PACIFIC TIMBER EXPORT CORPORATION, AND/OR CARLOS B. TERAOKA, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER JOAQUIN A. TANODRA, APOLITO BAUZON, DIOSDADO CAT…

On June 10, 1990 several employees of Pacific Timber Export
(PATECO) lodged a complaint with the Department of Local Government against the
non-remittance of their Social Security Service contributions by their
employer.^[1]
Twelve days later, PATECO issued two memorandum-circulars notifying eleven of
the complainants of the
termination of their services from office and the cancellation of their
privileges as PATECO employees.^[2]

On November 13, 1990, three of these employees filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the Department of Labor and asked that they be
granted separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. This was granted by Executive Labor Arbiter Antonio C. Pido on
December 17, 1990.

On that same date, the remaining complainants brought an action
with the Regional Arbiter alleging that as a result of the complaint they filed
with the DILG, their services were illegally terminated by the private
respondent.^[3]

On April 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Joaquin Tanodra, after
considering the position papers and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties, rendered a decision ordering the company to pay the dismissed
employees their separation benefits and back wages.^[4]

PATECO appealed to the NLRC, mainly on the ground of denial of
due process. This appeal having been
dismissed,^[5]
PATECO is now before this Court to invoke the same ground.

The petitioners cite Sec. 11, Rule V of the New Rules and
Procedures of the NLRC, reading as follows:

b) In case of two (2) successive non-appearances by the respondent,
despite due notice, during the complainant’s presentation of evidence, the
complainant shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte, subject to
cross-examination by the respondent, where proper, at the next hearing. Upon completion of such presentation of
evidence for the complainant, another notice of hearing for the reception of
the respondent’s evidence shall be issued, with a warning that failure of the
respondent to appear shall be construed as submission by him of the case for
resolution without presenting his evidence.

The petitioners’ contention is that after the submission of the
position papers by the parties, there was no notice from the respondent Labor
Arbiter that the hearings had been terminated. No reason for such action was given. It was only when they were furnished a copy of the decision of April 30,
1991, that they came to know that there was a scheduled hearing on April 10,
1991, presumably for the presentation by the complainants of their evidence.

The petitioners claim that if they had failed to attend the
hearing on April 10, 1991, another hearing should have been set for the
cross-examination of the complainants. Thereafter, a hearing should also have been set for them to present
their evidence, with a warning that their failure to appear would be construed
as their submission of the case for resolution.

The petitioners also point out that the notice for the April 10,
1991 hearing was served on the company and not their counsel. This was not notice in law. As early as April 2, 1991, the address of
their counsel had been notified to the Labor Arbiter, so there was no reason
why the notice was erroneously sent to the company.

On the question of dismissal, the petitioners insist that private
respondents Romualdo Magtangob, Carlito Magtangob, Domingo Abuan and Floro
Labrique voluntarily resigned so they could devote their time to fishing and trapping
lobsters. The other respondents,
namely, Felizardo Bauzon, Hipolito Bauzon and Eduardo Bauzon, Diosdado Catabay,
and Reynaldo Baradi, were dismissed from their employment on the grounds of
insurbordination and abandonment.

We hold for the respondents.

The petitioners should not have assumed that after they submitted
their position papers, the Labor Arbiter would call for a formal trial or
hearing. The holding of a trial is
discretionary on the Labor Arbiter; it is not a matter of right of the parties,
especially in this case, where the private respondents had already presented their documentary
evidence. Furthermore, it is noted that
the petitioner’s counsel attended only three of the eight scheduled hearings.^[6]

The petitioners cannot claim a denial of due process because the
Labor Arbiter gave the parties eight opportunities to ventilate their sides and
adduce evidence to substantiate their respective claims, in addition to the
position papers they submitted.

The non-service on the petitioners’ counsel of the notice of the
last scheduled hearing is not the fault of the Labor Arbiter. Although the address of their counsel was
furnished on April 2, 1991, the records show that as early as March 26, 1991,
immediately after the hearing of March 25, 1991, where the petitioners’ counsel
also did not appear,
notice to him was sent by registered mail.^[7] Prior to
the April 10 hearing, the petitioner never complained that notices were not
sent to their counsel but to the company itself. Significantly, despite the
alleged error, their counsel was able to attend the conferences on no less than
three of the eight occasions.^[8] It is too
late for them to be complaining now.

On the issue of
dismissal, we note that the petitioners failed to adduce evidence to
substantiate the private respondents’ separation. The burden was upon them as employers to show that the dismissal
was for just cause.^[9]
There was not even a single piece of evidence showing the continued absence or
abandonment of the dismissed employees.

The petitioners did ask in their position paper for a hearing to
thresh out some factual matters pertinent to their case. However, they had no right or reason to
assume that
their request would be granted. The
petitioners should have attached to their position paper all the documents that
would prove their claim in case it was decided that no hearing should be
conducted or was necessary. In fact,
the rules require that position papers shall be accompanied by all supporting
documents, including affidavits
of witnesses in lieu of their direct testimony.

The Labor Arbiter cannot be faulted for ruling out the holding of
further hearings, considering the attendance record of the petitioners’
counsel. Bearing in mind the objective
of the rules to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and
inexpensive settlement of labor disputes, the Labor Arbiter correctly ruled
that further hearings would put a heavy
burden on the workers, who would have to come all the way from Aurora, Quezon
to Quezon City.

It was the petitioner’s fault that they failed to attend the
several scheduled hearings. It would be
an injustice to require the private respondents to attend another round of
hearings simply because of the petitioners’ shortcomings.

We hold that the appeal to the NLRC and the petition now before
us have afforded the petitioners more than sufficient opportunity to be
heard. Whatever procedural flaws may
have marred the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter – although we have found none – have been rectified in the
subsequent proceedings.^[10]

The Court is not unaware of the practice of some lawyers who,
lacking plausible support for their position, simply claim a denial of due process as if it were
a universal absolution. The ground will
prove unavailing, and not surprisingly since it is virtually only a pro forma argument. Due process is
not to be bandied like a slogan. It is not a mere
catch-phrase. As the highest hallmark
of the free society, its name should not be invoked in vain but only when
justice has not been truly served.

WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been
committed by the NLRC in affirming in toto the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the
herein petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 48.

^[2]
Annexes D and E, Rollo pp. 56-57.

^[3]
Annexes F and G, Rollo pp. 58-59.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 46-55.

^[5]
Ibid, pp. 28-39.

^[6] Original Records, pp. 5, 8, 12, 14; 27,
28-29.

^[7]
Ibid., p. 30.

^[8]
Id., pp. 12-
27-28.

^[9]
Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, Sec.
279 Labor Code, Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. NLRC, 194
SCRA 573; Reyes and Lim Co. Inc. vs. NLRC, 201 SCRA 772.

^[10] TM Valderama & Sons v. Drilon,
181 SCRA 308; PNOC Energy Development Corp. v. NLRC, 201 SCRA 487;
Manila Resources Development Corporation v. NLRC, 213 SCRA 296.