WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND MANUEL CANCIO, RESPONDENTS.

The present controversy arose
from the construction of the Gay Theater building on the corner of Herran and Singalong Streets in Manila. 
Petitioner WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION sued the private respondent
Manuel Cancio in the then Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover P62,378.83 Pesos, which is ten per cent (10%) of the total
cost of construction of the building, as commission, and P23,788.32 Pesos as cost of additional works thereon.

The basis for the claim
for commission is an alleged contract of supervision of construction between
the theater owner Manuel Cancio, herein private
respondent, and the petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Weldon Construction, which the petitioner seeks to
enforce.  The private respondent refused
to pay the amounts demanded on the ground that the Gay Theater building was constructed by Weldon
Construction for the stipulated price of P600,000.00
Pesos which has already been fully paid. 
The irreconcilable positions taken by the parties brought the
controversy before the courts.

Two documents, Exhibit
“A” and Exhibit “5”, were produced by the plaintiff and the
defendant, respectively, before the trial court.  Plaintiff, herein petitioner sought the
enforcement of the alleged contract of supervision contained in Exhibit
“A”, which is quoted below:

March 7, 1961

Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Cancio

c/o
Goodwill Trading Co.

Rizal Avenue, Manila

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Cancio:

We have the pleasure to offer
your goodselves our services for the contruction of your theater and office building at Singalong corner Herran St., Manila
per plans and specifications of Engr. Filomeno Nunez.

We shall handle the administration of the construction of your
building under the following conditions:

1.  The Owner shall transfer
or advance an amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
to serve as a revolving fund and to be replenished from time to time to take
care of the cost and expenditures incurred for the proper prosecution of the
work.  Such cost to include the following
items and to be at rates not higher than the standard paid in the locality of the work except with prior consent of
the Owner:

a.   All materials necessary for the work;

b.   All payrolls including social security and
other taxes related thereto;

c.   Salaries of employees stationed at the field office in whatever capacity
employed.  Employees engaged in
expediting works or transportation of materials shall be considered as
stationed in the field office;

d.   Traveling expenses of administrator or
employees incurred in discharging duties connected with this work;

e.   Permit fees, royalties, damages for
infringement of patents, and cost of defending suits therefore and for deposits
lost;

f.    Losses and expenses not compensated by
insurance provided they have resulted from causes other than our fault or
neglect.  No such losses and expenses
shall be included in the cost of the work for the purpose of determining the
commission.  In the event of loss from
fire, flood, or other fortuitous events, we shall be put in charge of
reconstruction and be paid for a fee proportionate to the work done;

g.   Minor expense, such as telegrams, telephone
services and similar petty cash items;

h.   The amount of all subcontracts;

 i.   Premiums on all bonds and insurance policies
called for the execution of the work;

 j.   Rentals
of all construction plant or parts thereof necessary in the execution of the
work in accordance with rental agreements approved by the Owner.

Transportation of said
construction plants, costs of loading and unloading, cost of installation and
removing thereof, and minor repairs and replacements of parts during its use on
the work, in accordance with the terms
of the said rental agreement.

2.  That the Owner shall not
reimburse from us the following expenditures:

a.  Salary of any
person employed in our main office or in any regular established branch office,
during the execution of the work;

b.  Overhead or
general expenses of any kind, except as those which maybe expresssly
included in this contract;

c.  Interest on
capital employed either in plant or in expenditures on the work except as maybe
expressly included in this contract.

3.  That we shall be under
the direct supervision of the Owner, and shall provide facilities for the
Owner’s representative to have access or inspection of the work whether it is
in preparation or progress.

4.  That we shall
continuously maintain adequate protection of all works from damage and shall
protect the Owner’s property from injury or loss.  We shall protect adjacent properties as
provided by law.

5.  That we shall receive a
commission of Ten Percent (10%) of the total cost, to be paid upon submission
of statement of cost.

If the above conditions are satisfactory to you, you may sign your
approval at the left corner provided for in this page.

