PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGACIANO TADUYO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This case traces its origins to events which transpired on the afternoon
of 6 February 1973 at the
residence of complainant Margarita Mahayag, situated
in Barrio Carayman, Calbayog City,
Samar.  As an outcome of such events, two separate
criminal informations were filed in April 1973
against defendant-appellant Rogaciano Taduyo with Branch 5 of the then Court of First Instance of
Samar:

A.   Criminal Case No. 425 – charged the
accused with frustrated homicide:

“That on or about the 6th day of February 1973, in the
afternoon, in Bo. Carayman, Calbayog
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and armed with a sharp-pointed weapon,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with said weapon one Margarita Mahayag, who, as a result thereof, sustained wound on her
body, which would have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused, that is, by the able medical attendance rendered which prevented
the death of said Margarita Mahayag.

Contrary to law.

B.   Criminal
Case No. 426 – charged the accused with attempted rape, later amended to
consummated rape.  The complaint of the
offended party read:

“That on or about the 6th day of February 1973, in the
afternoon, in Bo. Carayman, Calbayog
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused actuated by lust, and with the use of deadly weapon, namely
a sharp-pointed instrument, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of undersigned complainant, against the latter’s will.

Contrary to law.”

At arraignment, the accused, aided by counsel, entered a plea of
“not guilty” to both charges against him.  Since the offenses charged in Criminal Case
No. 425 and Criminal Case No. 426 were very closely related to each other in
point of time and circumstance, and with the consent of the parties involved,
the two cases were tried jointly.

After trial, the court a quo found Rogaciano Taduyo guilty of
frustrated homicide and consummated rape. 
The dispositive portions of the decision read:

Criminal Case No. 425

“PREMISES considered, the Court finds the accused ROGACIANO
TADUYO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide a
charged in the information and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences the aforenamed accused to suffer an
imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY prision mayor as
the maximum; to pay the costs of the proceedings; to pay Margarita Mahayag the sum of P3,000.00 as exemplary and moral damages
and to suffer such other accessory penalties of the law.  He shall be credited in full with the total
period of his detention in correction with the case if he agrees to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon prisoners; otherwise, he shall only be
credited with 4/5 of such detention in accordance with RA 6127.”

Criminal Case No. 426

‘WHEREFORE, the Court finds ROGACIANO TADUYO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized by Article 335 (1),
paragraph 2, [Revised Penal Code] with the aggravating circumstance of robbery
committed on the occasion of the rape with no mitigating circumstance to offset
the same, and sentences the aforesaid accused to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH; to pay the costs of the proceedings; to compensate the victim, Margarita
Taduyo (sic) with the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) for moral damages in accordance with Article 21 and 2219, both of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines; to restitute to Margarita Mahayag the sum of P430.00 which he took from his
victim.  He shall likewise suffer such
other accessory penalties of the law.”

The defendant appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide to
the Court of Appeals where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
16022-CR.  The appeal was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals on 22 October 1975
since the accused himself stated in a letter-request to the Court of Appeals
that he was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal and failed to submit an
appellant’s brief.

The judgment of conviction for rape came before this Court on
automatic review.

The evidence for the prosecution consists mainly of the
testimonies of the complainant Margarita Mahayag, Julieta Legaspi, Amancio Amoguis and Dr. Lazaro Cutanda, the physician who
first examined Margarita after the events complained of.  The facts as they emerge from such evidence,
are outlined below.

Margarita Mahayag, then twenty-nine
years of age, testified that she was married to Francisco Mahayag
who, however, had abandoned her on 16
August 1972.  She has a house
situated in Barrio Carayman, Calbayog City,
Samar where she lived with her
two children, an eight-year old child and an infant of nine months.  Near the stairway which led to the interior
of her home, she maintained a small sari-sari store where she sold a
limited assortment of grocery items.

At around three o’clock
in the afternoon of 6 February 1973,
appellant Rogaciano Taduyo
came up her house and asked to buy ten-centavos’ worth of Pine cigarettes.  After Margarita handed over the cigarettes to
Rogaciano, the latter requested a drink of water.  Obliging, Margarita, followed by Rogaciano, went inside her kitchen (where her children
were) and proceeded to fetch a glass of water for her thirsty customer.

