THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BERNABE CIRILO, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant asks us to reverse his conviction because
his co-accused were acquitted.  He claims
the same evidence was submitted against all of them and urges in effect that
what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.  It is not that simple, of course.  Adages may embellish language but they do not
decide cases.

The original charge was for robbery with rape, against Bernabe Cirilo, Pedro Mendoza and
Manuel Sosota. 
According to the prosecution, the three men, at about eleven thirty
o’clock in the evening of September 26, 1971, entered the house of Asuncion
Segovia where she was sleeping in one bed with her daughter Maria and the
latter’s classmate, Lourdes Fernandez, both 14 years old.  The men warned them against making an outcry,
hogtied them at gunpoint, then started ransacking the place.  Afterwards, Mendoza and Sosota
took turns in raping Maria while Cirilo abused Lourdes.  Cirilo then asked
for some food from Maria, whom he also raped later.  The men then left, taking a number of
valuable articles with them.^[1]
The matter was reported to the authorities the following morning and the rape
victims were medically examined two days later.^[2]

The accused-appellant was the first to be charged in the
information filed on December 28,
1981.^[3] His co-accused were formally impleaded about ten months later, after they had been identified
by the victims.^[4]
On motion of the fiscal, all three accused were tried together, with the
prosecution presenting common evidence against them consisting mostly of the
testimony of the two girls and Asuncion Segovia.  Each of the accused claimed separate
alibis.  After trial, the
accused-appellant was convicted of double rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each rape.  The other two accused were exonerated for
insufficient evidence.  The charge of
robbery was dismissed and the allegation of conspiracy discounted.^[5]

Right or wrong, the acquittal of Mendoza and Sosota
cannot be reviewed by the Court because of the bar of double jeopardy.  The Solicitor General is of the opinion that
they should also have been convicted as there was sufficient evidence against
them but agrees that the issue has become academic.^[6]
However, the accused-appellant invokes their acquittal as a ground for his own
exoneration.  His claim is that he should
not have been found guilty while his co-accused were exonerated because they
were all tried together and the same evidence was adduced against all three of
them.

In suggesting what might be called a “package deal” in
common parlance, the accused-appellant is espousing a rather dubious legal
proposition.  His postulate is that where
a common trial is held, all the accused must be similarly dealt with and be
either all acquitted or all convicted on the basis of the evidence submitted
against them at the trial.  It is not
correct to treat one differently from the others, he argues, because the
evidence against all of them is identical.

The flaw in this argument is immediately apparent.  The supposition is that since the evidence
against the defendants was presented at their common trial, such evidence was
applicable to all of them and operated with equal weight or effect against each
of them.  This will not necessarily
follow.  And more so in this case since
the claimed conspiracy among the accused was not deemed established.  The evidence of the prosecution operated
against each one of them separately although some of the evidence was presented
against all of them, like the testimony that they all entered the house through
a window.  Some of the witnesses’
declarations affected one or the other and not always all of the accused.  Moreover, the accused-appellant does not take
into account the separate defenses made by each of the accused and simply
assumes that the defense of one was the defense of all and would determine in
its totality their innocence or guilt without distinction.

In truth, the evidence for the prosecution was not identical for all three
accused, and neither were their respective defenses.  Maria testified that she was raped by Mendoza
and Sosota in succession and later by Cirilo after he had eaten.^[7]
Lourdes testified she had been
raped only by Cirilo.^[8]
The two girls also differed in their separate identification of each of the
three intruders, particularly of the accused-appellant.  As for the defendants, while each of them
pleaded alibi, they did not claim to be in the same place together, Mendoza
claiming he was drinking with friends at the time of the rapes^[9]
and Sosota that he was then in Manila.^[10]  The accused-appellant testified he was in the
house of a neighbor and assisting with his wife in the delivery of a child.^[11]

The medical evidence is not disputed.^[12]
We shall dismiss as
inconsequential, if not ridiculous, the argument that the girls did not resist
(and so accepted?) the outrage inflicted upon them.  Given the actual threat of weapons and the
general menace of the rude intrusion in their sleep by masked and armed men,
the two 14-year old girls could not have been expected to make any physical or
vocal protest when they were violated. 
Moreover, their hands were tied.

