REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA AND LEON PASAHOL, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review by
way of certiorari questions the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Bataan granting the private respondents’ petition
to reopen the cadastral registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and
ordering its registration in the names of the respondents.

The facts are
undisputed.  As found by the appellate
court, they are as follows:

“On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza
and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of
the land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners (Annex
“A”) and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and adverse
possession by them tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period
exceeding 30 years.

“Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the
cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an ongoing cadastral
proceeding because of which Lot No. 444
was declared public land.  Notwith­standing,
admittedly it has not been alienated,
reserved, leased or otherwise disposed of by the government.  Basic petition reopens cadastral proceedings
insofar as this lot is concerned and prays for issuance of a decree/title in
petitioners’ name.

“Traversing the foregoing, Solicitor General opposed denying
adequate basis for grant of prayer; that neither documentary evidence nor
nature of possession would warrant; that lot 444 is of public domain.

“Evidence of ownership and possession show petitioner Esteban
Mendoza and his co-petitioner, his brother-in-law Leon Pasahol,
bought Lot 444 from the heirs of Maria Nunez and Feliciano Ignacio on December
1, 1957 as shown by a deed of sale (Exhibit “A”); that after
acquiring the land, they planted it to various fruit-bearing trees; that from
December 1, 1957, petitioners had possessed the land peacefully, openly and
continuously under claim of ownership, as had their predecessors-in-interest
before them; that before the purchase of the land, it had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Maria Nunez since 1932 (Exhibit
“E”); that in 1962, he and Leon Pasahol had
agreed that the property was to be declared for taxation in Pasahol’s
name only (Exhibit “F”); that petitioners were informed before the
sale by their vendors that the latter did not claim the land in the cadastral
proceedings Rec. No. 1097, Cad. Case No. 19 because they were ‘totally
ignorant’ of said proceedings, not having
been notified of the same; and that the land subject of the petition was not
covered by any government or forest reservation.

“Mendoza’s
testimony was corroborated by witnesses Arsenio Amante, Eliseo Reyes (one of the
vendors), and Cresencio Abuzman.

“Petitioners likewise presented other documentary evidence
namely:

“Exhibit
“B” – Certification of the Land
Registration Commission dated December
23, 1968 that the lot in question had been declared public land.

“Exhibit
“C” – Plan of Lot 444 of the Mariveles Cadastre prepared by Geodetic Engineer Victor
Clamor, Jr. and certified by Carlos G. Reyes, Chief of the Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands.

“Exhibit
“D” – Technical description of Lot
444 certified as correct by the Surveys Division Chief acting for the Director
of Lands.

“Exhibit
“G” – Certification dated December 10, 1968 by the Municipal
Treasurer of Mariveles, Bataan
that payment of land taxes for Lot 444 was up to date.

“Exhibit
“H” – Certification by the Acting District
Land Officer dated April 15, 1969
that the land had been cadastrally surveyed for the
heirs of Feliciano Iglesia, predecessors-in-interest
of the petition­ers.

“Exhibit
“J” –  Report of the District
Forester, Bureau of Forestry, Balanga, Bataan recommending approval of the petition
considering that the land being applied for was not needed for forestry
purposes.

“On the part of the State, the Solicitor General did not
present evidence of any kind but relied only on the petitioners’ own evidence.

“Initially, the court a quo denied registration observing,
that Exhibit “C”, the plan of the property sought to be registered,
‘does not appear to have been
approved by the Director of Lands.’ 
Furthermore, although Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol
were the petitioners in the case, the latter had not appeared ‘to corroborate
the oral testimony of Mendoza that Pasahol has agreed with him to have the land declared for
taxation purposes only in the latter’s name.’

“On motion for reconsideration, the court a quo
reconsidered and ordered a new hearing on the petition.

“In the new trial, the previous deficiencies were rectified by
the petitioners.  Leon Pasahol took the witness stand to corroborate Esteban
Mendoza’s testimony; Exhibit “C” was presented anew in evidence, this
time with the required approval of the
Director of Lands.  As a consequence, the
court a quo granted the
petition for registration of Lot
444.” (pp. 1-3, Decision?Intermediate Appellate Court)

On appeal, the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and held:

“In this appeal, the Solicitor General contests, alleging
Exhibit “:A” shows that petitioners’ possession began only in 1957,
they could not tack their possession to their predecessors-in-interest because of the failure of the latter to lay
claim to the property in question either during the cadastral survey of the
area in 1927 or in the original cadastral proceedings held thereafter.

“We do not agree.

“Record shows Feliciano Iglesia,
original owner of the property, died before herein cadastral proceedings were instituted. 
His heirs who succeeded to his rights over the land lived in a
remote part thereof and only infrequently visited the provincial capital where
the courts were located.  Under these
circumstances, it is quite credible petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest did
not receive any notice of the cadastral proceedings.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
show that either the petitioners’ possession or that of their predecessors was
ever disrupted or interrupted by third-parties, much less by the government.  Petitioners after the sale had zealously
cultivated the property and religiously paid the taxes thereon for a good
number of years.  We find possession of
the land by both parties was in good faith and that petitioners herein should
not, as a consequence, be held strictly accountable for the lapse of their
predecessors to file a cadastral claim to the property.  Petitioners may tack their period of
possession with that of their vendors totalling to
more than thirty years.

“The Solicitor General points out, however, that under Section
1 of Republic Act 391, as amended by Republic Act 2061, reopen­ing cadastral
proceedings is allowable ‘only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally
or permanently disposed of by the Government.’ Applying said provision to the
lot in question, it is claimed that registration is not possible as said land
is actually already forest land and/or part of a military reservation.  In support of this contention, the Solicitor
General cites the Report Of Forest
Guard Crescensio Abuzman to
the District Forester (Exhibit “J”) which states ‘that the area involved is a
portion of former Military Reservation (U S) turned over to Philippine
Government.’ Hence, not disposable under any circumstances.

