NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES AND ARTURO UMBAC, PETITIONERS, VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITEE OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANL…

An attempt by the
respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete to
punish non-members for legislative contempt was halted by this special civil
action of Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order questioning the very existence of the power in that local legislative body or in any of its
committees.  On November
7, 1985, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order:

. . . enjoining respondents, their agents,
representatives, and police and other peace officers acting in their behalf, to
refrain from compelling the attendance and testimony of Petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac at any and all future investigations to be conducted by
aforesaid respondents, and from issuing any contempt order if one has not been
issued yet or from executing any such contempt order if one has already been
issued.

Assailed is the validity
of a subpoena dated
October 25, 1985 (Annex “A”, Petition) sent by the respondent
Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and
Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and
the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros
Oriental II Electric Cooperative (NORECO II), requiring their attendance and
testimony at the Committee’s investigation on October 29, 1985.  Similarly under fire is the Order issued by
the same Committee on the latter date, (Annex “D”, Petition) directing
said petitioners to show cause why they should not be
punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said
investigation.

The investigation to be
conducted by respondent Committee was “in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities” (Id.) in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO
II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business.  Specifically,
the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the
petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city (Comment, Rollo, p. 50).  Respondent Antonio S. Ramas Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public
Utilities and Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee,
signed both the subpoena and the Order complained of.  Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following grounds:

a.       The power to
investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines
to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration; and

b.       Neither the Charter
of the City of Dumaguete
nor the Local Government Code grants (the Sangguniang
Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged
inefficient power lines of NORECO II.

(Annex
“C”, Petition)

The
motion to quash was denied in the assailed Order of October 29, 1985 directing the petitioners Torres and Umbac to show cause  why they should not be punished for
contempt.  Hence this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order.

Petitioners contend that
the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses, nor the power to
order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena.  It is further argued that assuming the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said
body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the
terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
(Rollo, pp. 7-8).

Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the
legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in
aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries
on matters within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p.
46).  It is also the position of the
respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily
implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp.
48-49).  Furthermore, the respondents
assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines
and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete
residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees.

1.  A line should be drawn
between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the
Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government units, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power.  While
the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members
for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the
legislative body as a means of
preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Arnault
v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the same way that
courts wield an inherent power to
“enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their
dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of
justice.  “(Commissioner
v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944,
950 [1916], and other cases).  The
exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time in
the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held
that the legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power.

That case arose from the
legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949.  Among the witnesses
called and examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a portion of
the purchase price to a representative of
the vendor.  During the Senate
investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity
of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.  The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000,
as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith.” (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29,43
[1950]).  Arnault
petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

In upholding the power of
Congress to punish Arnault for contumacy, the Court began
with a discussion of the distribution of the three powers of government under
the 1935 Constitution.  Cognizant of the
fact that the Philippines system of government under the 1935 Constitution was
patterned after the American system, the Court proceeded to resolve the issue
presented, partly by drawing from American precedents, and partly by
acknowledging the broader legislative power of the Philippine Congress as
compared to the U.S. Federal Congress which shares legislative power with the
legislatures of the different states of the American union (Id.pp.44-45).  The Court held:

*           *           *

. . . (T)he power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.  A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who possess it. 
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what
is needed.  (McGrain
vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L.R.,1) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to
Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour,
does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt by
any person.  (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242)

But no person can be
punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has
jurisdiction to inquire.  (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)

*           *           *

The Court proceeded to
delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the Philippine Congress
in a subsequent decision (Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]) arising from the same
factual antecedents:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to
punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.  Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power.  How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is
impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority?  When the framers of the Constitution adopted
the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the
realm of its respective authority, it
must have intended each department’s authority to be full and complete,
independently of the other’s authority or power.  And how could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity. . . (Arnault. v. Balagtas, L­-6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370
[1955]).

The aforequoted pronouncements in the
two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground
in what was then an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in
supplying the raison d’etre of this power of Congress even in the absence of express
constitutional grant.  Whether or not the
reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of
contempt by the respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue
in the present controversy.

3.  The exercise by the
legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of
the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts
thereof.  The contempt power of the
legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national
legislature does.  The power attaches not
to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the
legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of
government.  The same thing cannot be
said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.

