G.R. No. 73786. October 12, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO D. AGAPITO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regioal Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch CXXX finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 4, Article II, of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
and the costs.[1]
Accused-appellant was charged under an
information filed on October 6,
1982 which reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1982, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully and feloniously
sell and deliver to Efren Vergara,
a civilian informer, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of brown
paper, a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.[2]
The antecedent facts established on record and as summarized by
the Solicitor General are, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In the late afternoon of August
23, 1982, police officers Reynaldo Domingo, Ernesto Labucay and Henry Chao, all from
the Narcotics Command Unit based at Camp Datuin Sikatuna, Quezon
City, conducted a narcotics “buy-bust”
operation in Caloocan
City. They planned to entrap a certain
“Emil” who was a suspected drug pusher in the area of Mabalacat Street and 6th
Avenue, Caloocan
City. They enlisted the help of an informer named Efren
Vergara. Pat.
Domingo gave Vergara a 20-peso bill to be used as the purchase money (p. 7, tsn, April 4, 1984).
At about 6:30 that evening,
Vergara spotted “Emil”, who is appellant,
with two companions smoking cigarettes outside a billiard hall along Mabalacat Street. Vergara approached
appellant. Pat. Domingo, in civilian clothes, followed him a few meters
behind. Pat. Labucay
and Chao, also in civilian clothes, stayed farther away but within seeing distance. Vergara asked
appellant where he could buy “panggamot“. In turn, appellant
inquired whether Vergara was an old customer and Vergara replied “yes”. Appellant asked how much marijuana Vergara needed.
Immediately, Vergara gave appellant the
20-peso bill that came from Pat. Domingo (p. 7, ibid).
Appellant took the money and walked into an alley where he
disappeared. Within a few minutes he
returned and handed Vergara something wrapped with
brown paper (Exh. A-2). Thereupon, Pat. Domingo identified himself as
a police officer. Appellant and his two
companions scampered away. The two
disappeared into the feeder roads, while appellant dashed towards his house
which was about twenty meters from the billiard hall (p. 9, tsn,
July 21, 1984).
The policemen chased appellant and were able to collar him in front
of his house. Due to the intervention of
appellant’s relatives who pushed the policemen and pulled appellant, appellant
was able to wrest himself free. He ran
inside his house (p. 8, ibid).
The policemen enlisted the assistance of the barangay
captain, but were nevertheless unsuccessful in arresting appellant.
Pat. Domingo brought the matter wrapped with brown paper
confiscated from appellant to the police headquarters where he handed it over
to Pat. Chao. Pat. Chao submitted the confiscated matter to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination (p. 12, tsn,
March 12, 1984).
When the confiscated matter was examined by NBI Forensic Chemist Demelen de la Cruz,
it was found to contain marijuana (p. 9, tsn,
January 16, 1984).[3]
On the other hand, the appellant and his mother narrated a different version of what
transpired. As stated by the trial
court:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x When he took the
witness stand on September 6, 1984, the accused Emilio Agapito
declared that he was 25 years old. He
testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 o’clock in the evening of August 23, 1982 he was beside the
“poolan” or billiard hall, about four to
five meters away, when
something unusual happened. At that moment,
according to him, Patrolman Domingo arrived with his companions; that they
asked who Emilio Agapito was and when he replied
“I am the one”, the police
asked him to go with them, telling him that he was selling marijuana; that he
did not go with them, instead he
ran inside his house where the police followed him; that the police mauled him
and tried to force him to go with them, but they failed because his parents
intervened. He denied selling marijuana
to civilian informer Efren Vergara. Asked why the police had filed
this case against him, accused explained that because he was mauled by the
police and his mother was also hurt, his parents had threatened to charge the
police for what they did to him and to his mother.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
In his lone assignment of error, appellant maintains that THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE FOR THAT OF THE
PROSECUTION.[5]
Thus, the issue in this case boils down to “credibility” — on who among witnesses asserting contradictory or different
versions should be believed.
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the findings and conclusions of the trial
court.
In a well-written decision, the trial court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the accused and her mother did not impress the
Court as trustworthy witnesses. Their
version of the incident would portray the law enforcers as completely wanting not
only in obedience of the law which they are sworn to enforce and uphold but
also in elementary conduct and good manners as human beings, let alone as police officers.
There was no compelling motive for the police to insist in arresting the
accused if the latter had not committed an offense in flagrante within their view and knowledge. Their plan of entrapment was executed with success and their immediate arrest of the offender would
have crowned their collective efforts.
After the case was filed and a warrant of arrest issued against the
accused, he was nowhere to be found and it took the authorities seven months
later to apprehend him. This circumstance
alone does not sit well with the claim of innocence of the accused made by him
and his mother. x x x.[6]
xxx xxx xxx
As clearly expressed in his Brief, the underlying premise of all
of the appellant’s arguments in support of his position is that police officers
are dishonest, corrupt, and wicked. In
the exact words of the appellant “planting evidence is common practice of
the police”; and “police brazenness for distorting the truth” is
widely known.[7]
We cannot possibly accept the validity of this premise since our
acceptance would mean the sweeping and unjust condemnation of the entire police
force, on whom the maintenance of a peaceful and orderly society greatly
depends, merely on account of the misdeeds of some misguided policemen or on
the “say so” of an accused drug seller and his mother.