This would leave now only the question of the sufficiency of the
defendant-appellant’s identification, which he disputes on the ground that the
testimony of Maria and Luz are unreliable. 
His position is that if their identification of Mendoza and Sosota was rejected by the trial court, there is no reason
why their testimony identifying him was found acceptable.

There is.  The fact is that there were different
circumstances in which the three co-accused were identified, and the
identification of the accused-appellant was
more convincing to the trial court than that of the other two.  Perhaps the judge did err in disbelieving the
identification of the other two, as the Solicitor General suggests, but that is
beside the point now.  The only issue we
have to consider at this time is whether or not the identification of the accused-appellant was sufficient to sustain his
conviction as against the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

We hold that the
identification was sufficient.  To begin
with, it came from witnesses who had no ax to grind, so to speak, and had no
reason to fabricate testimony against the accused-appellant, who was
practically unknown to them.  They had no
grudge against him.  He was a stranger
until he forced his intimacy upon them. 
The only time they had talked to him earlier was when they and the
accused-appellant happened to ride together in the same passenger jeep, which
incident, providentially, enabled them to recollect his face later.^[13] Secondly, their means of identification was
quite positive.  Lourdes says she identified him by the light of the refrigerator when he opened it
in search for food.^[14] Maria saw his face three times, to wit, when
his mask fell off while he was raping her,^[15] when he lit a cigarette,^[16] and when he turned on the oil lamp.^[17] Asuncion Segovia, for her part, testified
that she recognized him while she was being hogtied and when his handkerchief
slipped from his face.^[18]

Significantly, the witnesses pointed to him only four days after
the incident, on September 30, 1971,
when he was picked up by the police for questioning.^[19]
By contrast, for whatever it may be worth, the other accused were identified
several months later^[20]
and were merely John Does in the information already filed against the
accused-appellant until they too were separately charged later.

In the light of the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, the alibi offered by
the accused-appellant was properly rejected.  Alibi is an inherently weak defense and will
be accepted only upon the clearest proof that the defendant was not or could
not have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.  It is especially feeble when he is positively
identified, particularly by the victims themselves, as in the instant case.

The trial court convicted
the accused-appellant of two simple rapes and sentenced him to two penalties of
reclusion perpetua without taking into
account his use of a deadly
weapon and the commission of the offense in the house of one of the
victims.  The crimes committed are double
qualified rapes, each punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion perpetua to death.  The appropriate penalty is death for each of
the rapes, in view of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and there being
no mitigating circumstances, but this can be no longer be applied because of
the prohibition in Article III, Section
19(1) of the Constitution.  The sentence
is therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua
for each of the two rapes, the same penalty imposed by the trial court but not
quite for the right reason.

Considering the age and innocence of his victims, whose future
has been forever blighted by his outrage to their chastity, the Court also
sentences the accused-appellant to pay a civil indemnity of P30,000.00 to each
of them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court as
above rectified is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the accused-appellant.  It
is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 8-11.

^[2]
Ibid., pp. 17-18.

^[3]
Id., p. 5.

^[4]
Id., p. 30.

^[5]
Id., p. 22.  The decision was penned by Judge Jose F. Madara, Court of First Instance of Albay.

^[6]
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 12-13.

^[7]
TSN, pp. 49 & 55.

^[8]
Ibid., p. 204.

^[9]
Id., p. 273.

^[10]
Id., p. 299.

^[11]
Id., pp. 352-353.

^[12]
Record on Appeal, pp. 2-4, Exhs. “A” &
“B”.

^[13]
TSN, p. 42.

^[14]
Ibid., p. 170.

^[15]
Id., p. 23.

^[16]
Id., p. 21.

^[17]
Id., p. 22.

^[18]
Id., pp. 100-101;
125.

^[19]
Rollo, p. 25.

^[20]
Ibid., p. 18.