As Margarita turned to face Rogaciano,
she was suddenly startled to find him standing in front of her wielding a
ten-inch knife.  Almost immediately, Rogaciano pressed the knife’s point on Margarita’s stomach
and demanded money.  Fear-stricken,
Margarita acceded and led Rogaciano into her bedroom
(located some three meters away from the kitchen) when she kept her money.

Inside her bedroom, Margarita surrendered to Rogaciano
P430.00 which she had kept hidden inside a wooden trunk.  Thereupon, Rogaciano,
with knife in hand, forced Margarita to lie on the floor face up and commanded
her to undress.  Margarita refused, so Rogaciano forcibly tore off her shorts and undergarments
(Exhibits “A” and “A-1”). 
Rogaciano opened his pants, pulled out his sex
organ and then lay on top of Margarita and proceeded to assault sexually his
helpless and unwilling victim.

During the coerced coitus, Rogaciano
thoughtlessly put down the knife he had been holding in his right hand and
placed it on the floor, somewhere to the left of Margarita.  Margarita reached for the knife with her left
hand, grasped it and thrust the blade into the right side of Rogaciano, causing him suddenly to withdraw from above
her.  A struggle immediately ensued
during which Rogaciano was able to regain possession
of the knife.  So armed, the wounded Rogaciano chased Margarita and, upon overtaking her at the
main doorway to her home (about two arms’ lengths from her bedroom), locked her
in an embrace and stabbed her.  The
wounded Margarita stumbled and fell down the staircase leading from her house.  She managed to escape and reach the house of Anastacia Obong (Rogaciano’s cousin) some fifteen meters away.  Unfortunately, she found no one there who
could help her as only children were at home at the time.  Margarita returned to her own house two minutes
later and put on fresh clothes.  Soon afterwards
along the main barrio road, she chanced upon Engracia
Obong who assisted her in boarding a tricycle and
accompanied her to the Calbayog City General Hospital
where she was confined and treated for her injuries.

Margarita did not complain to the doctors present at the hospital
that she had been sexually attacked by Rogaciano.  Consequently, no medical examination was
carried out on her person to determine whether or not she had been raped.  However, upon her discharge from the hospital
20 days later on 26 February 1973,
she promptly reported the entire incident to the authorities at the Philippine
Constabulary Detachment Office in Calbayog
City.^[1]

Julieta Legaspi
testified that at around three o’clock
in the afternoon of 6 February 1973,
she was at the house of Margarita Mahayag to borrow
money from Margarita.  She knocked on the
main door but received no answer from within. 
Seeing, however, that the door was open, Julieta
entered the house and proceeded up the staircase.  Once upstairs, Julieta
notice Margarita’s children playing in the kitchen while inside the bedroom
(about six meters from where she stood) she saw Rogaciano
Taduyo who was then holding a knife at the abdomen of
Margarita.  Julieta
observed that Margarita was close to tears when the latter handed over some
money to Rogaciano. 
She also testified that she stayed inside the house for only about a
minute before departing for the barrio proper of Carayman.^[2]

Amancio Amoguis
testified that at around three o’clock
in the afternoon of 6 February 1973,
he was resting inside his house when he heard Margarita Mahayag
yell “Tabag!” (“Help, a
man!”) twice.  He immediately got up
and rushed over to the house of Margarita situated just ten meters away.  Like Julieta Legaspi, Amancio was able to
enter Margarita’s house because the main door was left open.  Inside, he saw Margarita being chased,
embraced and then stabbed once in the right side of her abdomen by Rogaciano Taduyo.  Amancio also
observed that Rogaciano was already wounded on his
right side when the latter stabbed Margarita. 
He backed off and returned to his house because Rogaciano
had threatened to kill him if he ventured any closer.  Minutes later, he saw Margarita run towards
the house of Anastacia Obong;
he did not, however, see where Rogaciano went.^[3]

Dr. Lazaro Cutanda,
then a junior resident physician at the Calbayog City
General Hospital,
testified that he examined Margarita Mahayag inside
the emergency room of the hospital on the afternoon of 6 February 1973 when she was brought in for
surgery.  He prepared a Physical Injuries
Report at 3:20 p.m. that same
afternoon describing the extent of Margarita’s injuries.^[4]

“Penerating wound right lumbar area.

