GABRIEL ABAD, PIO AGANON, MARIO ALARCIO, JOSE AQUINO, CESAR ATANACIO, LEONARDO AURELIO, SOTERO BERNARDO, AURELIO CABRAL, JESUS CARREON, ABELARDO CARILLO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS…

THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ORIGINATED FROM A
COMPLAINT BY THE PETITIONERS FILED ON AUGUST 18, 1978 AGAINST RESPONDENT
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (PHILAMGEN, FOR BREVITY)
FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACT AND RECOVERY OF LOSS OF MONEY BASICALLY PRAYING
FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PAYMENT OF THE MONEY VALUE OF THE RESPECTIVE
ACCUMULATED SICK LEAVE WITH PAY OF THE SEPARATED EMPLOYEES OF RESPONDENT
COMPANY EITHER THRU RETIREMENT, RETRENCHMENT OR RESIGNATION.  INSTEAD OF FILING AN ANSWER THERETO,
PHILAMGEN MOVED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED IN ITS
ORDER^[1]
DATED FEBRUARY 16, 1979.  AFTER A DENIAL OF THEIR MOTION TO
RECONSIDER THE AFORESAID ORDER BY THE TRIAL COURT ON MAY 2, 1979, PETITIONERS FILED BEFORE US A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, DOCKETED AS G.R. No. 50563.  A DECISION^[2]
WAS RENDERED BY THIS COURT PROMULGATED ON OCTOBER 30, 1981, THE DECRETAL PORTION OF WHICH READS:

“WHEREFORE, THE
ORDERS OF THE RESPONDENT COURT,
DATED FEBRUARY 16, 1979 AND MAY 2, 1979, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE, THE DISMISSED
COMPLAINT IS REINSTATED; AND SAID COURT IS DIRECTED TO CONDUCT FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE DISPOSITION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 117708.  NO COSTS.

“SO
ORDERED.”

THE CASE WAS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.  UNFORTUNATELY FIRE
DESTROYED THE SALA WHEREIN THE ENTIRE RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE NO. 117708 WERE KEPT. 
HOWEVER, THE RECORDS OF THE CASE WERE RECONSTITUTED ON JANUARY 21,
1982 AND THE
CASE WAS RENUMBERED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 82-1324.  THEREAFTER, RESPONDENT PHILAMGEN FILED
ITS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT.  ON
JANUARY, 1983, JUDICIAL
REORGANIZATION TOOK PLACE BY THE PASSAGE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 864 AND
THE CASE AT BAR WAS RE-RAFFLED TO RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
WHICH WAS PRESIDED OVER BY JUDGE DAVID G.
NITAFAN.  RESPONDENT COURT MOTU
PROPRIO DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 82-1324 DECLARING
THAT IT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, BEING MONEY CLAIMS ARISING
FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS.  MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONERS WAS DENIED BY RESPONDENT JUDGE.  HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
WITH THE FOLLOWING:

“ASSIGNMENTS
OF ERROR

“FIRST
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN REVERSING MOTU PROPRIO THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION IN G.R. NO. L-50563 BY DISMISSING ONCE AGAIN
PETITIONERS’ ACTION ON THE ERRONEOUS GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.

“SECOND
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING ITSELF A TOTALLY DIFFERENT COURT FROM THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE WHOSE CASES WERE MERELY TAKEN OVER BY RESPONDENT
COURT.” (P. 25, ROLLO)

BY WAY OF REFERENCE THE ENTIRE RECORD AND DECISION OF THIS COURT
IN G.R. NO. L-50563 (108 SCRA 717) WERE INCORPORATED BY PETITIONERS
IN THEIR PETITION.

THE PERTINENT PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
READS AS FOLLOWS:

“EVEN BEFORE RECEIVING THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES, HOWEVER, THIS
COURT HAS DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION MOTU
PROPRIO, FOR THE SAME IS SO BASIC AS TO AFFECT
THE VALIDITY AND PROPRIETY OF ANY AND ALL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE.

“1.  IT
IS THE PERCEPTION OF THIS COURT THAT THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE DECIDED AND
SETTLED IN G.R. NO. 50563 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS THE LAW OF THE CASE INSOFAR
AS THIS PROCEEDING NOW PENDS BEFORE THIS COURT. 
WHAT WAS THERE PUT TO REST WAS THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA.

