ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOZIMA MUNOZ, AND DAVIDINA MUNOZ, PETITIONERS, VS. MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, AND THE HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., JUDGE OF T…

It’s unbelievable.  The
original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one
years ago.  A motion to amend that
decision was filed on March 6, 1957,
thirty one years later.  This was
followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition
thereto on March 26, 1957.  On October
11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the
petition was filed.  The petition was dismissed
on December 8, 1971, and
the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972.^[1]
The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.^[2]

These dates are not typographical errors.  What is involved
here are errors of law and
lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the
decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time,
indeed thirty one years too late.  Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners.^[3]

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become
final and executory because the land in dispute had
not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.  The said judgment would become so only after
one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.  If any one was guilty of laches,
it was the private respondents
who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their
name pursuant thereto.^[4]

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision
of February 9, 1926, became
final and executory after 30 days, same not having
been appealed by the petitioners during that period.  They slept on their
rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the
judgment of the cadastral court.  In
fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno
Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until
his death in 1945.  The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for review.^[5]

While arguing that they
were not guilty of laches because the 1926
decision had not yet become final and executory
because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners
rationalize:  “If an aggrieved party
is allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the issuance
of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the
decree is issued?”^[6]

Why not indeed?  Why then
did they not file their petition
earlier?  Why do they now pretend that
they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been
registered and the one-year reglementary period has
not yet expired?

Thinking to support their
position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran,^[7] where it was held:

“x x x. It is conceded that no decree of
registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act
provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud
must be filed ‘within one year after entry of the decree.’ Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at
first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the
final decree has been entered.  But on
further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention
of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed
by stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree.  
Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no
possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final
decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.  We therefore hold that a petition for review
under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time after the rendition
of the court’s decision and before the expiration of one year from the
entry of the final decree of registration.” (Underscoring supplied).

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions
and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their
claim of fraud.  Their delay was not only
for thirty one days but for thirty one years.  Laches bars their
petition now.  Their position is clearly
contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:

“‘Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict.  Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.  Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.’^[8]

“There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants
that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the
operation of a decision final and executory,
especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of
any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.”^[9]

“This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an
insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force.  Defendants had to display ingenuity to
conjure a technicality.  From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our
disapproval of such a practice. 
The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties
according to law.  Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.  Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to
pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation.  We have done so before. 
We do so again.”^[10]

Regarding the argument
that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of
the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto
had been made as early as March
26, 1957, or nine
days after the filing of the petition.^[11] Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move
for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents
to ask for its dismissal.  After all,
they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who
were in possession of the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a
degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning
effort to achieve their purposes.  By
doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen
popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law.  While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation
of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest
errors, this Court must express its
disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to
circumvent or violate it.

As officers of the court,
lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.  They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially
this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. 
A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets.  They
do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners.  This decision is immediately executory.  It is so
ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
and Paras, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 41-43; pp. 44-45.

^[2]
Ibid., pp. 10-17.

^[3]
Id., pp. 42-43.

^[4]
Id., p. 15.

^[5]
Id., p. 28.

^[6]
Id., pp. 12-14.

^[7]
48 Phil. 836.

^[8]
Li Kim Tho v. Go Siu Kao, et al., 82 SCRA 776; Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 36
SCRA 137.

^[9]
Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 394.

^[10]
Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo,
36 SCRA 141.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 11.