DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE T. SUELTO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN DAVAO CITY, BRANCH IV, MANOLITO GUINOO, ROMEO MONTEBON AND PORFERIO CA…

Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of mandamus.  The first is whether or not the
appropriateness of a summary judgment may ever be so self-evident in a case as
to make it well nigh a duty on the part of the Trial Judge to grant the
plaintiff’s motion therefor.  The second relates to the propriety of the
filing directly with this Court an application for a writ of mandamus
against a municipal trial court, considering that jurisdiction to issue
this extraordinary writ is also possessed by the Court of Appeals as well as
the Regional Trial Court of the district.

To resolve the first issue it will be necessary to deal with the
facts in some detail.

Petitioner Vergara commenced in the Municipal
Trial Court of
Davao City
an action for illegal detainer against the private
respondents.^[1]
His complaint^[2]
alleged in essence that-

1)   he is the owner of a commercial building
consisting of three (3) sections, each of which is separately occupied by the
defendants (private respondents herein) as lessees;

2)   the defendants’ lease contracts, two of which
were written, were all on “a month to month basis,” and originally
prescribed a monthly rental of P350.00, later increased to P450.00;

3)   because the defendants all defaulted in the
payment of their rentals for many months, Vergara’s
lawyer sent each of them a letter “(1) demanding payment of their unpaid
rentals, (2) terminating their lease contracts effective at the end of December
1985 on two grounds:  non-payment of rentals
and plaintiff’s need of the property for some other purpose, and (3) demanding
that defendants vacate the leased premises not later than the end of said month
of December 1985;”

4)   the defendants sent Vergara
a joint reply pertinently reading as follows:

“This is to confirm our verbal commitment with you to leave
the said premises as soon as you need it. 
However due to mainly economic reason, we request for an extension of
three months (3) to enable us to find new space wherein we can continue our sole
livelihood.”;

in addition, defendant Montebon
also paid a part of his arrearage;

5)   later however, the defendants wrote Vergara  another
letter; this time, while acknowledging the latter’s ownership of the building
and their status as lessees thereof, they announced their refusal to vacate the
premises on the ground that the lot on which the building stands, though titled
in Vergara’s name, was part of a tract of land
identified as Lot 508 which had been ordered reverted to the public domain by
the Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV) in a decison
rendered in Civil Case No. 16192 for “Cancellation of Titles and
Reversion” entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Kwong Tai Lung y Cia., et
al.”;

6)   Vergara wrote back
to them, pointing out the error of the position thus taken by them, and
reiterating his demand to vacate; his reply having gone unheeded, he initiated
the requisite proceedings before the Office of the Barangay
Captain; and when the controversy was not settled by conciliation, he
instituted the ejectment suit at bar.

In their answer to the complaint,1 defendants Guinoo,
Montebon and Cabase –

1)   denied the averments of the complaint
relative to their and the plaintiff’s personal circumstances;

2)     
denied Vergara’s
ownership of the building and the fact that it consisted of three sections
separately leased by them;

3)     
claimed that their lease contracts with Vergara were null and void;

4)     
denied having initially paid rentals but
thereafter defaulting and incurring arrearages in the amounts specified in the
complaint, claiming that they had been “occupying the premises in the
concept of an owner”;

5)     
denied knowledge and hence professed inability
to form a belief regarding either their joint letter to Vergara
(copy of which was attached to the complaint) or of the reply thereto by Vergara’s lawyer;

6)     
denied liability to Vergara
for damages because as “member(s) of good standing of (a group calling
itself) Salandanan et al Landless
Association, Inc., ** (they were) occupying the land as owners”; and

7)     
claimed that in virtue of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 16192 declaring null and void the title
issued over “lot 508” — of which Vergara’s
was formerly a part — they were claiming Vergara’s
land “as their share as member of Salandana
et al Landless Association,” which was “a recognized intervenor” in the case.

Vergara presented a reply to the
defendants’ answer, chiefly making the point that neither he nor any of the
defendants was a party to Civil Case No. 16192 and hence could not be bound by
whatever judgment or orders might be rendered therein; that his title to the
land was not void nor had it ever been subject of any action for annulment; and
that in any event Civil Case No. 16192 had no relevance to the “case for ejectment against defendants for non-payment of rents on **
(his) commercial building.”1

Under date of March 7,
1986 Vergara filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment.2 The motion was verified and had 8
supporting documents annexed to it.3 It asserted and sought to
substantiate the following propositions, to wit:

