MANUEL SOSITO, PETITIONER, VS. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

 We gave due course to this petition and
required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda on the sole question of
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay under the
retrenchment program of the private respondent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed
in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of
logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00,^[1] when he went on indefinite leave with
the consent of the company on January
16, 1976.^[2] On July 20, 1976, the private
respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to employees in the
active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not
later than July 31, 1976.  The
petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29,
1976, “to avail
himself of the gratuity benefits” promised.^[3] However, his resignation was not acted upon
and he was never given the separation pay he expected.  The petitioner complained to the Department
of Labor, where he was sustained by the labor arbiter.^[4] The company was ordered to pay Sosito the sum of P4,387.50,
representing his salary for six and a half months.  On appeal to the
National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held
that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program.^[5] The
petitioner then came to us.

For a better understanding of this case, the
memorandum of the private respondent on its retrenchment program is reproduced in full as follows:

“July 20, 1976

“Memorandum
To:  ALL EMPLOYEES

“Re:  RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM

“As you are all aware, the operations of wood-based industries
in the Philippines
for the last two (2) years were adversely affected by the worldwide decline in
the demand for and prices of logs and wood products.  Our company was no exception to this general decline in the market, and has
suffered tremendous losses.  In 1975
alone, such losses amounted to nearly P20,000,000.00.

“The company has made a general review of its operations and
has come to the unhappy decision of the need to make adjustments in its
manpower strength if it is to survive. 
This is indeed an unfortunate and painful decision to make, but it
leaves the company no alternative but to reduce its tremendous and excessive
overhead expense in order to prevent an ultimate closure.

“Although the law allows the Company, in a situation such as
this, to drastically reduce it manpower strength without any obligation to pay
separation benefits, we recognize the need to provide our employees some
financial assistance while they are looking for other jobs.

“The Company therefore is adopting a retrenchment program
whereby employees who are in the active service as of June 30, 1976 will be
paid separation benefits in an amount equivalent to the employee’s one-half
(1/2) month’s basic salary multiplied by his/her years of service with the
Company.  Employees interested in
availing of the separation benefits offered by the Company must manifest such
intention by submitting written letters of resignation to the Management not
later than July 31, 1976.  Those whose resignations are accepted shall
be informed accordingly and shall be paid their separation benefits.

“After July 31, 1976,
this offer of payment of separation benefits will no longer be available.  Thereafter, the Company shall apply for a
clearance to terminate the services of such number of employees as may be
necessary in order to reduce the manpower strength to such desired level as to
prevent further losses.

“(SGD.) JOSE G. RICAFORT

President

“N.B.

“For
additional information and/or resignation forms,

please see Mr. Vic Maceda or Atty. Ben Aritao.”^[6]

It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay
was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976.  It
is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity
as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date.  Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the
active service of the private respondent athough, if
one were to be technical, he was still in its employ.  Even so, during the period of indefinite
leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits
available to those in the active service.

It seems to us that the petitioner wants to enjoy the best of two worlds at the expense of the private
respondent.  He has insulated himself
from the insecurities of the
floundering firm but at the same time would demand the benefits it offers.  Being on indefinite leave from the company,
he could seek and try other employment and remain there if he should find it
acceptable; but if not, he could go back
to his former work and argue that he still had the right to return as he was
only on leave.

There is no claim that the petitioner was temporarily laid off or
forced to go on leave; on the contrary, the record shows that he voluntarily
sought the indefinite leave which the private respondent granted.  It is strange that the company should agree
to such an open-ended arrangement, which is obviously one-sided.  The company would not be free to replace the
petitioner but the petitioner would have a
right to resume his work as and
when he saw fit.

We note that under the
law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work
force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant
separation pay.  This was permitted under
the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code,^[7] which was in force at the time.  To its credit, however, the company voluntarily
offered gratuities to those who would
agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment
program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their own
financial difficulties.  The Court feels
that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the
same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefor.  We hold
that the petitioner is not one of them.

While the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor.  Management
also has its own rights which, as
such, are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.  Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined more often
than not toward the worker and unpheld his cause in
his conflicts with the employer.  Such
favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every
case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts
and the applicable law and doctrine.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 13.

^[2]
Ibid.

^[3]
Id., p. 14.

^[4]
Id., pp. 43-45.

^[5]
Id., pp. 62-64.

^[6]
Id., p. 19.

^[7]
“Art. 272.  Termination by
employer.  – An employer may
terminate an employment without a definite period for any of the following just
causes:

“(a) the closing or cessation
of operation of the establishment or enterprise, or where the employer has to
reduce his work force by more than one-half due to serious business reverses,
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Chapter; x x x.”