In cases involving persons accused of being drug pushers or
sellers, almost always the defense is that the accused was framed by the
apprehending police officers. We realize
the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention
the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the
policemen’s alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance this form of
defense which can be so easily fabricated.
It is precisely for this
reason that the legal presumption, that official duty has been regularly
performed, exists.
We accept the finding of the trial court on the credibility of
the police officers who testified for the prosecution. Thus, we give credence to their narration of
the incident because they are law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.[8]
The appellant admits that Patrolman Domingo and his companions
approached him and spoke to him. But
according to him, their purpose was not to buy marijuana, instead, he was asked to accompany them to the police
station as he was being accused of selling marijuana.
It is not difficult to discern why the police did not persist in
arresting the accused after the latter ran towards his house and sought the
help of his relatives. It was not
because, as argued by the appellant, the police had no case against him,
rather, the police wanted to avoid the needless spilling of blood on both sides or unnecessary violence, it appearing from the
testimony of the appellant’s mother that she and her relatives vigorously resisted the arrest of the appellant.
The records of this case would show that in the evening of the
same day that the buy-bust operation was conducted, the police involved therein
brought the piece of brown paper, the same one which the appellant handed over
to the civilian informer, to the National Bureau of Investigation; and the
results of the tests confirmed that the said paper contained dried marijuana
leaves. The fact remains that the information
was filed in due time, and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the appellant. If, as
argued, the police had no strong case would they persevere in searching for the
accused for more or less seven months after the buy-bust operation?
On the contrary, it is the appellant who, by his sudden
disappearance from his place of residence soon after the failed attempt by the
police to arrest him, acted as though he was really guilty of the crime. He knew that the police, being unsuccessful
the first time, would be back to rearrest
him. Indeed, flight is inconsistent with
innocence.
The appellant claims that the charge was filed against him
because of his mother’s threat that she would sue the policemen for trespass to
dwelling. This reason is too superficial
and self-serving to be accorded any consideration. If the declarations of the appellant and his
mother that they were mauled by the police officers were indeed truthful, with
more reason should they have made good their threat by charging the police with
physical injuries, not trespass to dwelling, and the fact that they did not
file any charge only proves that they did not really have a case against the
police; that they have been less than truthful; and that they are simply bent
on discrediting the testimonies of the policemen.
On the other hand, Pat. Domingo explained why they did not file any case against the
resisting relatives. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q : And did you file any case from interfering your police duties?
A : We did not file, sir.
Q : Please
tell the Honorable Court why?
A :
We were not able to file because in my place they have no criminal act I
think because they are the relatives of the accused, sir.[9]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant moreover argues that if, as alleged by the police,
the offense was committed near his house, how is it possible for his mother to
know nothing about her son’s commission of said offense. The answer has been given by the appellant’s
mother herself. She testified that she
was at home ironing clothes, and from where she was working she could not see
the billiard hall, in the vicinity of which the buy-bust operation took place.[10]
Knowing that the positive eyewitness account of Vergara was convincing, the defense sought to discredit him
by emphasizing his close relationship with the police, he being a civilan informer. We
find Vergara’s testimony to be clear, factual, and
straightforward. More importantly, his
testimony was not rebutted by the defense.
In any case, the testimonies of the three other eyewitnesses to
the sale of marijuana by the appellant to Vergara are
more than sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Pat. Domingo
testified that he introduced himself as a police officer immediately after he
saw the appellant hand over the marijuana to Vergara.[11]
Similarly, Pat. Labucay testified that
he witnessed the delivery by the appellant to Vergara
of the brown paper containing the marijuana after the payment of the
twenty-peso price.[12]
Pat. Chao, who was with Pat. Labucay, likewise testified that he actually saw the appellant hand
over a piece of wrapped paper to Vergara.[13]
The contents of this same piece of brown paper were subsequently analyzed by Demelen Renton de la Cruz, an NBI chemist, and, as she
testified, the results came out positive for marijuana.[14]
Thus, on the whole, the testimonial and physical evidence for the
prosecution is overwhelmingly against the pretended innocence of the accused.
Considering that the accused-appellant does not appear to be a habitual
delinquent or recidivist;
considering, further, that he is in the prime of his youth and to accord him
the opportunity to turn a new leaf, we recommend the granting of executive
clemency.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the
recommendation to the President, through the Secretary of Justice, that
executive clemency be extended to Emilio Agapito
after he shall have served a term of imprisonment, consistent with the ends of
retributive justice and the objectives of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1] Judge Segundino
G. Chua; Decision, 6; Rollo,
16.
[2] Id.,
1, 11.
[3] Appellee’s Brief, 2-4; Rollo,
47-49.
[4] Decision, 4; Rollo, 14.
[5]
Appellant’s Brief, 5; Rollo, 35.
[6] Decision, 5-6; Rollo,
15-16.
[7] Appellant’s Brief, 10; Rollo,
35.
[8] People vs. Madarang, No. L-70569, January 7, 1987, 147 SCRA 123.
[9] T.s.n., session of July 21, 1983, 13.
[10] T.s.n., session of October 23, 1984, 11.
[11] T.s.n., session
of July 21,
1983, 7.
[12] T.s.n., session
of January
16, 1984, 27.
[13] T.s.n., session of March
12, 1984, 18.
[14] T.s.n., session of January
14, 1984, 6.