Wound 1 inch at the
inferior border of the

right lobe of the liver.”

Dr. Cutanda
opined that if Margarita’s assailant were left-handed, then Margarita must have
been frontally assaulted; and if her assailant were right-handed, then she was
stabbed from behind.  Dr. Cutanda, referring to Margarita’s wound, categorically stated
that “(i)f the patient was not operated [upon],
she will die.”^[5]

The defense of Rogaciano Taduyo consisted generally of denying that he had raped
Margarita with whom, he claimed, he had been living as husband and wife at the
time the events complained of took place and for sometime before.^[6]
Essentially, Rogaciano’s defense was that he could
not have raped Margarita, for he had no need to rape her.  He painted a picture of Margarita as a woman
of highly developed sexuality, who was accustomed to multiple intercourse with
him and who found him irresistible because he was well-endowed physically.  He claimed he had been meeting Margarita
clandestinely even before her husband had abandoned her.^[7]
His more specific defense consisted of the claim that Margarita, far from being
a victim, was the aggressor during the events which took place in her house in
the afternoon of 6 February 1973.

Rogaciano’s version of those events was
basically the following:  In the
afternoon of 6 February 1973, Rogaciano saw Margarita,
Anastacia Obong (Rogaciano’s cousin), Irene Mahayag,
and a fourth woman unknown to him, all drinking tuba in front of
Margarita’s store.  He approached the
group upon Anastacia’s invitation but Margarita
suddenly hurled a bowl at him, hitting him on the forehead.  Perplexed but unangered,
he disregarded this unexpected act of hostility and went home.  Later in the same afternoon, Rogaciano returned to Margarita’s store to buy cigarettes
for his elder brother Tarcilo.  He went upstairs upon Margarita’s invitation.  Inside, he asked her why she had thrown a
bowl at him earlier.  According to Rogaciano, Margarita retorted that she resented his
belittling her.  She then threatened him
saying “papatayun ta
ikao” and, with that warning, suddenly
thrust a knife into his right side. 
Margarita attempted to stab a second time but, Rogaciano
said, he grasped her knife and twisted it around and pushed the knife towards
her own body and wounded her in the abdomen. 
All he remembered after that, he testified, was that Margarita ran away,
as a few moments later he fell unconscious along the stairway of the house.^[8]

Rogaciano was taken by his bother Tarcilo to the Calbayog City
General Hospital
where he was treated for his injuries and he was confined for ten (10)
days.  Upon his discharge therefrom on 16
February 1976, he surrendered himself to the Constabulary
authorities stationed in Calbayog
City.^[9]

Rogaciano sought to explain the sudden
knife attack by Margarita by testifying that two (2) days before the incident,
Margarita had seen him offer a bottle of softdrink to
another woman in the Barrio, one Tita Achoso, in the neighborhood store.  Margarita, he further suggested, was also
disturbed by news of her estranged husband returning from Manila.^[10]

The defense presented two (2) witnesses to corroborate Rogaciano’s claim that he and Margarita were common-law
husband and wife.  The first witness, Demetrio Bongo, in effect testified that he was a voyeur,
that he had one evening in May 1972, climbed the house of Margarita and peeped
through the wall of her bedroom and for half an hour watched Rogaciano and Margarita sprawled on the floor, locked in
coitus.^[11]
A second witness, Alfonso Antor, a compadre and business (“buy and sell”)
associate of the accused Rogaciano Taduyo, testified that he passed by every morning at 5:00
o’clock for Rogaciano at the house of Margarita on
his way to work and that Rogaciano had informed him
that he was living with Margarita.^[12]

Clearly, the resolution of the present appeal must turn on the
issue of credibility of the witnesses on each side.  Only Margarita herself testified that the
accused had indeed raped her.  But this
is by means unusual.  Indeed, in a
prosecution for rape, more often than not, only the offended party can testify
as to the act of coerced copulation. 
Accordingly, the Court has held that conviction of rape may ensue on the
sole basis of the complainant’s testimony where such testimony is found to be
positive and credible.^[13]

