MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND MELBA C. BELONCIO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review on certiorari the National Labor
Relations Commission’s (NLRC) decision which modified the Labor Arbiter’s
decision and ordered the Manila Mandarin Employees Union to pay the wages and
fringe benefits of Melba C. Beloncio from the time she was placed on forced leave until
she is atually reinstated, plus ten percent (10%)
thereof as attorney’s fees.  Manila
Mandarin Hotel was ordered to reinstate Beloncio and
to pay her whatever service charges may be due her during that period, which
amount would be held in escrow by the hotel.

The petition was filed on January
19, 1987.  The private
respondent filed her comment on March
7, 1987 while the Solicitor General filed a comment on June 1, 1987 followed by the
petitioner’s reply on August 22, 1987.  We treat
the comment as answer and decide the case on its merits.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Herein private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio,
an employee of Manila Mandarin Hotel since 1976 and at the time of her
dismissal, assistant head waitress at the hotel’s coffee shop, was expelled
from the petitioner Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts allegedly inimical
to the interests of the union.  The union
demanded the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on
the basis of the union security clause of their collective bargaining agreement
and the Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced
leave effective August 10, 1984.

The union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement
provides:

“Section 2.  Dismissals.

x  x  x  x  x

b)  Members of the Union who
cease to be such members and/or who fail to maintain their membership in good
standing therein by reason of their resignation from the Union, and/or by
reason of their expulsion from the Union, in accordance with the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Union, for non-payment of union dues and
other assessment, for organizing,
joining or forming another labor organization shall, upon written
notice of such cessation of membership or failure to maintain membership in the
Union and upon written demand to the company by the Union, be dismissed from
employment by the Company after complying with the requisite due process
requirement; xxx” (Underlining supplied)” (Rollo,
p. 114)

Two days before the effective date of her forced leave or on August 8, 1984, Beloncio
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against
herein petitioner-union and Manila Mandarin Hotel, Inc. before the NLRC,
Arbitration Branch.

Petitioner-union filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the
complainant had no cause of action against it and the NLRC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint.

This motion was denied by the Labor Arbiter.

After the hearings that ensued and the submission of the parties’
respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter held that the union was guilty of
unfair labor practice when it demanded the separation of Beloncio.  The union was then ordered to pay all the wages and fringe benefits due to Beloncio
from the time she was on forced leave until actual
reinstatement, and to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.  The charge against the hotel was
dismissed.

The Union then appealed to the respondent
NLRC which modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision as earlier stated.

A subsequent motion for reconsideration and a second motion for
reconsideration were denied.

Hence, this present petition.

The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:

I

“THAT RESPONDENT NLRC ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY INVOLVED INTRA-UNION CONFLICTS AND
THEREFOR IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER THEREOF.

II

“THAT RESPONDENT
NLRC SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S SALARY AND FRINGE BENEFITS, AND AWARD OF 10% ATTORNEY’S FEES,
AFTER FINDING AS UNMERITORIOUS HER PRETENDED CLAIMS OR COMPLAINTS FOR UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE, ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, AND DAMAGES.”

(Rollo, pp. 6-9)

On the issue of the NLRC jurisdiction over the case, the Court
finds no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC conclusion that the dispute is not
purely intra-union but involves an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) provisions and
whether or not there was an illegal dismissal. 
Under the CBA, membership in the union may be lost through expulsion
only if there is non-payment of dues or a member organizes, joins, or
forms another labor organization.  The charge
of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her
emotional remark to a waitress who happened to be a union steward, “Wala akong tiwala
sa Union ninyo“.  The remark was made in the course of a heated
discussion regarding Beloncio’s efforts to make a
lazy and recalcitrant waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work.

We agree with the Solicitor General when he noted that:

“xxx The Labor Arbiter explained correctly that ‘(I)f the
only question is the legality of the expulsion of Beloncio
from the Union undoubtedly, the question is one
cognizable by the BLR (Bureau of Labor Relations).  But, the question extended to the dismissal
of Beloncio or steps leading thereto.  Necessarily, when the hotel decides the
recommended dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny.  Particularly, it will be asked whether it
violates or not the existing CBA.  Certainly,
violations of the CBA would be unfair labor practice.’

“Article 250 of the Labor Code provides the following:

“‘Art. 250.  Unfair labor practices of labor
organizations.  – It shall be unfair
labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:

xxx                                                         xxx                                                       xxx

“’(b)  To cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual
terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is
made available to other members.‘ (Underscoring supplied)

Article 217 of the Labor Code also provides:

“‘Art. 217.  Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.  – (a) The Labor Arbiters
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide x x x the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non agricultural;

“‘(1) 
Unfair labor practice cases;

xxx                                                         xxx                                                       xxx

“'(b)  The
Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided
by Labor Arbiters.’” (Rollo, pp.
155-157.)

The petitioner also
questions the factual findings of the public respondent on the reasons for Beloncio’s dismissal and, especially, on the argument that she was on forced leave; she was never dismissed;
and not having worked, she deserved no pay.

The Court finds nothing in the records that indicates reversible
error, much less grave abuse of discretion, in the NLRC’s
findings of facts.

It is a well-settled principle that findings of facts
quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.  (Akay Printing Press v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
140 SCRA 381; Alba Patio de Makati v. Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association, 128 SCRA 253; Dangan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA
706; De La Concepcion v. Mindanao Portland Cement
Corporation, 127 SCRA 647).

The petitioner now questions the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent and
directing the Union to pay the wages and fringe benefits
which she failed to receive as a result of her forced leave and to pay
attorney’s fees.

We find no error in the questioned decision.

The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio
to go on forced leave were it not for the union’s insistence and demand to the
extent that because of the failure of the hotel to dismiss Beloncio
as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair labor practice.  The hotel was then compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and to stop payment of her salary
from September 1, 1984.

Furthermore, as provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement between the petitioner – the Union and the Manila Mandarin Hotel,
“the Union shall hold the Company free and blameless from any and all
liabilities that may arise” should the employee question the dismissal, as
has happened in the case at bar.

It is natural for a union to desire that all workers in a
particular company should be its dues-paying members.  Since it would be difficult to insure 100 percent membership on a purely
voluntary basis and practically impossible that such total membership would
continuously be maintained purely on the merits of belonging to the union, the
labor movement has evolved the system whereby the employer is asked, on the
strength of collective action, to enter into what are now familiarly known as
“union security” agreements.

The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union
security clause – a closed-shop agreement.

A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds
himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to
remain members in good standing to keep their jobs.  It is “the most prized achievement of
unionism”.  It adds membership and
compulsory dues.  By holding out to loyal
members a promise of employment in the closed-shop, it welds group
solidarity.  (National
Labor Union v. Aguinaldo’s Echague,
Inc., 97 Phil. 184).  It is a very
effective form of union security agreement.

This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union
security, and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution.  (Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87; Manalang v. Artex Development Company, Inc., 21 SCRA 561).

The Court stresses, however, that union security clauses are also
governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, and legality.  Union security clauses cannot be used by union
officials against an employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility,
fairness, prudence, and judiciousness.

A union member may not be expelled from her union, and
consequently from her job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes
foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a manner characterized by
arbitrariness and whimsicality.

This is particularly true
in this case where Ms. Beloncio was trying her best
to make a hotel bus boy do his work
promptly and courteously so as
to serve hotel customers in the coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully.  Union
membership does not entitle waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy
in their work, inattentive to customers, and disrespectful to supervisors.  The Union
should have disciplined its erring and troublesome members instead of causing
so much hardship to a member who was only doing her work for the best interests
of the employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they serve.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.  The questioned decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.  Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.