1.     
The 3 defendants were lessees of Vergara’s commercial building, their status as such being
established by-

a)     
the 2 written contracts of lease of Guinoo and Cabase, copies of
which were attached to the verified complaint as Annexes A and B;

b)     
the demand letters sent by Vergara’s
lawyer to each of the 3 defendants, copies of which were attached to the motion
for summary judgment as Anenxes A, B, and C thereof;

a)     
the payment by Montebon
on December 20, 1985 of back rentals for November and December 1984, evidenced
by Official Receipt No. 2300, a copy of which was appended to the motion as
Annex D;

b)     
the joint letter dated December 6, 1985 confirming their “verbal
commitment to leave the ** premises” as soon as needed and asking for an
“extension of three (30 months to enable ** (them) to find new
space”, a copy of was attached to the verified complaint as Annex C
thereof.

2.     
Neither he (Vergara)
nor the defendants were parties in Civil Case No. 16192 and consequently could
not be bound by any judgment or order therein promulgated, a proposition
confirmed by the Order of the Court in that action dated February 24, 1986, a copy of which he attached to
his motion as Annex E.

3.     
Civil Case No. 16192, involving “parcels
of land“, was irrelevant to the ejectment
case at bar involving ejectment from Vergara’s “commercial building“; and
defendants had acknowledged in their joint letter dated January 7, 1976 that
the building belongs to Vergara, a copy of the letter
being attached to the motion as Annex F.

4.     
In view of their acknowledgment of Vergara’s ownership of the building, the defendants’ claim
of ownership of the land on which it stands is “false and absurd.”
“Moreover, defendants as lessees are estopped from
asserting any adverse claim or title agianst
plaintiff (Art. 1436 of the Civil Code).”

5.     
The defendants’ answer is patently
defective.  It flatly denies their own
personal circumstances, and professes lack of knowledge sufficient to form a
belief about the exchange of letters between them and Vergara’s
lawyer — matters about which they could not but have direct, personal
awareness and about which they could not therefore claim ignorance.1

Against this motion defendants filed an “Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss.”2
They argued that –

1.     
A genuine issue exists which “cannot be
resolved by mere resort to summary judgment,” that issue having arisen
from defendants’ controversion of Vergara’s
claim “of possession and ownership over the commercial building and the
land on which the same is constructed.”

2.     
Their answer “tendered a genuine issue and
does not only consist of a mere general denial” since in the main “it
specifically denied the material averment of facts in the complaint setting
forth the substance of the matters in support of their denial”; and as
regards their declared ignorance of some of the facts alleged in the complaint,
an averment of lack of knowledge was under the Rules equivalent to a specific
denial.

3.     
The Court had no jurisdiction over the case
because “the real issue involved ** is title and/or ownership of the
property and not physical possession”, and “this case should not be
by accion interdictal
but accion de reivendicacion
(sic)”.

Vergara submited
a reply dated April 9, 1986,
adverting to the distinction between a summary judgment under Rule 34 and a
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19, and reiterating and amplifying the
propositions and arguments set out in his motion for summary judgment.1

The incidents were resolved by the respondent Judge in two
separate orders promulgated on the same day, April 15, 1986.  The
first order denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.2
The Judge ruled that –

” * * Ownership by the plaintiff of this building has not been
seriously denied by defendants who instead insist that their claim to ownership
of the land be a ground for a dismissal of this case for the court’s lack of
jurisdiction.  But the court believes
that this case properly is an Unlawful Detainer
action as it assesses the respective claims of the parties and it (the court),
in accordance witht he provisions of Section 33 of
Batas Pambansa BIg. 129 is
not without authority to resolve the issue of ownership if only to determine
the issue of possession.”3

The second order4 denied Vergara’s
motion for summary judgment.  The denial
was grounded on the following observations of the respondent Judge:

” * * Of course, the (plaintiff’s) discussion seeks to
convince the court that there is no more need of a trial because conclusively
it is claimed that no genuine issue on a material fact was raised.  But it appears from the answer that the material
allegations of facts in the complaint constituting plaintiff’s cause of action
are specifically denied and in addition thereto, defendants have put up affirmative
defenses in avoidance of plaintiff’s claims. * *.

“The rule gives the court limited authority to enter summary
judgment.  Upon a motion for summary
judgment, the court’s sole function is to determine whether there is an
issue of fact to be tried.  It does
not vest the court with authority to try the issues on depositions, pleadings,
letters or affidavits.  ** (I)f there is
a controversy upon any question of fact, there should be a trial of the case
upon its merits.5

His Honor’s observations expose no little confusion about the
fundamental nature of a summary judgment. 
The confusion is further bared by his statement that the “only
issue in this motion (for summary judgment) is whether, in this Unlawful Detainer action the material averments of facts
constituting plaintiff’s cause of action have been specifically denied in
accordance with Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.” He seems to
think it is the same as a judgment on the pleadings which, of course, it is
not.