We shall submit an estimate of the whole project based on the plans
as soon as possible.  In as much (sic) as
time is of the essence, may we proceed right away under the administrative
(sic) basis.

Respectfully
yours,

WELDON
CONSTRUCTION

(Sgd.)ANTONIO C. WONG

Office Manager

Private respondent Cancio resisted the petitioner’s claims for commission and
for the cost of “extra works” by producing Exhibit “5”, a
building contract providing for the construction of the building in question
for the stipulated price of P600,000.00 pesos which said private respondent had
already paid to the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest.  Exhibit “5” is reproduced as
follows:

BUILDING CONTRACT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This contract, made and executed in the
City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of March, 1961 by and
between:

MR. MANUEL CANCIO, of legal age, married and residing at 711
Rizal Avenue, Manila,
Philippines,
hereinafter referred to as the Owner,

–and–

WELDON CONSTRUCTION, a construction firm, with main office at No.
1262 Rizal Avenue Extension, Caloocan,
Rizal, Philippines, represented herein by its General
Manager and proprietor Lucio Lee, hereinafter
referred to as the Contractor, witnesseth:

That, the Owner and the Contractor have agreed to the following
terms and conditions:

1.  The Contractor shall
erect and build in a workmanlike manner and to the best of its ability a Cinema
and Commercial Building located at Herran corner Singalong, Manila, in accordance with the plans and
specifications agreed upon by the Owner and the Contractor, the latter being
made an integral part hereof as Annex “A”; except the following:

(a)     Electrical Fixtures

(b)     Water pumps & Sump pumps

(c)     Drinking Fountains

(d)     Fire Fighting Equipments

(e)     Neon Lights

(f)      Air Conditioning

(g)     Chair

(h)     Curtain & Curtain Motors

(i)      Screen

(j)      Mezzanine along Singalong
(Except that marked on plans noted.)

(k)     Contractor’s Sales Tax

(l)      Doors for Store Space (to be provided by tenant)

(m)    Third Storey (store space up to 2nd floor
only)

2.  The contractor shall
supply the corresponding labor and materials on said construction which shall
include plumbing, tinsmith, masonry, concreting, electrical, carpentry and
painting, in accordance with the aforementioned plans and specifications
(except as noted in Art. 1 above.)

3.  The building permit shall
be paid for by the Owner.

4.  The Owner shall pay the
Contractor the full amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P600,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, which payment the Owner shall pay in the basis of
work accomplished based on the breakdown attached herewith marked Annex
“B” and “C”.  Such
payment shall be paid on the tenth day of every month.  Ten percent retention of every payment shall
be retained by the owner, to be paid upon completion of the project.

5.  The Contractor recognizes
that time is an essential element of this contract and, on this basis, agrees
to finish the construction of the said Commercial-Cinema Building by November
30, 1961.  Should the contractor fail to finish the said
building by that date, he (the Contractor) shall indemnify the Owner the sum of
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) for each day of delay, as liquidated damages.  Any
extensions of the date of completion due to delays caused by force majeure or due to decision of Owner to hold in abeyance
certain portions of work must be approved in writing by the Owner.

6.  The Contractor shall
secure from the proper authorities the certificate of final approval of the
work completed in accordance with the plans and specifications, the same shall
be given to the Owner upon the turnover of the work so completed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Building Contract
this 30th day of March, 1961, at Manila,
Philippines.

With Marital Consent:

(Sgd.) JUANA CANCIO

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE
OF:

– – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – –                                                                                 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
–

The then Court of First
Instance of Manila ruled that the agreement between the parties is a contract
of supervision of construction found in Exhibit
“A” and ordered the theater-owner Cancio to
pay the ten per cent (10%) supervision fee or commission provided for in said
contract (Record on Appeal, p. 91).  On
appeal by the defendant Cancio, the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court’s Decision and dismissed the Complaint.  The appellate court held that the transaction
between the parties is a construction contract for a
stipulated price contained in Exhibit “5” (Rollo, pp. 53-62 [Court of Appeals Decision]) The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
promulgated on December 23, 1971 reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set
aside.  Let another issue dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant-appellant P5,000.00 as moral damages, P4,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  Costs against plaintiff-appellee in both instances.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo,
p. 64)