“We disagree.

“The land may have been a military reser­vation in the past,
but no longer.  The same report Exhibit
“J” relied upon by the Solicitor General goes on to state that this
‘former Military Reservation’ had already been ‘delimited and classified by our
bureau (Forestry) as alienable and disposable block under the Proposed Land
Classification Project No. 4-C of Mariveles, Bataan.’ Additionally, the Report in fact recommended the
titling of the property in the
petitioners’ name as the same was no longer needed for forestry purposes and
the government would not be adversely affected.

“Contributing to the view as to the disposable character of
the land is the approval by the Director of Lands himself of Exhibit
“C”, the plan of the land to be registered.  Such approval would hardly be forthcoming
were the property really non?disposable
as claimed by the State.

“Finally, We note from the record as well that all the other
adjoining lots (Nos. 443, 447, 446, 438, etc.) were already registered and titled
in the names of private individuals, a circumstance hard to reconcile with the
position of the Solicitor General that registration of the area was simply not
possible.” (pp. 4-6, Decision-Intermediate Appellate
Court).

In this instant petition,
the petitioner challenges the decision of the appellate court as being contrary
to law on the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural and
alienable land of the public domain and that the same can be subject to
acquisitive prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession under a bona fide claim of ownership by the private respondents
as to entitle them to registration and title over the land.

The petitioner maintains
that Exhibit “J” which is the report of the District Forester
recommending approval of the private respondents’ petition is a mere proposal
contained in the Proposed land Classification Project No. 4 of Mariveles, Bataan, which has not
yet been approved by the President of the Philippines; and that unless the
President upon the recommendation of the Minister (Secretary) of Natural
Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricul­tural or
disposable, its status as military reservation or forest land remains unaltered
and no amount of physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change
it to agricultural land and bring it within the provi­sions of the Public Land
Act.  Therefore, it was error on the part
of the appellate court to rule that the land in dispute has been in the open,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the private respondents for more
than thirty years as to entitle them to register the same and procure a title
thereto because possession of an inalie­nable land, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership.

On the other hand, the
private respondents argue that even though Exhibit “J” was a mere
proposal, such proposal had been honored and implemented when the land
in dispute had been recommended for titling in their favor.  Furthermore, the recommendation for such
titling was made by the same office or branch of the government authorized and
empowered to classify and dispose of the property.  Moreover, the subject property has no more
use for any government purpose and for which reason, the Bureau did not object
but instead recommended that it be titled in favor of the private
respondents.  In fact, the Director of
Lands himself approved the plan Exhibit “C” covering the land sought
to be registered.

We find merit in the
instant petition.

While it may be true that
as ruled by the appellate court, the private respondents could tack their
possession of the land to that of their predecessors-in-interest as a result of
which they now have more than thirty (30) years possession of the same, the
fact remains that the subject land has not yet been released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone and still has to be
reclassified as alienable public land with the approval of the President of the
Philippines as required by the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and
Republic Act No. 1275.  As we have ruled
in Republic v. Court of Appeals (148
SCRA 480, 489):

“Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was
at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec.
48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could
only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of
the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965,
the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio
Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No.
267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated  from
the forest zone
and released by the Bureau of
Forestry as
an agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act.  (Record on Appeal, p. 19). 
Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in­-interest
could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30)
years as disposable agricultural
land.” (Emphasis supplied).

We, therefore, cannot
sustain the appellate court’s ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part
of the military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.  A proposal cannot take the place of a formal
act declaring forest land released for disposition as public agricultural
land.  To sustain the appellate ruling
would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the government from exercising its
prerogative in classifying lands of the public domain.  We ruled in the case of Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, (129 SCRA 689,
692-693) that:

“In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release
the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction.  The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts.  In the absence of such classification,
the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended:  Yngson
v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 123 SCRA
441 [1983]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]).  This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts.  This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs.
8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Consti­tution), and that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).

“The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject
property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the
matter.  And the fact that BF Map LC No.
637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified
region was not presented in evidence
will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the
parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials
or agents, (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]) if omission there
was, in fact.

“While it may be that the Municipality
of Obando
has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not
follow that all lands comprised therein are automatically released as
alienable.  A survey made in a cadastral
pro­ceeding merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for
adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties.  Besides, if
land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.

“Since the subject
property is still un­classified, whatever possession Applicant may have had,
and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.”

We are not unmindful,
however of the plight of the private respondents who have in good faith
possessed and occupied the disputed land for more than (30) years.  If what is needed is only the formal release
of the property from its classification as a military reservation and its
reclassification to disposable agricultural land, the petitioner should, for
equitable reasons, take the necessary steps towards the declassification
of the same.  As we have held in the same case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals 
(supra):

“The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by
Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.  Applicants’ remedy lies in the release of the
property from its present classification. 
In fairness to Applicants,
and it appearing that there are titled
lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious
consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.”

The attempts of humble
people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled
in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but
should, as a matter of policy be encouraged. 
(Director of Lands v. Funtillar, 142 SCRA 57,
69).  Apart from strongly opposing an
obviously improper method of securing title to public land, the Solicitor
General should also take positive steps to help the private respondents remedy
the situation in which they find themselves.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent appellate court is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.  The application for cadastral registration of
title of the private respondents is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to
their recourse to the proper administrative remedy.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.