ERNESTO ROBLES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, ATANACIO GERONIMO AND BENEDICTO GERONIMO, RESPONDENTS.

The central figure in this case is Severino
Geronimo, who worked in the petitioner’s land for twenty years until 1969 and
died the following year at the age of 86. 
The central question in this case is the nature of the work he performed
and the compensation he was supposed to receive.

After his death, an ejectment suit was
filed against his two sons by the petitioner, who claimed they had no right to
remain in his land.^[1]
Benedicto Geronimo did not choose to answer and so
was declared in default.^[2]
The other defendant, Atanacio Geronimo, averred that
he was entitled to succeed his father as the petitioner’s agricultural tenant in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and Section 9 of
R.A. No. 3844.

The private respondent’s position is that his father was an
agricultural tenant of the petitioner during the twenty years the former worked
in the latter’s land.  Hence, in
accordance with the aforementioned laws, he could remain in the petitioner’s
land under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy share arrangement
entered into between his father and the petitioner.  His share should also be P100.00 more or less
per harvest every forty days during the time he continued discharging his
father’s work as his statutory successor.^[3]

The petitioner, for his part, insists that Severino
Geronimo was never an agricultural tenant of his but worked merely as a watcher
in his land.  He did receive the sum of
P100.00 every harvest but not as his
share therein for that amount was given to him as a reward for his past services.  The only work he did was watch over the
petitioner’s land and make brooms out of the fallen coconut leaves he would
gather.  He sold these brooms and kept
the proceeds for himself without sharing them with the petitioner.^[4]

After trial, the Court of
Agrarian Relations* rendered judgment recognizing the defendant as the agricultural tenant of the plaintiff and
ordering the payment to him of the sum of P12,000.00
as his tenancy share.^[5] Not satisfied, the petitioner went to the
Court of Appeals,^** which affirmed the challenged decision in
toto.^[6] The petitioner is now before us and faults
the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion for upholding the trial
court.

We do not agree that the
respondent court erred.  On the contrary,
we find that its findings are supported by the evidence of record and in accord
with the applicable law and doctrine.

Thus, on the nature of
the work performed by Severino Geronimo, it quoted
with approval the conclusion of the trial court that he “was the tenant on
the subject parcel for quite a time and was recognized by Ernesto Robles as
such,” discharging such tasks as supervising the harvest, cutting down bushes, clearing the land,
picking up the fallen nuts, and paying the laborers, like the coconut gatherers
and huskers, from his 1/3 share.^[7] This was based on the declarations of
several witnesses,^[8] including the petitioner himself, and the
several documents presented by Atanacio in which his
father was described by the petitioner as his “kasama” to whom was being
given his “bahagui” or share.^[9]

As for the private respondent’s right to succeed his father, the
respondent court was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court that, as the son
of Severino Geronimo, Atanacio
had the right to take over as agricultural tenant in the petitioner’s land in accordance
with R.A. No. 1199 and R.A. No. 3844.^[10]
Obviously, Atanacio was the only heir interested in
succeeding his father as his brother, Benedicto, had not
seen fit to claim his right and in fact defaulted in resisting the petitioner’s
claims in the ejectment suit.  Significantly, when in his prayer the
petitioner asks for authority to appoint the said Benedicto
to succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher only and not as
agricultural tenant.  The petitioner’s consistent
claim, it should be noted, is that Severino Geronimo was not his
tenant but only his watcher.

The Court gave limited due course to this petition to enable the parties
to argue on the amount of damages in view of the apparent lack of a credible
basis therefor as observed by the trial court.^[11]
In his memorandum, the petitioner says the basis should be the weight of the
coconut harvested and then, consistent with his main thesis, urges that no
damages should be awarded at all.^[12] The private respondent says that the basis should be the number of nuts
harvested and then asks that the damages be doubled.^[13] In his reply, realizing probably that the
matter may have gotten out of hand, the petitioner now counters that the
private respondent cannot claim an increase in the amount of damages because he
has not, providentially, appealed the same.^[14] This is correct and estops
the private respondent.

In La Mallorca
v. Court of Appeals,^[15] the Court said:

“The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however,
cannot be sustained.  Generally, the
Appellate Court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant’s brief.  Plaintiff did not appeal from that portion of
judgment of the trial court awarding them
damages.  Neither does it appear that, as appellees
to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief inadequacy
of the award or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00
was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an
exception to the general rule.  Thus, the
Court of Appeals committed error in raising the amount for damages.”

In Dy v. Kuizon,^[16]
we declared:

“It is a well-settled
rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the
decision of the court below.  An appellee who is not appellant may assign errors in his
brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he
may not do so if his purpose is to have the judgment modified or reversed for,
in such a case, he must appeal.  Here,
the respondent did not appeal and so it was error for the Court of Appeals to
award him a relief not granted
by the lower court.”

In Madrideo
v. Hon. Court of Appeals,^[17] our ruling was:

“x x x
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil
case, an appellee
who has  not appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the
decision of the court below.”

The latest decision on
this matter is Aguilar v. Chan,^[18] where the Court noted that although the
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff-appellee
exceeded the amount awarded to her by the lower court, this amount could not be
increased because she had not appealed.

The trial court had the
opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand and so was in the best position
to determine the factual relationship between the parties as well as the share
to which the private respondent was entitled. 
We do not find that the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the decision of the court a quo and see no reason to
reverse it.  We too affirm.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED, with costs against
the petitioner.  This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
and Paras, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 28.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 29.

^[3]
Id., p. 58.

^[4]
Id., p. 8.

* Judge Antonio O. Yatco, Ninth Regional
District, Branch I, Lucena City.

^[5]
Id., p. 109.

^[6]
Id., pp. 28-37.

^[7]
Id., pp. 101-103.

^[8]
Id.; Agapito
Laylo, Benedicto Geronimo,
and Atanacio Geronimo.

^[9]
Rollo, pp. 102-103; Exhs. “3” and
“4”.

**
Justices Delfin Fl. Batacan, ponente, Conrado N. Vasquez, and Jose S. Jimenez.

^[10]
Ibid., pp. 33-35.

^[11]
Id., p. 60.

^[12]
Id., pp. 56-58.

^[13]
Id., pp. 70-75.

^[14]
Id., p. 58.

^[15]
17 SCRA 739.

^[16]
3 SCRA 617.

^[17]
137 SCRA 617.

^[18]
144 SCRA 673.