Both parties moved for
the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision. 
Plaintiff-appellee WELDON CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION assailed the Decision as a whole and reiterated its claims. 
Defendant-appellant sought an increase in the amount of damages
and attorney’s fees awarded.  In a
Resolution dated February 7, 1972, the same division of the Court of Appeals
denied the two Motions for Reconsideration. 
Upon a Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff-appellee, the Court of Appeals modified its Decision of December
23, 1971 as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We hereby maintain the
decision of December 23, 1971,
dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, with the modification that defendant’s
counterclaims are also dismissed, without pronouncement as to attorney’s fees
and costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Resolution, October
18, 1972; [Rollo, p. 124])

Not satisfied with the
Resolution of its Second Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff-appellee WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION elevated its case
to this Tribunal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

1.  The Court is called
upon to ascertain whether or not a commission of ten per cent (10%) of the
total cost of construction of the Gay
Theater building should be paid by
the private respondent pursuant to the alleged contract of supervision of
construction which the petitioner seeks to enforce.  Stated otherwise, the principal issue
presented is whether the agreement between the parties is a contract of
supervision of construction on commission basis, in which case commission will
be legally demandable, or a construction contract for a stipulated price which
has already been consummated.  The
ancillary issue is whether or not the petitioner can recover the cost of
additional works on the building.  The
task at hand entails the interpretation of the true agreement between the
parties, which is in effect an inquiry into the “law” imposed by the
parties upon their contractual relations. 
Since a contract is in the nature of “law” as between the parties
and their successors-in-interest its interpretation necessarily involves a
question of law (Melliza v. City of Iloilo, L-24732,
April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 477, 481)
properly raised in this Certiorari proceeding under Rule 45.

2.  The facts are not
disputed.  It appears from the records
that in 1961 Lucio Lee, whose name was later changed
to Lucio Lee Rodriguez, was doing business under the
trade name Weldon Construction, the predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION. 
The latter corporation was incorporated in July, 1963 as a closed
corporation composed of Lucio Lee (owner of Weldon
Construction), his wife, his sister and the latter’s husband, and a
cousin.  The assets of Weldon
Construction were transferred to, and its liabilities assumed by the new
corporation.  Hence, the instant case was
brought by WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION as successor-in-interest of Weldon
Construction and Lucio Lee.

Prior to March 7, 1961,
Lucio Lee drafted plans for a theater-apartment
building which private respondent Cancio intended to
put up.  Thereafter, on March 7, 1961, he submitted to the
latter a proposal (Exhibit “A”) for the supervision of the
construction of said building on commission basis.  The proposal was signed not by Lee but by his
office manager, Antonio Wong.  The
private respondent never affixed his signature on the document.

Among the provisions
contained in the proposal was the setting up of a revolving fund of P10,000.00 Pesos for the costs and expenditures to be incurred
in the construction of the building, such as materials and labor among others
(Exhibit “A”, par. 1).  The
fund was to be replenished by the owner of the building from time to time (Id.).  The proposal also provided for the payment to
Weldon Construction of a commission of ten per cent (10%) of the total cost of
the building (Id., par. 5)

Without having signed the
proposal Exhibit “A” or any written agreement on the construction of
the building, private respondent Cancio
gave an advance payment of P10,000.00 Pesos.  Then, on March 28, 1961, Lee submitted another proposal (Exhibit
“4”) this time for the construction of the same building at the
stipulated price of P600,000.00 Pesos.  Two days after, Lee sent the private
respondent a prepared “Building Contract” (Exhibit “5”)
signed by him, for the signature of the latter and those of the witnesses.  Private respondent did not return the document
to Lee, but the petitioner started the construction of the building.  When the document (Exhibit “5”) was
later presented in court, it contained the signatures of Lee, as well as the
signatures of Manuel Cancio, that of his wife, giving
her marital consent, and those of two witnesses.

