crime.  The complaint must, therefore, be
brought at the instance of the offended party, which was not done in this
case.  Hence, the fiscal did not have the
authority to file the information and the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case.

The records do not show that the offended party filed a complaint
in the fiscal’s office and that the Information was
signed by her.

The motion to quash was denied by respondent Judge, prompting appellee to move for its reconsideration.  This second motion was likewise denied.  Thus, appellee
filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao
a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was docketed as Special
Civil Case No. 5270.

Appellee reiterated in her petition the
grounds in her motion to quash and elaborated on her arguments in support
thereto.  On the other hand, respondents
maintained that the slanderous words alleged in the “information contain
imputations not only to (sic) one
crime but to (sic) other offenses like vice, defect and condition which are
distinct from and independent of each other; one, admitted to be of adultery
and others are public crimes which can be prosecuted de oficio.”

In deciding Civil Case No. 5270 against respondents, then Judge
Alfredo I. Gonzalez opined that “the entire context of the Information
should be read together as a whole and not to pick up (sic) particular words
and phrases and then detach or isolate them from the rest so as to give them
different meaning (sic) that is desired by the one who may use it for his own
convenience” and that “the entire defamation in question should be given an ordinary and peculiar
significance in order to render it effectual in the sense that is most likely
understood by the parties and which is in keeping with the purpose and intent
of the party who uttered them.” He then concluded and ruled
that:

“The first part of the defamation complained of, quoted:  ‘mang-aagaw ng asawa ng
may asawa’ may literally mean:  ‘one who grabs another’s husband,’ thereby
imputing the commission of the crime of adultery wherein the accused maintained
an immoral or illicit relations (sic) with another man who is not her husband.

The prosecuting Fiscal has correctly construed in English the
significance of the first portion of the defamation in question by imputing the
commission of the crime of adultery, in which case, it becomes undisputed that
the offended party has the exclusive right to sign and file the complaint and
not the Fiscal.

However, the City Fiscal did not interpret the correct meaning of
the succeeding group of clauses quoted: 
‘Putang ina mo, tibi-hon, walang hiya, patay gutom‘
for he just gave them a strict, literal construction which does not portray the
real intent of the accused and does not conform to the sense as it is
ordinarily understood by an average person. 
Expressions of this kind and tenor are commonly used by many people according
to their custom specially those who are unschooled and coming from the lower
social strata.  They are usually uttered
by the slip of the tongue and are intended to describe, intensify, explain or
emphasize the other parts of the utterances which accompany them or to which
they cling or are attached.  They may be
defamatory or not depending upon the tenor and import conveyed by the
accompanying statements.

In the instant case, the above quoted combined utterances expressed
in the native dialect are mere accompanying and supporting phrases and terms
used to give more vivid color and importance to the first portion, depicting
the temper, emotion, demeanor and the
hatred of the petitioner (accused in the lower Court) owing perhaps to a fit of
jealousy arising from her suspicion that the offended party is having immoral
relations with her husband.

It become (sic) clear and logical then to conclude that the next
group of words mentioned in the preceding paragraph does not impute the
commission of any public offense that may be considered distinct and
independent from that conveyed in the first sentence, but they are simply
intended to give more spicy flavor to the main thought expressed in the whole
statements.  No other reasonable and
logical conclusion can be drawn from the premises except that the correct
imputation to the crime probably committed in this case is that of adultery or
a similar offense, private in nature and that there is but one, single and
indivisible crime that is described by the whole slanderous statements alleged
in the information.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court is convinced and is of the
opinion that only the crime of adultery or a kindred offense is imputed to the accused (petitioner
herein) for uttering the alleged defamation in question taken as a whole and no
imputation to (sic) any other public offense could be logically inferred from
the tenor and spirit conveyed therein.”

Respondents-appellants challenge the above decision in their four
(4) assigned errors, to wit:

“FIRST – The lower court erred in holding that the information
alleges only one defamatory remark imputing a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.

SECOND – The lower court erred in holding that the other utterances
alleged in the information are not defamatory as to constitute the crime of
slander which can be prosecuted de oficio.

THIRD – The lower court erred in holding that the fiscal lacks
authority to file the information and, therefore, the City Court fails (sic) to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.

