THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE POSTRERO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant, Jose Postrero,
appeals from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Masbate,*
convicting him of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The People’s Brief summarizes the evidence for the prosecution as
follows:

At around 5:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of March 9, 1983,
Francisco Gonzales, Jr., and Francisco Tanola, both
farmers, left their farms situated adjacent each other in sitio
Patag, Barangay Marcella, Uson, Masbate
(pp. 3-5, 6, tsn, Jan. 23, 1984; p. 5, tsn, March 6, 1984).  On their way home to barangay
Marcella, they saw at a distance of about twenty (20) meters from them and
about 150 meters away from their farms, appellant Postrero
place his left arm on the shoulder of Marcos Montemor
and without ado stab the latter with a knife (macheta)
in the abdomen (pp. 3-5, tsn, Jan. 23, 1984; p. 3, tsn, March 6, 1984). 
As a result thereof, Montemor fell face
downward (pp. 4, 8, tsn, March 6, 1984).  As
soon as appellant Postrero had run away towards the
direction of the mountain, the two approached the victim Montemor
who immediately informed them that his assailant was Jose Postrero
and the motive was jealousy (pp. 4, 8, tsn, March 6, 1984; p. 4, tsn, Jan. 23, 1984).  Thereafter, they brought Montemor
to Barangay Marcella about 15 meters from the place
of the incident (p. 7, tsn, March 6, 1984).  From there, the victim was brought by Catalino Patutoy, stepfather of
the victim, to the Provincial Hospital of Masbate,
where the victim died on arrival (p. 4, tsn, January
23, 1984; pp. 2-4, tsn, April 16, 1984).^[1]

The post-mortem examination on the body of the victim, Marcos Montemor, attributed the victim’s death to “shock
secondary to hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds in the epigastric
region and lumbar region, posterior”.^[2]

Appellant denies having had anything to do with the killing nor
even knowing the victim.  Not only does
he claim that he was at home in Barrio Centro, six (6) kms.
away from Bo. Marcella, the scene of the crime, in the afternoon of the
incident, but more so that he could not have perpetrated the crime because he
suffers from an eye defect.  To capsulize his defenses:

“x x x On
March 9, 1983, at about 5:30 in the afternoon he was at their house in Centro, Uson, Masbate, which was more
than six (6) kilometers away from Bragy. Marcella, Uson, Masbate; that in 1969, he
suffered an eye defect which blurred his vision, because of which, he could
only effectively move around when aided by his son Rustico;
that his wife had separated from him in 1968 and his companion at said house is
his son named Rustico; that on March 28, he was
summoned by the barangay captain and was informed
that he was a suspect in the stabbing of one Marcos Montemor;
that he denied any participation in the alleged incident; that he does not even
know this person nor the witnesses who testified against him x x x.”^[3]

The Trial Court gave no credence to the defense version and, as
heretofore stated, rendered a verdict of guilty.

In this appeal, appellant faults the Trial Court:

1.       “in convicting
the accused-appellant of the crime charged by relying heavily on the incredible
and inconsistent testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses to the crime and in
totally disregarding the evidence;

2.       “in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime charged notwithstanding the insufficiency of the
evidence of the prosecution; and

3.       “in convicting
the accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite the fact that his guilt
was not duly proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”^[4]

It is to be conceded that prosecution witnesses Francisco
GONZALES and Francisco TANOLA categorically stated that they saw appellant
place his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and then stab the latter in
the abdomen with a knife (machete).  TANOLA
declared that thereafter, appellant ran “very fast”.  Both witnesses maintain that they could not
have been mistaken as to the identity of appellant because it was still
daylight at 5 in the afternoon besides the fact that they were acquainted with appellant.  GONZALES had known appellant for about ten
(10) years, while TANOLA knew him for one year prior to the incident during
which time said witness used to see appellant frequently in Barrio Marcella at
nighttime.  TANOLA further testified that
he was told by the victim that the motive for the killing was jealousy.  GONZALES, for his part, declared that he did
not know the reason for the stabbing.

Notwithstanding the identification by prosecution witnesses,
however, the eye defect that appellant suffers from engenders doubt as to his
culpability.  That such defect exists is
admitted.  The question is the nature and
the degree of that physical handicap vis-a-vis
appellant’s capability to commit the crime charged.

Prosecution witness GONZALES would have us believe that it was
during daytime that appellant’s vision was defective but that during nighttime
he could see clearly alleging that he used to see appellant always walking at
night.