As the construction of
the theater building shifted to high gear, subsequent
payments were made by respondent Cancio to
Weldon Construction as per accomplishment in the varying
amounts of P25,000.00 Pesos, P27,414.62 Pesos, P40,000.00 Pesos, P50,000.00
Pesos and even P70,000.00 Pesos (Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo
p. 56; Exhibits “8”-“18”). 
The materials were bought and paid for by the contractor, although the
invoices were in the name of the owner, evidently to avoid payment by the
former of the three per cent (3%) contractor’s tax.  (Court of Appeals Decision,
Rollo p. 59). 
The invoices, receipts of payment, vouchers and payrolls were not
surrendered to the owner but were kept by the contractor.  (Id. p.
57).

Shortly after the
completion of the theater building and its delivery to the owner, the latter
completed the payment of the P600,000.00 contract
price (CA Decision, Rollo p. 59).  However, Weldon Construction demanded the
payment of P62,378.83 Pesos, as a commission of ten
per cent (10%) of the total cost of construction and of P23,788.32 Pesos as the
cost of the “extra works” on the building.  The owner Cancio
denied the existence of any agreement on the payment of commission and refused
to pay the amounts demanded.  Hence, this suit initiated by the WELDON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
the successor-in-interest of Lucio Lee and Weldon
Construction.

3.  A careful scrutiny of
each and every term and stipulation in the two documents Exhibit”A”
and Exhibit “5” revealed two differences between them which are
crucial to this case.  One basic
difference between the two agreements lies in the proposed consideration for
the administration or supervision services. 
Proposed under Exhibit “A” was Ten Per Cent (10%) of the total
cost of construction (Exh “A”, par. 5)
without a maximum amount set as a limit on that cost.  In contrast, Exhibit “5” sets the
stipulated price of the construction of the building at P600,000.00
Pesos, which is the consideration of the contract (Exhibit “5.” par.
4).  The other point of divergence is the
manner in which the expenses for labor and materials are provided for.  Exhibit “A” sets up a revolving
fund of P10,000.00 Pesos to be paid by the Owner and
to be replenished by him from time to time, which fund shall answer for the
various costs of construction including labor and materials (Exh. “A” par. 1).  No such fund is provided for in Exhibit
“5” since the Contractor Weldon Construction binds itself to supply
the labor and materials (Exh. “5”,
par. 2).

The first proposal
submitted by Weldon Construction for rendering service under a contract of
supervision (Exhibit “A”) is simply that, a proposal.  It never attained perfection as the
contract between the parties.  Only an
absolute or unqualified acceptance of a definite offer manifests the consent
necessary to perfect a contract (Article 1319, New Civil Code).  The advance payment of P10,000.00 Pesos was not an unqualified
acceptance of the offer contained in the first proposal (Exhibit
“A”) as in fact an entirely new proposal (Exhibit “4”) was
submitted by Weldon Construction subsequently. 
If, as claimed by the petitioner, the parties had already agreed upon a
contract of supervision under Exhibit “A”, why then was a second
proposal made?  Res ipsa loquitur.  The
existence of the second proposal belies the perfection of any contract arising
from the first proposal.

With regard to the second
proposal (Exhibit “4”) for the construction of the building at a
stipulated price, the same was closely followed by the “Building
Contract” (Exhibit “5”) signed by Lee, setting forth in detail
the proposed terms and stipulations. 
Although the petitioner claims that the contract was never returned to
its predecessors-in-interest, it appears upon the face of the document
(Exhibit “5”) that the same was signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses.  Petitioner does not question the authenticity
of the signature of its predecessor-in-interest, Lucio
Lee, appearing on the document (Exhibit “5”).  Lee himself has admitted said signature as
his.  Petitioner, however, impugns the
binding effect of the Building Contract (Exhibit “5”) by assailing
its due execution.  It calls the attention
of the Court to
the conclusion of the trial court that the signature of the defendant (herein
private respondent) and that of the witness Martinez
were affixed on said contract after its purported date of execution on March 30, 1961 (Record on Appeal, pp.
89-90).