FOURTH – The lower court erred in permanently enjoining the
respondents from taking further cognizance of the information.”^[2]

In support thereof, they contend that:

a)  It is clear that the
information alleges “many remarks or utterances which are all
defamatory” and not just one as ruled by the court.  Each may constitute a separate offense.  However, since they were made on one
occasion, and the product of a single criminal intent, there is only one
offense of slander.

b) One slanderous remark should not be given more emphasis than
the other.  Neither should a single
remark be considered to suit the purpose of the accused.  Rather, the rule is that all the slanderous statements
should be treated as one and taken as a single offense of slander.

c) The one remark held by the court to be slanderous as it imputed
the crime of adultery is “mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa.” Standing
by itself, it does not, contrary to the court’s ruling, impute the crime of
adultery.  At most, it implies that the
one to whom it is addressed is a
flirt, a temptress, or one who indulges in enticing other husbands.  It imputes a vice, condition or act which
equally casts dishonor and contempt upon the person alluded to.  Flirtation is not adultery.

d)  All the defamatory
statements alleged in the information likewise only impute a vice, defect, act
or condition not constituting a crime. 
The fiscal, therefore, has the authority to file the information and the City Court acquired jurisdiction
over the case.

e)  Assuming for the sake of
argument that the defamatory statements alleged in the information include one
imputing an offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
still the case at bar is one which can be instituted upon the instance of the
fiscal on the ground that what then is involved is a compound or complex crime,
one of the components of which is a public crime, in which case it can be
prosecuted de oficio under the theory that public interest
is paramount to private interest.^[3]

In her Brief,^[4]
appellee maintains that:

(a)  when the slanderous remarks, uttered on one
occasion with one criminal intent, also imputes the commission of adultery,
regardless of the other imputations, the charge can only be brought at the
instance of and upon complaint subscribed and filed by the offended party.  Thus, in People vs. Padilla,^[5]
it was held:

“x x x while
said Article 364 penalizes any intrigue which has for its purpose to blemish
the honor or reputation of a person, the information avers facts which do not
merely constitute an incriminatory machination or a defamatory intrigue but go
as far as accusing a married woman of having
illicit relations with a man not her husband which in effect constitutes the
crime of adultery.

x x x

Considering that under Article 360, paragraph 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, no criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation
of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio can
be brought except upon the complaint filed by the offended party, and the crime
of adultery is one that cannot be prosecuted de officio (Article 344, Idem.), it is obvious that the information filed in this case is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court of origin. 
The trial court was therefore correct in quashing the information.”

(b) People vs. Yu, cited by appellants, is
not applicable in this case because it refers to a complex crime defined under
the Revised Penal Code which imposes only one (1) penalty.  Appellants
admit that in this case there is only
one offense, although it involves many slanderous remarks.

Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing.^[6]
In both, there is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.^[7]

In determining whether the offense has been committed, the
defamatory words are to be construed in their entirety, and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by persons reading or hearing them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.^[8]
In short, the language used must be understood “in its plain and popular
sense — to read the sentences as would the man on the street.”^[9]
The intent or purpose then of the speaker or writer is not relevant.

The issues in this case revolve on the correct appreciation of
the statements uttered by appellee and alleged in the
information to be slanderous.  They read
as follows:

“Mang-aagaw ng
asawa ng may asawa! Tibihon! Putang Ina Mo! Walang Hiya! Patay Gutom!”

The fiscal translated them as follows:

“Seducer of wives of other husbands or adulteress.  Consumptive. 
Your mother is a prostitute.  You
do not have a sense of shame.  You are a
glutton.”

Judge Gonzalez, after
postulating the major premise that the entire defamation in question should be
given an ordinary and peculiar significance in order to render it effectual in
the sense most likely understood by the parties and which is in keeping with the purpose and intent of the party who uttered them, held
that the controlling slanderous utterance is the first part which literally means: 
“one who grabs another’s husband,” thereby “imputing the
commission of the crime of adultery,” while the rest are mere
“accompanying and supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and importance to the first portion.”

In the light of the above
rule of determining whether the offense of oral defamation or libel has been committed, it is evident that
the last part of Judge Gonzalez’ major premise focusing on the purpose and
intent of the speaker is erroneous.

Equally erroneous is his literal translation of the
first portion of the alleged defamatory utterance.  We agree with appellants that “mang-aagaw ng asawa may asawa,” even
if translated as “one who grabs another’s husband,” does not
necessarily mean an adulteress.  At most,
it may imply that the person to whom
it is addressed is a “flirt, a temptress, or one who indulges in enticing
other husbands;” hence, it is more of an imputation of
a vice, condition or act not constituting a crime.