The trial court explicitly assayed the credibility of the testimony
respectively presented by complainant and by the accused.  The trial Judge clearly was not moved or
convinced by the story presented by the accused and his witnesses.  Indeed, the lurid character of that defense
story and the ocular examination by the court of the physical endowment Rogaciano had boasted about,^[14]
convinced the court he was merely spinning a tale.  Upon the other hand, the Judge accorded the
testimony of Margarita full weight.  The
trial Judge said:

“The court in appreciating the totality of the evidence laid
before it, finds that the prosecution evidence should be accorded more faith    and credence than that of the defense
because it is founded upon the common experience of man.  More than that from the stand the court noted
that the complaining witness narrated her harrowing experience in a manner that
left no doubt as to her sincerity and candor. 
Upon the other hand the story of the defense is like one copied from
books on pornography or from the pornographic “bomba
komiks” that saturated the country during the
days before martial law.  The narration
by the accused as to how he undressed Margarita before the supposed sexual acts
he had with her and how Margarita wiped his genital organ with her panty after
every copulative act, looks fiction(al)ized or at the
least invented.  x x
x

xxx                                                    xxx                                                       xxx

With respect to Margarita’s version as to how she was abused by Rogaciano Taduyo, there is no
corroboration.  But that fact alone has
not weakened the case of the people. 
When Margarita was on the stand she did not show any trace of hesitancy
as she described how the fear of the knife poked at her by Rogaciano
made her lie down on the floor and offered no resistance when the accused
inserted his penis into her vagina.  She
was candid in her answers to questions propounded to her.  There was no indicia of artificiality in her
manner of testifying which are easily detected in a witness who has a
fabricated story.  x x
x“^[15]

Necessarily, the findings of fact of the trial Judge must be
accorded great weight by an appellate tribunal^[16]
for the latter can only read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses which
commonly is translated from the local dialect into English.  In the process of converting into written
form the statements of living human beings, not only fine nuances but a world
of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and listening, may escape
the reader of the written, translated words.

The accused stressed the fact that Margarita did not tell any one
in Calbayog
City General Hospital
that she had been raped.  This fact,
however, does not appear to us to be critical. 
Margarita was unconscious when she arrived in the hospital that
afternoon of 6 February 1973,
and was rushed to the operating room for emergency laparatomy
surgery.^[17]
It is common knowledge that post-operative stupor may take time to clear
up.  Such factors, coupled with the
severe shock complainant must have experienced, would account for her failure
to tell her story to the hospital doctors during her confinement.  What is important is that she reported the
whole incident — the rape and the stabbing — to the Constabulary authorities
as soon as she left the hospital on 26
February 1973.  This is
consistent with her explanation^[18]
that her temporary silence at the hospital was due merely to her belief that
the criminal charge of rape was appropriately lodged with the police
authorities rather than with the hospital officials.

The accused also claimed that the criminal charge for rape was
instituted against him by Margarita basically to justify Margarita’s act of
stabbing him and to counteract the charge of frustrated murder which Rogaciano had supposedly filed against Margarita with the
City Fiscal of Calbayog City.^[19]
The accused, however, completely failed to show that he had indeed filed a
criminal complaint against Margarita.

The testimony of Rogaciano and his
witnesses failed to convince the trial court; this Court has neither reason nor
inclination to overthrow the findings of the trial courts.  The bowl-throwing incident which allegedly
took place in front of Margarita’s store was not proven by evidence other than
the accused’s bare assertion.  The defense could have easily presented the accused’s own cousin, Anastacia Obong, who was supposed to have been present at that
incident to testify on it on behalf of the accused; but the defense did not do
so.  In any case, that story of Rogaciano is not only uncorroborated but also, to our mind,
improbable and inadequate to explain the supposed murderous attack by Margarita
upon Rogaciano.

The testimony of the voyeur Demetrio
Bongo must have appeared contrived and prurient to the trial Judge.  We note that Rogaciano’s
claim that he and Margarita had been living together as common-law husband and
wife, a relationship not easily kept secret in a small rural community like Carayman, could have been easily established by unrelated,
competent and credible witnesses, e.g., by barrio people living in the
immediate vicinity of Margarita’s house or the accused’s
own relatives.  The defense, however,
failed to present any such supporting testimony.  The testimony of defense witness Alfonso Antor, which was in itself inadequate to show a common law
marital relationship between the accused and the complainant, was not
corroborated even by the accused himself.