Petitioner’s position is
untenable.  Once a contract is
shown to have been consummated or fully performed by the parties thereto, its
existence and binding effect can no longer be disputed.  It is irrelevant and immaterial to dispute
the due execution of a contract, i.e. the date of signing by one of the
parties, if both of them have in fact performed their obligations thereunder and their respective signatures and those of
their witnesses appear upon the face of the document.

Thus, even assuming that
the Building Contract in Exhibit “5” was signed by the private
respondent only after the
Gay Theater building had been completed and the stipulated price of P600,000.00
Pesos fully paid, such fact can no longer negate the binding effect of that agreement
if its existence and especially, its consummation can be established by other evidence, e.g. by the contemporaneous acts of the parties and their having performed their respective obligations pursuant to the
agreement.  As held in Kriedt v. E.C. McCullough & Co., 37 Phil. 474, 480
(1918):

. . . Acts done by the parties to a contract in the course of its
performance are admissible in evidence upon the question of its meaning as
being their own contemporaneous interpretation of its terms.  (Cited in Manila Electric Company v. Court of
Appeals, L-33794, May 31, 1982, 114 SCRA 173, 181)

A similar pronouncement
was made by the Court in Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. v. Firemen’s
Insurance Co. of Newark, 100 Phil. 757 (1957), to wit:

To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not
bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties,
should there be a controversy as to
what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the contracting
parties do or perform their respective obligations, stipulated or agreed upon
may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict with the
name given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over the latter (cited in Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals, L-22962, September 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 65, 74).

Thus,
the manner in which the parties conducted their transactions relating to the
construction of the Gay Theater building indicates whether the parties had
intended to be bound by a construction contract for a stipulated price or by any other agreement.  The demandability
of the amounts sought to be recovered by the petitioner will depend on the
nature of that agreement.

In this case, the Court
finds that the parties adhered to the terms and stipulations of the Building
Contract (Exhibit “5”).  After
said contract bearing the signature of the contractor Lee was submitted for the
signature of the respondent Cancio, subsequent
payments were made by the latter in amounts ranging from P25,000.00
Pesos to P70,000.00 Pesos.  Even granting
that the P10,000.00 Pesos advance payment by the owner
was set up as a revolving fund, these relatively large amounts could hardly be
considered as mere replenishments of said initial amount.  As correctly reasoned out in the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 56), replenishments
of the P10,000.00-peso revolving fund could not exceed
that amount.  The remittances made by the
building owner were actually partial payments of the contract price of P600,000.00 Pesos, the amount having been based on the actual
accomplishment of the construction during the period covered by the
payment.  Thus, the receipts issued by
Weldon Construction contained the words, “as per accomplishment” (Exhibits
“8” – “18”).  The aforecited acts of the parties with respect to said
remittances are in consonance with paragraph 4 of the Building Contract
(Exhibit “5”), to wit:

*           *           *

4.  The Owner shall pay the
Contractor the full amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P600,000.00) PESOS
Philippine Currency, which payment the Owner shall pay
in (sic) the basis of work accomplished
based on breakdowns attached herewith marked Annex ‘B’ and ‘C’.  Such payments shall be paid on the tenth of
every month.  Ten per cent retention of every
payment shall be retained by the Owner, to be paid upon the completion of the
project;

*           *           *

The inescapable
conclusion is that Weldon Construction assumed the obligation to construct the
building at the price fixed by the parties and to furnish both the labor and
materials required for the project.  It
acted as an independent
contractor within the meaning of Article 1713 of the New Civil Code, which
states:

ART. 1713.  By the contract
for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to execute a piece of work for
the employer, in consideration of a certain price or compensation.  The contractor may either employ only his
labor or skill or also furnish the materials.

In view of all the
foregoing considerations this Court finds that the agreement between the
parties is the contract of construction for a stipulated price contained in Exhibit “5” which is akin to a
contract for a piece of work defined in the aforequoted
article.  Both parties having fully
performed their reciprocal obligations in accordance with said contract,
petitioner is estopped from invoking an entirely
different agreement so as to
demand additional consideration.  Once a
contract has been consummated, there is nothing left to be done or to be
demanded by the parties thereto.  All obligations
arising from the contract are extinguished.