If indeed it were the
intention of the appellee to impute upon the offended
party the crime of adultery, then in the light of the charge that the remarks
were made “in the heat of anger” or that, as Judge Gonzalez described
it, they were uttered in a manner “depicting the temper, emotion,
demeanor and the hatred of the petitioner (accused in the lower court) owing perhaps to a fit of
jealousy arising from her suspicion that the offended party is having immoral
relations with her husband,” appellee should
have used more direct, pointed and descriptive terms to convey the accusation
that the offended party is an adulteress. 
Under such circumstances, she would not have the luxury of time to
choose less offensive or even harmless words to camouflage a clear intent to
defame the other and thus avoid criminal or civil liability for the
utterance.  On its face, her statement is merely suggestive of a doubt as to
the kind of relationship the offended party would have with married men.  It is thus an imputation of some kind of
moral depravity, immoral conduct or a vice, but certainly not of a crime.

Neither do We agree with Judge Gonzalez’ conclusion that the
other portions of the alleged slanderous remarks “are mere accompanying
and supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and importance
to the first portion.” The other remarks are by themselves defamatory and
are not at all related to the first portion. 
They were uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or vice intended
to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the offended party.  “Tibihon“
means a person suffering from tuberculosis, and not “consumptive” as
translated by the fiscal.  “Putang Ina Mo,” although referring to a mother,
was meant to suggest that the offended party is not a legitimate daughter of
her mother.  “Walang-Hiya,”
which means “shameless,” could relate to the offended party’s being a
flirt, seducer, or a daughter of a prostitute. 
“Patay-Gutom“ is a derogatory
remark connoting abject poverty entirely unrelated to the first portion.  In short, the other imputations did not give
color and importance to the first portion; they were uttered merely to expose
all the possible vices, defects, real or imaginary, status, or condition of the
offended party.  None of these, however,
imputed any crime.

Accordingly, the last paragraph
of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that:

“No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed
by the offended party.”

which has specific reference to the
crimes against chastity,^[10]
and the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

“The crimes of adultery and concubinage
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.  x x x“

are not applicable in this case since, as above
discussed, the alleged slanderous utterances subject of the assailed
information do not impute any crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

The foregoing considered, neither People vs. Yu,
cited by the appellant, nor People vs. Padilla,
cited by appellee, is applicable in this case.  The first refers to a prosecution “for
rape with murder” (included in the generic term homicide) under Article 335 in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.  A single act resulted in two (2) grave
felonies.  Appellants admit that in the
instant case, the remarks were made in one occasion and that even granting for
the sake of argument that one portion imputes a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the rest, however, can be, hence the
applicability of People vs. Yu.  The
argument is flawed by the wrong assumption that Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code applies in this case.  Under said Article, there is a complex crime when a single act constitutes
two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing another. 
Appellants apparently forgot that it is their thesis that the rest of the utterances did not impute any crime but merely a “vice, defect, act,
and condition not constituting a
crime;” otherwise stated, regardless of the number of defamatory utterances, the appellee
can only be prosecuted for a single
offense.

Neither is People vs.
Padilla applicable.  In that case,
the special counsel of Pasay City accused Lydia
Padilla of the offense of intriguing against honor^[11] in an information which alleges that
“with the principal purpose of blemishing the honor and reputation of one Fausta Bravo, a married woman, (the accused did) circulate
and spread gossips, rumors or stories highly offensive and defamatory to her
honor, virtue and reputation, by then and there telling some people in
the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo was a paramour of one Sangalang,
a man not her husband.”^[12] The lower court dismissed the case on the
ground that it was not initiated
by a complaint filed by the offended party pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that it involves an imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio.  This
Court sustained the dismissal for the reason that the import of the allegation
in the information cannot be mistaken — “[I]t charges Fausta Bravo with committing adultery pure and
simple.” Contrary then to the pretension of appellee,
only one (1) crime was imputed — adultery.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from in SP Civil Case No.
5270 of the court below dated 7 June 1967 is hereby REVERSED.  The Order of the City Court of Davao City of 27 July 1966 in Criminal Case No. 2273-B
denying the motion to quash is hereby REINSTATED and said court is directed to proceed with the arraignment, if one
has not yet been had, and the trial of the case on its merits.

Costs against petitioner-appellee.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 23, et seq.

^[2]
Brief for Respondents-Appellant, 1-2;
5-13.

^[3]
People vs. Yu, L-13780, 28 January 1961, 1 SCRA 199.

^[4]
Rollo, 27, et seq.

^[5]
L-11575, 24 January 1959, 105
Phil. 45.

^[6]
People vs. Castro, 43 Phil. 842; 53 C.J.S. 34-35.

^[7]
Article 353, Revised Penal Code.

^[8]
53 C.J.S 283.

^[9]
U.S. vs. O’ connell, 37 Phil. 767.

^[10]
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.

^[11]
Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code.

^[12]
Underscoring supplied for emphasis.