GELMART INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANCISCO ESTRELLA, AS THE THEN REGION…

In this special civil action for certiorari the petitioner
Gelmart Industries (Phils.),
Inc. (GELMART) seeks a reversal of the order of public respondent Director
Francisco L. Estrella of the Regional Office No. 4,
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), dated June 15, 1979 requiring the
immediate reinstatement of Jenny Juanillo to her
former position with full backwages reckoned from
August 8, 1977 to the date of actual reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights as affirmed by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo,
Jr. who dismissed petitioner’s appeal and motion for reconsideration.

The following antecedent facts are undisputed:  GELMART is a labor-intensive, export-oriented
entity registered and operating under Philippine law.  It had a collective bargaining agreement with
the National Union of Garment, Textile Cordage and Allied Workers of the
Philippines (GATCORD) for the period January
25, 1976 to January 27,
1979 covering petitioner’s 8,000 rank-and-file workers among whom is the private respondent Juanillo.  On August
1, 1977 GATCORD went on strike. 
After two return to work orders were issued by
the Ministry of Labor, the second one on August
2, 1977 giving a 48-hour deadline “or face the danger of
losing employment status,” all workers complied except 334.  Juanillo was not
among those who reported back to work within the period.  GELMART gave these workers notice and applied
for clearance to terminate their employment. 
Public respondent Vicente Leogardo, Jr.,
Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment by order of October 5, 1977 sustained
the preventive suspension imposed by GELMART but certified the case for
compulsory arbitration on the issue of termination.  The NLRC docketed the case as “National
Union of Garment, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippines
(GATCORD) v. GELMART Industries, Philippines, Inc., NLRC RB-IV-13275-77.”
It took eleven months before the labor arbiter issued a decision dated September 13, 1978 granting clearance
for dismissal, but with specific provision to exclude those who did not
participate in the strike because they were absent before and during the same
for justifiable causes such as illness or “validated absences.” [Rollo, p. 26].  In
the decision was a list of those ordered to be reinstated.  Juanillo was not in
the list.

Juanillo filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal on February 15, 1979
docketed as Case No. R4-STF-2-1189-79 alleging that she was employed by GELMART
for the last seven (7) years as sewer with a daily wage of P12.40, excluding
allowance and other fringe benefits, that on July 31, 1977 through a letter
sent to the respondent company, she applied for vacation leave effective August
1, 1977 to August 7, 1977; that she went home to Laguna to take care of her
child who was then sick and stayed till August 7, 1977; that when she reported
back for work on August 8, 1977 she was refused admittance and was served a copy
of preventive suspension for alleged participation in the mass walk-out by
workers of the company on August 1, 1977; that while a substantial number of
workers who had participated in the mass walk-out had already been reinstated,
despite repeated representations the company refused to reinstate her; and that
her dismissal in the guise of preventive suspension was without just cause and
prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor. 
The complainant prayed for reinstatement with full backwages,
for damages in the amount of P10,000 and attorneys
fees.

The respondent, traversing Juanillo’s
complaint, asserted that the subject of the complaint was barred by prior
judgment citing the decision of September
13, 1978, and the list in said decision of 63 workers who were
excluded from the clearance to terminate, Juanillo’s
name not appearing in said list.

On June 15, 1979, the public respondent Francisco L. Estrella, then Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE) Region No. IV issued an order finding for petitioner Juanillo, thus:

We find respondent’s contentions untenable.

Firstly, at the time when the strike was staged by the workers of
respondent, complainant was already in the province.  In fact, before she went to the province, she
even notified respondent and applied for vacation leave of absence.  Consequently, respondent could not deny that
she was on vacation and in the province and, therefore, could not possibly join
the strike.  Furthermore, it appears that
complainant was dismissed without the required clearance in violation of the
mandatory provision of Art. 278 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended.  For these reasons
therefore, we find and so hold that the dismissal of complainant is illegal and
without just cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to
immediately reinstate complainant to her former position with full backwages­ reckoned from August 8, 1977 up to the date of actual reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights [Rollo, p. 40].

This order was affirmed on November 17, 1982 by respondent Leogardo
as Deputy Minister of MOLE.  Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration dated March
11, 1985 having been denied, the present petition was filed on April 18, 1985, assigning on the part
of public respondents the following errors:

1.   IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, FAULTED GELMART
FOR THE ABSENCE OF RESPONDENTS’ CLEARANCE IN DISMISSING MS. JUANILLO, WHEN
DEPUTY MOLE MINISTER LEOGARDO HAD, IN FACT, PERSONALLY SUSTAINED AND APPROVED
GELMART’S CLEARANCE SINCE OCTOBER 5, 1977;

2.   PUBLIC RESPONDENT LEOGARDO, IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, DISREGARDED HIS OCTOBER 5, 1977 ORDER TRANSMITTING MS. JUANILLO’S
CASE TO THE NLRC FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION WHICH, WITH GATCORD’S OPPOSITION,
WERE HEARD/DECIDED ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1978 IN NLRC CASE NO. RB-IV-13275-77,
WHEREAT MS. JUANILLO’S TERMINATION WAS UPHELD IN A DECISION CONCLUSIVE AND
BINDING ON ALL THE RESPONDENTS.