In evaluating appellant’s defective vision, the Trial Court
“believe(d) that the accused could still see despite the eye defect to be
able to move around.  This the Court
could observe from the accused whenever in Court for his trial of this
case”.^[5]

As against the foregoing declarations and observation, the prison
guard, Honesto Almine, who
had the opportunity to observe appellant daily during his incarceration from
March, 1983 to July, 1985 when he testified, declared that appellant had
blurred eyesight; that at a distance of two (2) meters he could not see
anymore; that there were times when appellant’s cellmates would joke him but
they noticed that he could not identify persons around him; that he moved very
slowly because of his defective vision specially during nighttime, and that
although he could move by himself inside the cell, he would always have to be
escorted on the way to and from the capitol where the courthouse was situated.

Defense witness Manuel Merdegia, a
farmer, declared that he had known the accused for two (2) years already as
they were neighbors in Barrio Centro, their houses being only twenty (20)
meters distant; that appellant’s eye defect blurs his vision during the day and
particularly at night; that he encounters difficulty in walking because of that
eye defect; and that if appellant goes at all to Barrio Marcella, it is only
when accompanied by his son.

The son, Rustico Postrero,
a 15-year-old Grade IV pupil, who lives with appellant in the same house
confirmed that his father, although not completely blind, suffers from blurred
vision because of which he usually accompanies his father in going from place
to place.

In the absence of reliable expert opinion, the Court finds it
difficult to determine the actual condition of appellant’s vision and to
ascertain his guilt with judicial certainty. 
GONZALES’ testimony is that appellant can see better at night than
during the day.  Diametrically opposite
is the testimonial evidence for the defense that appellant’s vision is
defective both during the day and particularly at night.  And while, perhaps, appellant could, indeed,
move around within the limited confines of the Courtroom as the Trial Court had
observed, no reliable determination was made as to the freedom with which he
could really maneuver about as to be able, despite defective vision, to stab a person,
chase him as he was running away and stab him again, and then flee “very
fast” as prosecution witness had narrated.

Another significant point. 
The prosecution attributes the motive for the killing to appellant’s
jealousy of the victim whom appellant suspected of courting his (appellant’s)
wife.  According to witness Francisco
TANOLA, he was so told by the victim when he went to the latter’s succor after
the stabbing.  Catalino
Patutoy, the victim’s step-father, also testified
that appellant had confided to him his feelings of animosity against the victim
so much so that he had warned his stepson to avoid appellant.  He further stated that appellant and his wife
“Sina” had already separated two weeks
prior to the incident.  Witness GONZALES
also declared that appellant is married; that his wife lives with him and that
they are not separated; that he does not know the name of the wife but that he
would recognize her face.

However, as Rustico, appellant’s son
declared, his mother is Adoracion Bacud
(not “Sina“) but that he does not have a
mother anymore and that since childhood he had not seen nor known her.  Appellant’s neighbor, Manuel Merdegia, also declared that since knowing appellant, he
had not seen the wife living with him nor visiting him.  Appellant himself averred that his wife went
away in 1968 and that he had not gotten married since.

As between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses GONZALES and Catalino Patutoy, the stepfather,
who were residing six (6) kilometers away from appellant, and the testimonies
of a son and a neighbor, the Court inclines to the latter testimonies as the
more reliable by reason of relationship and proximity of abode.

We thus find that the foregoing considerations, taken together,
cast a pall of doubt on appellant’s authorship of the crime and the alleged
motive for its commission.  It is
axiomatic that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and should not rely on the weakness of that of the defense.^[6]
In this case, that degree of proof necessary to convince the Court with moral
certainty of appellant’s culpability is direly wanting.  And while appellate Courts normally accord
the highest respect to findings of credibility made by Trial Courts, we find
that the lower Court herein had misappreciated a
circumstance of weight and substance – appellant’s admitted eye defect – as to
alter the result of this case.  Oddly
enough, the Solicitor General, in recommending affirmance
of the guilty verdict, was sepulchrally silent on
this physical handicap of appellant.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant, Jose Postrero,
is hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt and is ordered released from further
custody unless held on other charges. 
Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Paras,
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

* Presided by Judge Ludovico C. Lopez.

^[1]
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 1-3.

^[2]
Exhibit “A”.

^[3]
T.s.n., July
25, 1985, pp. 5-10.

^[4]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1.

^[5]
Decision, p. 7.

^[6]
People vs. Bihasa, L-63450, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 62; People vs.
Tabayoyong, L-31084, May 29, 1981, 104 SCRA 724.