CENTRAL AZUCARERA DON PEDRO, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND NEMESIO TANIO, RESPONDENTS.

Nemesio Tanio started
working at the Central Azucarera Don Pedro (hereafter
simply referred to as the CENTRAL) as a laborer, picking up strewn cane, during
the 1946-1947 milling season.  Starting
with the 1954-1955 milling season, he was assigned as operator of an electrically
operated cane-unloading machine.^[1]

Tanio stopped working on February
9, 1960, allegedly
because he began to spit blood at this time.  An x-ray examination conducted by the CENTRAL’s physician revealed that Tanio
was suffering from minimal pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) in the right lung.  He was consequently confined at the CENTRAL’s hospital, pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement then in force, but after three (3) days, he refused further treatment
and at his request was discharged.

Tanio then opted to retire, and the
CENTRAL paid him P400.00 as gratuity.  On
March 30, 1960, he executed
an affidavit affirming his voluntary refusal to be treated at the CENTRAL’s hospital.^[2]

Three years later, or more precisely on October 8, 1963, Tanio
filed a complaint aganst the CENTRAL with Regional
Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor at Manila,
seeking disability compensation and reimbursement of medical expenses.  The CENTRAL moved to dismiss, alleging that Tanio was statutorily barred from presenting and
prosecuting his claim.^[3]

The Hearing Officer to whom the case was assigned rendered a
decision on August 15, 1965
dismissing the case for lack of merit. 
The decision pointed out that Tanio’s averment
of having spat blood was corroborated by neither an eyewitness nor medical
proof; there was no showing of any resulting disability for labor; and proof of
illness alone does not entitle an employee to compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.^[4]

On appeal taken by Tanio, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission reversed the judgment of the Hearing Officer.  It declared that since Tanio
was healthy when first admitted for employment by the CENTRAL and he was
afterwards found to be suffering from minimal PTB, the presumption was that his
illness had been caused or aggravated by his employment, a presumption that had
not been overthrown by the evidence on record. 
It accordingly ordered the CENTRAL to pay Tanio
P4,000.00 as disability compensation; P1,300.00 as reimbursement for medical
expenses; P400.00 as attorney’s fees, and P41.00 as costs.  It also commanded the CENTRAL to provide
medical services to Tanio until his illness was
cured.^[5]
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated September
27, 1968, the Commission denied the CENTRAL’s
motion for reconsideration.^[6]
However, the Medical Member of the Commission dissented.  According to her, Tanio’s
PTB was minimal, was not in an aggravated stage at all but was in fact just
beginning, hence, there could be no causal relation between Tanio’s
illness and his employment.^[7]

The CENTRAL has filed a petition with us for the review of the
Commission’s judgment in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to persuade us that the latter has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by us or decided it in a way not in accord with law or
our applicable decisions.  Said
petitioner submits the following particular issues:  (1) whether or not the Regional Office No. 4,
stationed in Manila, had jurisdiction over Tanio’s
claim; (2) the proper interpretation of Sections 24 and 45 (paragraph 2) of Act
3428, otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act; (3) whether or not Tanio was entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses
notwithstanding his voluntary waiver of proferred
medical treatment; and (5) whether or not attorney’s fees were correctly
awarded despite the absence of any prayer therefor in
Tanio’s complaint.

The CENTRAL maintains that Regional Office No. 4 stationed at Manila
is, under the law, without authority to entertain the claim and that Tanio having admitted he is a resident of Bo. Talon, San
Luis, Batangas, only Regional Office No. 5 could
validly assume jurisdiction over the claim.

Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, a claim for compensation may be filed and heard in the
regional office of any of the following places: 
where the accident occurred; where the claimant, or any of the claimants
resides; or where the respondent or any of the respondents, resides, at the
option of the claimant.  The choice of
any of these venues is solely the claimant’s.

Tanio having opted to file his claim
for compensation at the Regional Office No. 4, stationed at Manila,
and it having been established that Tanio was
residing at Sta. Cruz, Manila, at
the time of such filing, Regional Office No. 4 validly assumed jurisdiction
over the same.  The purpose of the rule
is to foster the convenience of the claimant considering that he is the
aggrieved party.^[8]

The CENTRAL contends that in order to maintain an action under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, it was necessary for Tanio to file with said employer notice of his illness and
claim for compensation within two months after learning of such illness, as
prescribed by Section 24 of the Act; and that, not having done this, his cause of
action, if any, had already prescribed when he filed the compensation claim
herein with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4, on October 8, 1963,
three years and some seven months after he first learned that he had
tuberculosis and chose to retire.