3.   RESPONDENT JUANILLO’S COMPLAINT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1979, WAS FILED SEVEN
(7) MONTHS AFTER THE NLRC DECISION ON HER CASE OF SEPTEMBER 13, 1978: IT IS, THEREFORE, BARRED BY FINALITY
OF JUDGMENT, ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA;

4.   PUBLIC RESPONDENTS’ SUMMARY AND CAVALIER
VALIDATION OF A GRATUITOUS AND EVIDENTIARILY UNSUPPORTED REQUEST FOR AN ALLEGED
LEAVE OF ABSENCE WHICH, IF, TRUE, MS. JUANILLO PERVERSELY AND WILLFULLY KEPT IN
SECRET UNTIL AFTER SHE LOST HER CASE AT THE NLRC, IS CONTRARY TO THE NORMS OF
JUSTICE, EQUITY AND MORALITY: THAT THEY UNDULY PROCRASTINATED IN RESOLVING THE
CASE TO GELMART’S PREJUDICE AGGRAVATES THEIR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.  [Rollo, pp. 13-14].

The first three assigned errors charging the public respondents
of having disregarded the clearance obtained by GELMART to dismiss workers who
had staged a mass walk-out and disobeyed the return to work order and the decision
in the NLRC Case No. RR-IV-13275-77 upholding the dismissals are
well taken.  The strike was staged by
GATCORD members, the return to work orders were directed to them and the
decision on the illegal strike is binding on them.  In this particular case, the application for
clearance with preventive suspension and compulsory arbitration on the issue of
termination involved GATCORD members who had not returned to work.  Of these there were 334 and Juanillo was among them. 
However, she has taken the position that since at the
time of the illegal mass walk-out she was already in the province on leave, she
was not covered by NLRC Case No. RB-IV-13275-77.  The compulsory arbitration precisely covered
her case.  All she needed to do was prove
“validated absences,” during the proceeding and she would have been
in the list of those to be reinstated. 
But she did not choose to present her proof in the arbitration
proceeding.  Instead, she waited seven
months after the decision became final before bringing a separate case.  If every member of a striking union not
satisfied with a decision in an arbitration case resolving the issues involved
in a labor dispute arising from the strike were to be accorded the right to
bring a separate individual action on an issue covered by that decision, there
can be no end or solution to the controversy. 
The dismissal of Juanillo was an incident of
the GATCORD strike against GELMART.  Her
action is not distinct from the issues dealt with in the compulsory arbitration
case.

But even if the Court were to grant that she could bring this
separate action, Juanillo would have to prove her
case.  The only basis of her action is
the alleged leave of absence she had filed. 
The public respondents decided in her favor.  Was there substantial evidence presented to
support the decision under review?

The public respondents found as a fact that Juanillo
had not participated in the mass walk-out because at the time it took place she
was in the province taking care of a sick child; that before she left she had
by letter filed a leave of absence.  The
petitioner GELMART denied having received any letter from Juanillo
requesting leave and assailed the letter offered as self-serving evidence.  Public respondents, however, found that leave
was obtained, that GELMART failed to prove that Juanillo
was among the workers who staged the mass walk-out and that therefore her
dismissal without previous clearance was illegal.

This Court will not ordinarily disturb findings of fact of
administrative agencies like the public respondents.  It is axiomatic that in their exercise of
adjudicative functions they are not bound by strict rules of evidence and of
procedure.  When confronted with conflicting
versions of factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of discretion to
determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received.  [Halili
v. Floro, 90 Phil. 245 (1951); Estate of Florencio Buan v. Pampanga Bus Co. and La Mallorca, 99 Phil. 373 (1956); Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon Labor Union, 117 Phil.
118 (1963), 7 SCRA 116].

However, as the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [69 Phil. 635
(1940)] has pointed out there are “cardinal primary rights which must be
respected” in such proceedings.  Not
the least among them are those which refer to the
evidence required to support a decision:

(3)     “While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support the decision.  A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least, when directly
attacked.” . . .

(4)     Not only must there be
some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but evidence must be
“substantial.” “Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla.  It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” . . .  [at p. 642].

The Court finds merit in the respondents
fourth assignment of error.  A careful
review of the basis on which the decision of the labor arbiter as affirmed by
the respondent Leogardo as deputy minister of MOLE
reveals that not only is there no substantial evidence to support Juanillo’s claim but also that the respondents evidence to
the contrary contravenes it.

Juanillo asserts that at the time of
the strike she was on leave, to prove which she presented a letter purportedly
requesting leave dated Sunday, July
31, 1977, the day before the illegal strike began.  There is no proof that it was filed with or
received by the company.  She asserts
that she was denied admission upon her return on August 8, 1977 and was served notice of “Termination
with Preventive Suspension” on August
10, 1977.  In the case
between GELMART and GATCORD of which she is a member, the respondent Leogardo sustained the preventive suspension of those who
failed to return to work but referred this case for compulsory arbitration on
the issue of termination on October 5,
1977.  The arbitral
proceedings lasted eleven months, the decision became final and executory on September
13, 1978.  In the decision,
specific provision was made to exclude from termination:

. . . those who did not participate in the strike, who among others
were absent before and during the same for justifiable causes, as for example,
illness or validated absences, are herewith ordered reinstated to their former
positions without back wages. . . .

Since Juanillo had received notice of
the termination in August 1977 and as she claims she had made repeated
representation and demands for reinstatement, it is passing strange that her
claim was not ventilated in the compulsory arbitration proceeding conducted
precisely on the issue of termination of GATCORD members who had not complied
with the return to work order.  All that
was needed was to show that she had indeed not participated in the strike by
presenting her letter asking for leave. 
Instead she filed her case seven months after the decision had become
final and executory. 
By way of evidence all she presented was a self-serving uncorroborated
letter purportedly asking for leave, receipt of which was not proved.  This quantum of evidence fails the
substantiality of evidence test to support a decision, a basic requirement in
administrative adjudication.  [Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, supra; Air Manila v. Balatbat,
G.R. No. L-29064, April 29, 1971,
38 SCRA 489].

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the order of
the public respondents REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.