“SECTION 1 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 864 PROVIDES
THAT THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE SHALL BE DEEMED AUTOMATICALLY ABOLISHED UPON
THE CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS PROVIDED IN BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
129 AS OF 12:00 O’CLOCK MIDNIGHT OF JANUARY 17, 1983, WHICH RE-ECHOES A SENTENCE IN SECTION 44
OF SAID ACT.

“WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE – WHICH WAS HELD IN G.R. NO. 50563 AS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE, THE JURISDICTION OF SAID COURT WAS ABOLISHED WITH IT.  THIS IS SUPPORTED BY THE REPEAL OF REP. ACT.
NO. 296 (DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF, AMONG OTHERS, THE
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE) BY SECTION 47 OF B.P. BLG. 129, AND WHICH LAW
(B.P. BLG. 129) IN TURN DEFINES THE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
IN ITS SECTIONS 19, 20, 21 AND 22.

“2.  THE POSTULATE THAT ONCE
JURISDICTION IS ACQUIRED BY A COURT, THE SAME LASTS UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF
THE CASE, NOTWITHSTANDING CHANGES IN THE LAW ON JURISDICTION, DOES NOT APPLY TO
THIS CASE BECAUSE IT WAS THE COURT ITSELF WHICH ACQUIRED INITIAL JURISDICTION
THAT WAS ABOLISHED SO THAT THERE IS NO MORE COURT TO CONTINUE EXERCISING SUCH
INITIALLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION.

“3.  JURISDICTION OF THIS
COURT (THE REORGANIZED REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) MUST BE TESTED BY THE LAWS IN
FORCE AT THE TIME THE REORGANIZATION TOOK
PLACE, AND WHEN THIS CASE WAS RE-RAFFLED, NOT AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION BECAUSE THE
COURTS THEN EXISTING WERE ALL ABOLISHED UPON THE REORGANIZATION.

“WHAT WERE THE RELEVANT LAWS ON JURISDICTION IN FORCE AT THE TIME OF DECLARATION OF JUDICIAL
REORGANIZATION?

“OF COURSE, INSOFAR AS THE REORGANIZED COURTS VESTED WITH
GENERAL JURISDICTION, BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 WAS AND STILL IS THE CONTROLLING
LAW.  WHEN IT COMES TO LABOR-RELATED
ACTIONS, HOWEVER, SUCH AS THE ONE AT BAR, INITIAL JURISDICTION IS VESTED ON ‘ADMINISTRATIVE
MACHINER(IES)’ PROVIDED ‘FOR THE EXPEIDITIOUS SETTLEMENT OF LABOR OR INDUSTRIAL
DISPUTES’ (SEE ART. 211, P.D. 442), WHICH ARE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSIONS AND THE LABOR ARBITERS, THE JURISDICTION OF THE LATTER OF WHICH ARE
DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

‘ART. 217.  JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION.  – (A) THE LABOR ARBITERS SHALL HAVE THE ORIGINAL
AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
DECIDE WITHIN THIRTY (30) WORKING DAYS AFTER SUBMISSION OF THE CASE
BY THE PARTIES FOR DECISION, THE FOLLOWING CASES INVOLVING ALL WORKERS,
WHETHER AGRICULTURAL OR NON-AGRICULTURAL:

‘1.  UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE CASES;

‘2.  THOSE
THAT WORKERS MAY FILE INVOLVING WAGES, HOURS OF WORK AND OTHER TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT;

‘3.  ALL MONEY CLAIMS OF
WORKERS, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON NON-PAYMENT OR UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES,
OVERTIME COMPENSATION, SEPARATION PAY AND OTHER BENEFITS PROVIDED BY LAW OR APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT.  EXCEPT CLAIMS FOR EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION, SOCIAL SECURITY, MEDICARE AND MATERNITY BENEFITS.

‘4.  CASES
INVOLVING HOUSEHOLD SERVICES; AND

‘5.  CASES
ARISING FROM ANY VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 265 OF THIS CODE, INCLUDING QUESTIONS
INVOLVING THE LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS.’