That contention is without merit, there being no dispute that as
soon as he exhibited the first symptoms of his ailment, which the CENTRAL’s physician diagnosed as minimal PTB, Tanio was confined and treated at the CENTRAL’s
expense at the latter’s hospital for at least three days.  The employer’s act of extending and paying
for medical assistance suffices for and obviates the necessity of giving him
the notice required by law.  Just as we
have consistently ruled that compensation claims accruing under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and prior to the effectivity of the
Labor Code of 1974 prescribe in ten years,^[9]
so we have also held that delay or failure to give the employer notice of
compensable illness or injury within the prescribed period does not bar a claim
for compensation if it is shown that the latter, his agent or representative in
fact knew of such injury or illness or that he suffered no damage by reason of
such delay or lack of notice.^[10]

Whether, considering the nature of the private respondent’s
employment, minimal PTB is a compensable illness in his case, is also a settled
question.  As we held in Villones vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission^[11]:

“Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding that the
disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such
occupations as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and such
other occupations, hence compensable, aptly stated and WE quote:  ‘Medical science has it that tuberculosis as
an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation.  When given favorable conditions this disease
becomes active and prominent.  Some of
these favorable conditions are:  too much
physical exertion without the corresponding rest; exposure to excessive heat
and cold; lack of good food as to weaken the body constituents and contact with
people suffering from tuberculosis ***’ (Corales vs.
ECC, supra).”

Moreover, the CENTRAL having failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to controvert Tanio’s claim within the limiting periods established in
said section,^[12]
it is deemed to have waived by operation of law its right to controvert said
respondent’s claim on non-jurisdictional grounds.^[13]

Likewise, we find the CENTRAL’s
allegation that the Commission erred in awarding attorney’s fees without a
prayer for such fees and evidence to justify an award thereof, devoid of merit.

The case of Central Azucarera Don Pedro
v. Agno^[14]
cited by the CENTRAL, is no longer applicable. 
The insertion of the phrase “which shall be chargeable against the employer” in Section
31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law by Rep. Act 4119, which was approved June
30, 1964 clearly indicates the intention of the law to make attorney’s fees an
integral part of the compensation or benefits due the employee or his
dependents under the Act.  As said
Section 31 fixes the amount of the attorney’s fees that may be recovered,
prayer for such relief and proof thereof are no longer necessary.^[15]

We, however, find that the Commission incurred in legal error in
awarding reimbursement for medical expenses and ordering that Tanio be given medical services until his illness is
cured.  As already observed, after three
days of confinement following discovery of his illness, Tanio
had refused further treatment and was discharged from petitioner’s hospital at
his own request, a fact he later confirmed in a sworn statement.  The right of a disabled employee to medical
attendance under Section 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, can
be impugned or abated if he unreasonably refuses to accept the medical services
proffered by the employer, or if he shall voluntarily impede or obstruct such
services.^[16]

WHEREFORE, modified only by striking therefrom
the award of P1,300.00 to reimburse medical expenses incurred by Tanio as well as the order that he be extended medical
services until he is cured of his illness, the decision under review is
affirmed in all other respects, with costs against Central Azucarera
Don Pedro.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, and Paras*,
JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 35.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 36.

^[3]
Id., p. 2

^[4]
Rollo, p. 28.

^[5]
Id., pp. 31-41.

^[6]
Id., pp. 54-55.

^[7]
Id., p. 58.

^[8]
Phil. Cotton Dev. Corp. v. WCC, 2 SCRA 16, 19-20.

^[9]
Corales vs. Employees Compensation Commission,
88 SCRA 547, 553; Capinpin vs. WCC, infra;
Art. 1144 [2], Civil Code.

^[10]
Balanga vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
et al., 83 SCRA 721.

^[11]
92 SCRA 320, 329.

^[12]
on or before the 14th day after disability or within 10 days after the employer
first has knowledge of the accident.

^[13]
Capinpin v. WCC, 103 SCRA 271; Vda. de Eustaquio v. WCC,
96 SCRA  45, 46-47.

^[14]
L-20424, Oct. 22, 1964, 12
SCRA 179.

^[15]
Manila Electric Company v. WCC, 39 SCRA 669.

^[16]
Lerma v. WCC, No. L-29805, Oct. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 125, 130,
citing Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. WCC, No.
L-19164, Feb. 29, 1964, 10
SCRA 420, 425.

* Specially designated as Member of the First Division.