G.R. No. 104166. July 30, 1993
JULITA S. ZAMBO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CARIDAD SANCHEZ VDA. DE BABAO AND EUTIQUIANO V. SANCHEZ, RESPONDENTS.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision
dated August 2, 1991, and its resolution of January 30, 1992, in CA-G.R. CV No.
16634 entitled, “Caridad Sanchez Vda. de Babao and Eutiquiano V. Sanchez
vs. Julita S. Zambo” dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
The petitioner, Julita S. Zambo, and the private respondents,
Caridad Sanchez Vda. de Babao and Eutiquiano V. Sanchez, are full blood brother
and sisters. They are the pro-indiviso
owners of a house and lot (Psu-07-01-002736-Amd) situated at the corner of A. del Rosario and Suson Streets,
Barrio Poblacion, Mandaue City which had been bequeathed to them by their
parents. On May 9, 1985, they entered
into an Agreement disposing of the property as follows:
“1. x x x.
“2. That in our desire to
have the above-described parcel of land partitioned among the three of us in
equal shares, we have agreed and decided to first demolish the residential
building which is constructed thereon together with the appurtenances thereto
immediately after which the said parcel of land shall be subdivided into three
equal portions in the most practicable and ideal manner;
“3. That we have
likewise agreed and decided that a raffle shall be drawn among the three of us
to determine which portion shall belong to each of us; that in this connection,
I, Caridad S. Vda. de Babao, hereby appoint, name and constitute Judge
Temistocles M. Boholst, Jr. of the Mandaue Municipal Trial Court to act for
and on my behalf insofar as the raffle is concerned;
“4. That the demolition
of the above-mentioned house shall be undertaken by Mrs. Julita S. Zambo;
“5. That the expenses
for the subdivision shall be borne equally by the three of us.” (p. 40,
Rollo.)
When the respondents, Caridad and Eutiquiano, requested their
sister petitioner Julita S. Zambo, to implement the terms of the above
agreement, the latter refused to do so, compelling the respondents to file
Civil Case No. MAN-79 in the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue entitled,
“Caridad Sanchez Vda. de Babao, et al. vs. Julita S. Zambo” for
specific performance.
After the issues were joined, the case was called for pre-trial
on June 2, 1986. Eutiquiano Sanchez appeared
for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his sister Caridad Sanchez Vda. de
Babao. Petitioner was represented by her
lawyer and attorney-in-fact, Omar Redulla, who submitted a duly-notarized
Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1986, which reads:
“I, JULITA S. ZAMBO, of legal age, married and a resident of
Alang-Alang, Mandaue City, do hereby NAME, CONSTITUTE and APPOINT OMAR B.
REDULLA, of legal age, married and a resident of Looc, Mandaue City to be my
true and lawful attorney-in-fact at the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No.
MAN-79 entitled “CARIDAD SANCHEZ VDA. DE BABAO, et al., vs. JULITA S.
ZAMBO,” before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, on such date as
may be agreed upon by the parties or directed by the Court, with full
power to do and perform in my behalf any and all acts which I could legally do
and perform including the power to consider and agree upon the following:
“1. The possibility of
an amicable settlement under such terms and conditions as said attorney-in?fact may
deem proper and beneficial;
“2. The simplification
of the issues;
“3. The possibility of
obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
“4. The limitation of the
number of witnesses;
“5. Such other matters as
may aid in the prompt disposition of this action.” (p. 84, Rollo.)
When the case was called for pre-trial, the parties and their
attorneys-in-fact discussed possible terms of settlement. Petitioner was willing to comply with the
May 5, 1985 agreement provided that their other brothers, Mariano and Bonifacio
Sanchez, and their sister Marcelina Sanchez-Cabrera (who had neither claim nor
interest in the property in question), would manifest that they had no
objection to the demolition of the house in Poblacion, Mandaue City. The three willingly executed a joint
affidavit stating that indeed they had no objection to the implementation of
the agreement among Eutiquiano, Caridad and Julita, and to the demolition of
the building on the lot. The contending
parties then manifested to the court on the same date that they had come to an
agreement of amicable settlement, as follows:
“1. The parties, duly assisted
by counsels or their duly authorized representatives, hereby agree to affirm,
confirm and abide by all the terms and conditions of the May 5, 1985 agreement
entered into among themselves subject matter of the case.
“2. Defendant agree(s) to
demolish the existing building situated at A. del Rosario Street and Suson St.,
Poblacion, Mandaue City, constructed on a parcel of land ‘Psu-07-01-002736-Amd’
on or before July 3, 1986.
“3. All expenses for
demolition shall be for the account of Julita Zambo pursuant to paragraph 4 of
aforesaid agreement.
“4. All materials derived
from the demolished building shall be apportioned, in three (3) equal parts but
with defendant Julita Zambo having priority right to choose her 1/3 portion after
which all remaining materials shall be left on the premises to be removed by
plaintiffs after the lottery of the
subdivided lot pursuant to paragraphs 2 & 3 of aforesaid agreement.
“5. Parties agree to
commission Atty. Michael Mayol to prepare a subdivision plan of aforesaid lot
using as frontage the portion facing Suson St. and dividing said lot in
accordance with applicable provisions of law.
“6. The raffle referred to in par.[s] 2
& 3 of the agreement shall be ten (10) days from actual completion of
demolition of the aforementioned building.
“7. Other co-heirs of the
parties have manifested their conformity to the implementation of the foregoing
agreement.” (pp. 34-35, Rollo.)
Assisted by their
respective counsel, they affirmed and signed the above agreement before the
trial judge.
On June 5, 1986, the trial court, “finding the agreement not
contrary to law, morals, and public policy,” (p. 52, Rollo) approved it
and rendered judgment ordering the parties thereto to obey, abide by and
comply with all the conditions therein set forth.
However, Julita Zambo had another change of heart. She filed a petition for relief from the
court’s June 5, 1986 order. The
respondents opposed it. Petitioner filed her Comments and Reply to the
Opposition. The respondents filed a
Memorandum of Authorities in support of their opposition to the petition for
relief from judgment.
On August 14, 1987, the new presiding Judge of the trial court
issued an Order denying the petition for relief. Julita Zambo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
16634) alleging “mistake” and “excusable negligence” of her
attorney-in-fact, even as she conceded
that there may have been no fraud.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on August 2, 1991
dismissing the appeal.
When appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the adverse
decision was denied for lack of merit, she came to the Supreme Court by a petition
for review, alleging that there is neither factual nor legal basis for the
appellate court’s “interpretation” or finding that the special power
of attorney which she delivered to Attorney Redulla authorized him to enter
into a compromise agreement and that there was no mistake or negligence on his
part in performing his commission.
The petition has no merit.
It has long been settled that a public document executed and
attested through the intervention of
a notary public is evidence of the facts in
clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these,
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (Gevero
vs. IAC, 189 SCRA 201, citing Rebuldeda vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 520). Such evidence does not exist in this case.
After reading the
questioned Special Power of Attorney in its entirety, we find not the slightest
ambiguity in its terms. Moreover, this
case does not come under any of the exceptions which would justify a review by
us of the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court. There exists no reason to
further delay the execution of the judgment by compromise in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.