(THIS ARTICLE OF THE LABOR CODE WAS
ORIGINALLY ARTICLE 216 OF PD 442, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY RENUMBERED TO ART. 217, AMENDED BY PD 1367 WHICH TOOK
EFFECT 1 MAY 1978, FURTHER AMENDED BY PD 1691 WHICH TOOK EFFECT 1 MAY 1980, THEN FURTHER AMENDED BY BP BLG.
130 WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 21 AUGUST 1981 AND FINALLY AMENDED BY BP BLG. 227
WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 1 JUNE 1982; UNDERSCORING SUPPLIED.)

AS LAST AMENDED BY BP
BLG. 130 AND 227, THE
ABOVE PROVISION WAS IN FORCE ON 17 JANUARY 1983 WHEN THE
JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION TOOK PLACE.

“NOTE, THAT BP BLG. 130 WAS CONSIDERED
BY THE BATASAN PAMBANSA IN THE SAME SESSION WHEN IT ENACTED BP BLG. 129, THE JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION ACT,
SO THAT THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO DOUBT IN THE LEGISLATIVE MIND AT THE TIME THAT
JURISDICTION OVER LABOR-RELATED CLAIMS WAS BEING
INITIALLY VESTED, NOT TO THE COURTS BUT TO ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERIES.  BESIDES THE UNDERSCORED PORTIONS OF THE
ABOVE-QUOTED PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE ARE CLEAR AND COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH TO
INCLUDE THE CLAIMS EMBODIED IN THE COMPLAINT IN THIS ACTION, AND WHAT IS MOST
IMPORTANT IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION VESTED BY THE LAW UPON THE
LABOR ARBITERS IS ‘ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE’.

“THAT IT WAS THE EVIDENT INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
DIVEST THE COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION INITIAL JURISDICTION OVER CASES SUCH
AS THAT INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION IS FURTHER CORROBORATED BY ARTS. 292, 293 AND 294 OF THE LABOR CODE
WHICH OUTLINE THE PROCEDURE OF ‘PROSECUTING ALL MONEY CLAIMS ACCRUING’ BOTH
DURING OR PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CODE.

“MORE PARTICULARLY, THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF
ART. 293 OF THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES –

‘PENDING THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE MERIT OF MONEY CLAIM FILED
WITH THE APPROPRIATE ENTITY, NO CIVIL ACTION ARISING FROM THE SAME CAUSE OF
ACTION SHALL BE FILED WITH ANY COURT.  X
X’

“WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE FACT THAT G.R. NO. 50563 WAS
DECIDED BY THE HIGHEST COURT ON THE BASIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 217 OF
THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED BY PD
1367, WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 1 MAY 1978, BUT
AS HERETOFORE INDICATED, SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS OF THE SAME PROVISION TOOK PLACE.  IN SAID DECISION IN G.R.
NO. 50563, MENTION WAS MADE OF THE AMENDMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY PD 1367
HAVING BEEN GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. 
FOLLOWING THIS RULE OF RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION, WE CAN NOT SEE ANY
REASON WHY THE SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
217 OF THE LABOR CODE, BROUGHT ABOUT BY PD 1691 (1 MAY 1980), BP BLG. 130 (21 AUGUST 1981) AND BP BLG. 227 (1
JUNE 1982) MAY NOT ALSO BE APPLIED TO THIS ACTION WHICH WAS FILED ON 28 AUGUST 1978.

“NEITHER IS THIS COURT
UNAWARE OF THE 10 FEBRUARY 1983 RESOLUTION OF THE HON. SUPREME COURT PROVIDING
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF CASES RELATIVE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF BP BLG. 129, BUT SAID ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION CANNOT BE
INTERPRETED TO HAVE THE EFFECT OF MODIFYING OR ABROGATING SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
OF LAWS ON JURISDICTION BECAUSE BY EXPRESS MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE
RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL RULES MERELY,
WHICH MAY NOT DIMINISH, INCREASE OR MODIFY SUBSTANTIVE LAWS.  (SEC. 5[5], ART. X,
CONSTITUTION).