4.  To begin with, there is
no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses
and the power to punish non-members for contempt.  Absent a constitutional or legal provision
for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the
issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members
for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to
be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power.  But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature.  They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power.  Neither can they
exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions.  To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis
would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power,
which the framers of the fundamental law did not expressly provide for but
which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as one
of three co-equal branches of the government cannot be deemed implied in the
delegation of certain legislative functions to local legislative bodies.  These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of
the latter and must be considered as
an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P.
337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local
autonomy.  Since the existence of the
contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government body
inevitably poses a potential
derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment
for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly
granted such powers to local legislative bodies.  It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed
these powers in all government agencies. 
The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in
the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local
legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.

There being no provision
in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.  The
Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it
can exercise these powers.

5.  Even assuming that the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the
order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires.  The
contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the
subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body (Arnault v. Nazareno, supra., citing Kilbourn v. Thompson).  As admitted by the respondents in their
Comment, the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-Hoc Committee was to look
into the use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines “of pre-war
vintage” which the latter had acquired from the Visayan
Electric Company, and “to hear the side of the petitioners” (Comment,
Rollo, p. 50). 
It becomes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of
the electric service of NORECO II and, necessarily, its compliance with the
franchise.  Such inquiry is beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent committee.

There is no doubt that a
city government has the power to enact ordinances
regulating the installation and maintenance of electric power lines or wires
within its territorial jurisdiction.  The
power subsists notwithstanding the creation of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), to which body the franchise powers of local government
units were transferred by Presidential Decree No. 269.  Section 42 of the Decree states:

SEC. 42.  Repeal
of Franchise Powers of
Municipal, City and Provincial Governments.– The powers of municipal, city and provincial governments to grant
franchises, as provided for in Title 34 of the Philippines
Statutes or in any special law, are hereby repealed; Provided, That this section shall not impair or invalidate
any franchise heretofore lawfully granted by such a government or repeal
any other subsisting power of such governments
to require that electric facilities and
related properties be so located, constructed
and operated and maintained as to be
safe to the public and not to unduly interfere with
the primary use of streets, roads, alleys and other public ways, buildings and
grounds over, upon or under which they may be built.   (This Section was not
among those amended by Pres. Dec. Nos. 1370 [May 2, 1978] and 1645 [October 8,
1979]).

This particular power of
the city government is included in the enumeration of powers and duties of a Sangguniang Panlungsod in Section
177 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, February 10, 1983), to wit:

SEC. 177.  Powers and Duties. – – The Sangguniang
Panlungsod shall:

*           *           *

(j) . . . regulate the digging and excavation for the laying of gas, water, power, and other
pipelines, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers and drains, and all
structures thereunder; the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and
construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph
and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus,
and the correction, condemnation of the same
when dangerous 
or defective;

*           *           *

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to
regulate the installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g.
prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in order to protect the city
residents from the hazards these may pose.  
In aid of this ordinance-making power, said body or any of its
committees may conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as, the
legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature.  As already discussed, the difference lies in
the lack of subpoena power
and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local legislative
bodies.  They may only invite resource persons who are
willing to supply information which may be relevant to the proposed
ordinance.  The type of investigation
which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry
into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions of
its electric franchise.

The power to inquire into
the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the
franchising powers of the NEA under Sec. 43 of Pres. Dec. No. 269, i.e.:

*           *           *

(2) to repeal and cancel any franchise if the NEA finds that the
holder thereof is not then furnishing, and is
unable to or unwilling within reasonable
time to furnish adequate and dependable
service on an area coverage  within such area;

*           *           *

In the
exercise of this power, the NEA
may conduct hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas and invoke the aid of
the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54,
P.D. 269).  Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected failure of NORECO
II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law and in
its franchise.  The proper recourse is to
file a
complaint with the NEA against
NORECO II if there be sufficient basis therefor.

WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25,
1985 requiring the attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation
by the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued by the latter on
October 29, 1985 directing herein petitioners to show cause why they should not
be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires.  The respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are
without power to punish non-­members for contempt.  The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their agents and
representatives, and the police and other peace officers from enforcing the
aforesaid Order of the respondent committee is made permanent.  Petition is GRANTED.  No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.