There is another reason why we are compelled to reject the accused’s defense that he and Margarita were common law
husband and wife.  One may assume arguendo merely, that Rogaciano
and Margarita did live together as pretended husband and wife.  But that by itself does not prove that Rogaciano could not have raped Margarita, that
Margarita would never have denied Rogaciano
sexual access.  Certainly, no presumption
arises that a common law wife will, or is willing to, submit to the common law
husband’s embraces always and under all circumstances.  Proof of a prior history of a common law
marital relationship will not prevail over clear and positive evidence of
copulation by the use of force or intimidation. 
In People vs. Blance,^[20]
Mr. Justice Johnson explained:

“Admitting that the appellant had been having illicit
relations with the offended party for months before the time and place
mentioned in the complaint, yet, nevertheless, that fact would not constitute a
defense, providing the illicit relations, which are described in the complaint,
took place by force and violence and against the will of the offended
party.”

“The fact that Maria Bernales may
have been an unchaste character constitutes no defense of the charge of rape,
providing it is proved that the illicit relations described in the complaint
were committed with force and violence. 
The appellant is equally guilty, under the law, if force and violence
were used, regardless of the good or bad morals of Maria Bernales.”^[21]
(Underscoring supplied.)

To our mind, the stab wound inflicted by
Margarita upon Rogaciano, and that sustained by
Margarita herself from Rogaciano, are sufficient
proof that she did not consent indeed objected vehemently to Rogaciano’s embraces that afternoon of 6 February 1973.

We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the guilt of
the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt.

We turn now to the robbery that the trial court found to have
been committed by the accused.  That
robbery was, however, neither alleged in one or the other of the two (2) informations filed against Rogaciano,
nor charged in a third separate information. 
In any case, robbery can scarcely be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance in the crime of rape and the trial Judge was in error in so
considering it in the instant case.  We
have taken note of the fact that the accused immediately surrendered himself to
the Constabulary authorities upon his discharge from the hospital on 16 February 1973.  Until that point, no formal charges had been
filed against him by complainant who was still in the hospital recovering from
her injuries.  The informations
for homicide and rape were in fact filed only on 26 February 1973, i.e., ten (10) days after the accused
had given himself up.  Furthermore, it
appears that the warrant for his arrest was never issued.  Under the circumstances, therefore, it may
reasonably be inferred that the accused’s surrender
to the authorities was spontaneous and voluntary and not one forced upon him by
extraneous circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, insofar as it relates to
the conviction of the accused-appellant of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the death penalty imposed by the trial court is hereby
reduced to reclusion perpetua in view
of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender^[22]
which offsets the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon^[23],
and in accordance with Article III, Sec. 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
abolishing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original TSN, pp. 85-103, 5 June 1973.

^[2] Id.,
pp. 3-18, 25 June 1973.

^[3] Id.,
pp. 26-45, 26 June 1973.

^[4]
Original Records, p. 62.

^[5]
Original TSN, pp. 70-76, 11 July 1973.

^[6] Id.,
p. 149, 23 August 1973.

^[7] Id.,
pp. 151 and 174.

^[8] Id.,
pp. 166 and 170.

^[9] Id.,
p. 167.

^[10] Id.,
pp. 164-165.

^[11] Id.,
pp. 190, 192 and 199, 16 October 1973.

^[12] Id.,
pp. 204-206.

^[13]
People vs. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668 [1986].

^[14]
Original TSN, p. 176, 23 August 1973.  See also Decision, pp. 15-16.

^[15]
Decision, pp. 14-16.

^[16]
People vs. Eguac, 80 SCRA 665 [1977].

^[17]
Original TSN, pp. 113-114, 5 June 1973.  See also Decision, p. 12.

^[18] Id.,
pp. 114-115.  See also Brief for the Appellee, p. 17.

^[19]
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 13. 
See also Original TSN, pp. 168-169, 23 August 1973.

^[20]
45 Phil. 113 [1923].

^[21]
45 Phil. at 116.

^[22]
Article 13 (7), Revised Penal Code.

^[23] Article
335, 3rd paragraph, Revised Penal Code.