“THIS COURT IS NOT
ALSO UNAWARE OF THAT PORTION OF SECTION 44 OF BP BLG. 129 PROVIDING THAT CASES
PENDING IN THE ABOLISHED COURTS SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE COURTS CREATED IN THE ACT, BUT IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE
PHRASE ‘APPROPRIATE COURTS’ MUST HAVE REFERENCE TO THOSE COURTS WHOSE
JURISDICTION ARE CLEARLY DEFINED IN OTHER PARTS OF THE LAW, OTHERWISE A MERE
TRANSITORY PROVISION WILL SERVE TO NEGATE THE PRIMARY AND AVOWED PURPOSE OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION
ACT.  BUT BE THAT AS IT MAY, THIS
PROVISION HAS HARDLY ANY APPLICATION HERE BECAUSE THIS CASE IS BEING REFERRED
TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY WHICH HAS BETTER
FACILITIES OF ADJUDICATING THE CLAIM. 
(MOLE IS FURNISHED WITH COPIES OF CBA‘S) MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY AS THEY ARE NOT HAMSTRUNG BY THE STRICT
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE.

“IN ANY EVENT, EVEN IF LIMITATIONS
OF ACTIONS ARE ALSO PROVIDED IN THE LABOR CODE (ART. 292 THEREOF), THE PENDENCY
OF THIS ACTION BEFORE THE THEN COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA MAY BE DEEMED TO
HAVE SUSPENDED THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION IF ONLY TO GIVE MEANING TO THE
SOCIAL JUSTICE SPIRIT AND ORIENTATION OF
THE LABOR CODE.” (PP. 40-44, ROLLO).

BASED ON SUCH FINDINGS, THE RESPONDENT
COURT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITIVE PORTIONS:

“WHEREFORE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PLAINTIFF’S PURSUING THEIR
CLAIMS BEFORE THE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERIES IN THE MINISTRY OF
LABOR EMPLOYMENT, THE COMPLAINT IN THIS CASE IS DISMISSED.  NO COSTS.

“SO ORDERED.” (P.
45, ROLLO, UNDERSCORING FOR EMPHASIS).

PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS DO NOT DESERVE MERIT.  ONE OF THE IMPORTANT FEATURES IN THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION EFFECTED
THROUGH B.P. BLG. 129 IS THE
ADDITION OF PARAGRAPH (6), SEC. 19, IN DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS (WHICH TOOK THE
PLACE OF THE ABOLISHED COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE), READING
AS FOLLOWS:

“IN ALL CASES NOT WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF ANY COURT, TRIBUNAL, PERSON OR BODY EXERCISING JUDICIAL
OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.” (UNDERSCORING
FOR EMPHASIS).

A
PROVISION NOT FOUND IN SEC. 44 OF
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1948.  IT WAS THE
INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY TO UNCLOG THE COURTS OF CASES WHICH MAY BE
ADJUDICATED, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, BY OFFICIALS OR BODIES EXERCISING
QUASI-JUDICIAL ADJUDICATORY POWERS LIKE THE LABOR ARBITERS OR THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION A SPECIALIZED BODY OR BODIES ON LABOR RELATED
PROVISIONS AND ARE NOT RESTRICTED BY THE TECHNICAL RULES OF PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OF TODAY ARE ACTUALLY THE SAME
COURTS THAT FUNCTIONED AS COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE BEFORE THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT (BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129). 
THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A CHANGE IN THE NAME AND IN SOME INCIDENTAL
FEATURES, BUT ESSENTIALLY, THEY ARE THE
SAME.

HOWEVER, WHEREAS BEFORE JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS OF
LABORERS AND EMPLOYEES APPERTAINED TO COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, THE SAME ARE
NOW TO BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF BY PROPER ENTITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT.

THE RULE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION UNTIL A CAUSE IS FINALLY
RESOLVED OR ADJUDICATED DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE CHANGE IN JURISDICTION IS CURATIVE
IN CHARACTER.  THUS IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NOTHING
WRONG IN HOLDING THAT COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE/REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS NO LONGER
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER AFORESAID MONETARY CLAIMS OF LABOR.

WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED AND THE RULING OF THE RESPONDENT
COURT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.   LET
THE PARTIES FILE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION BEFORE THE PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
PENNED BY JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. EJERCITO OF THE THEN CFI OF MANILA, BRANCH 39.

^[2]
108 SCRA 717. PENNED BY JUSTICE VICENTE
ABAD SANTOS WITH THE CONCURRING VOTES OF JUSTICES ANTONIO P. BARREDO, RAMON C. AQUINO,
HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR. & PACIFICO P.
DE CASTRO.