As set by the parties,
the consideration for the construction of the Gay Theater building is P600,000.00
Pesos which amount has been fully paid by the private respondent.  There is no basis for the petitioner’s demand
for the payment of P62,378.83 Pesos as commission of
ten per cent (10%) of the total cost of construction.  The denial of petitioner’s claim for said
amount is affirmed.

4.  Since the contract
between the parties has been established as a contract for a piece of work for
a stipulated price the right of the contractor to recover the cost of
additional works must be governed by Article 1724 quoted as follows:

ART. 1724.  The contractor
who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a stipulated price,
in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the landowner, can
neither withdraw from the contract or demand an increase in the price on account of the higher
cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in the plans and
specifications, provided:

(1)  Such change has been
authorized by the proprietor in writing; and

(2)  The additional price to
be paid to the contractor had been
determined in writing by both parties.

This Court has found occasion
to expound upon the nature
of the requisites prescribed by Article 1724 in the case of San Diego
v. Sayson, L-16258, August 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 1175,
1178-1179, which is in point:

*        *          *

It will be noted that whereas under the old article recovery for
additional costs in a construction contract can be had if authorization to make
such additions can be proved, the amendment evidently requires that instead of
merely proving authorization, such authorization must be made in writing.  The evident purpose of the amendment is to
prevent litigation for additional costs incurred by reason of additions or
changes in the original plans.  Is this
additional requirement of a written authorization, to be considered as a mere
extension of the Statute of Frauds, or is it a substantive provision?  That the requirement for a written
authorization is not merely to prohibit admission or oral testimony against the
objection of the adverse party, can be inferred from the fact that the provision
is not included among those specified in the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of
the Civil Code.  As it does not appear to
have been intended as an extension of the Statute of Frauds, it must have been
adopted as a substantive provision or a condition precedent to recovery.

*        *          *

In
addition to the owner’s authorization for any change in the plans and
specifications, Article 1724 requires that the additional price to be paid for
the contractor be likewise reduced in writing. 
Compliance with the two requisites in Article 1724, a specific provision
governing additional works, is a condition precedent
to recovery (San Diego v. Sayson, supra.).  The absence of one or the other bars the
recovery of additional costs.  Neither
the authority for the changes made nor the additional price to be paid therefor may be proved by any other evidence for purposes
of recovery.

In the case before this
Court, the records do not yield any written authority
for the changes made on the
plans and specifications of the Gay Theater building. 
Neither can there be found any written agreement
on the additional price to be paid for said
“extra works”.  While the trial
court may have found in the instant case that the private respondent admitted
his having requested the “extra works” done by the contractor (Record
on Appeal, p. 66 [C.F.I.  Decision]),
this does not save the day for the petitioner. 
The private respondent claims that the contractor agreed to make the
additions without additional cost. 
Expectedly, the petitioner vigorously denies said claim of the private
respondent.  This is precisely a
misunderstanding between parties to a construction agreement which the
lawmakers sought to avoid in prescribing the two requisites under Article 1724
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 148). 
And this case is a perfect example of a tedious litigation which had
ensued between the parties as a result
of such misunderstanding.  Again, this is
what the law endeavors to prevent (San Diego v. Sayson, supra.).

In the absence of a
written authority by the owner for the
changes in the plans and specifications of the building and of a written
agreement between the parties on the additional price to be paid to the
contractor, as required by Article 1724, the claim for the cost of additional
works on the Gay Theater building must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its
Decision of December 23, 1971 which was upheld in its Resolution of October
18, 1972 dismissing
the complaint filed by Weldon Construction Corporation is AFFIRMED.  The modification by the Court of Appeals of
said Decision in its Resolution of October
18, 1972 which dismissed the defendant’s counterclaims is likewise
AFFIRMED.  Petition DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, and Bidin,
JJ., concur.