The confusion is shared by the defendants (private respondents),
this being revealed by their argument that in view of their denial of
plaintiff’s assertion of ownership over the premises in question, and their controversion of “the material facts of the
adverse party,” their answer did not only consist of a mere “general
denial” but “definitely tendered a genuine issue”
“which cannot be resolved by resort to mere summary judgment.”1
Indeed, they point out that in their answer they have dealt with each
paragraph of the complaint; and “considering therefore the totality of
the allegations of ** (said) answer vis-a-vis the
allegations of the complaint, ** the answer tendered a valid issue.”2

The essential question however is not whether the answer does
controvert the material allegations of the complaint but whether that controversion is bona fides.  The fundamental issue is not whether the
answer does tender valid issues — as by setting forth specific denials and/or
affirmative defenses — but whether the issues thus tendered
are genuine, or fictitious, sham,
characterized by bad faith.

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an
answer “fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegation of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading.”3
The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not comply with
the requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of
Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but
also if it omits to deal with them at all.4

Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint in the manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule
8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be
proper.

But even if the answer does tender issues — and therefore a
judgment on the pleadings is not proper — a summary judgment may still
be rendered on the plaintiff’s motion if he can show to the Court’s
satisfaction that “except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact,”1 that is to say, the issues thus
tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, contrived, set
up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial.2 The determination may be made by
the Court on the basis of the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and
affidavits that the movant may submit, as well as
those which the defendant may present in his turn.3

In this case, the defendants’ answer appears on its face to
tender issues.  It purports to deal with
each of the material allegations of the complaint, and either specifically
denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to form a belief as to
them.  It also sets up affirmative
defenses.  But the issues thus tendered
are sham, not genuine, as the slightest reflection and analysis will readily
demonstrate.

1.    To
begin with, the defendants’ denial of their own personal circumstances, as
these are stated in the complaint, is obviously sham.  The accuracy of those stated circumstances is
quite evident.  They are in truth all
residents of Davao
City, doing business at Cabaguio Avenue, where the
plaintiff’s building is located, and in which they have rented space and where
they have been maintaining their commercial establishments under one trade name
or another.  As fictitious is their
denial of plaintiff’s own personal circumstances.  They could not but know that those
circumstances had been correctly set down in the complaint, having been dealing
with the plaintiff for years, and he being the owner of the building occupied
by them.

2.   
Their disavowal of the plaintiff’s
ownership of the building occupied by them, and also that the building is
composed of three (3) sections, also cannot be genuine.  They had each been occupying those three (3)
sections for years and been paying rentals therefor
to the plaintiff.  Their answer contains
their admission that the plaintiff has title over the land on which the
building stands.4
There are two (2) written contracts showing the lease by two of them of the
building from the plaintiff, and a receipt evidencing payment by another of
rentals to the plaintiff, documents which they have made no serious or
effective effort to controvert but which, on the contrary, they have impliedly
admitted.  There is, too, their own
letter to the plaintiff dated December 6, 1985, acknowledging receipt of the
communication of the latter’s lawyer (demanding their vacation of the premises
and payment of rentals in arrears), and confirming their “verbal
commitment to you to leave the said premises as soon as you need it.”1
There is, finally, another letter of theirs dated January 7, 1986 referring to Vergara’s
demand for the payment of their “rental in arrears” and for them
“to vacate the building rented by us.”2

3.   
Also patently sham is their professed
ignorance of the joint letter sent by them to the plaintiff under date of December 6, 1985, just referred
to.  It should be noted that they have
not denied writing or sending the letter. 
What they say is that “they have no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief” as to it. 
This is ridiculous.  Either they
wrote the letter or they did not.  Either
way, they cannot but have knowledge of it. 
To say that they are ignorant of it is palpable dishonesty.  In any event, we have already pronounced such
a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within
the pleader’s knowledge, or means of knowing, as ineffectual, as no denial at
all.3

4.    So,
too, their denial of ever having paid rents to the plaintiff is
fictitious.  The facts on record, to
which the plaintiff has drawn attention, inclusive of the official receipt
issued to defendant Montebon, prove this beyond
cavil.

5.    Finally,
their affirmative defense, in which they assert title in themselves over the
land on which the plaintiff’s building stands, is also sham, even an
absurdity.  They base their claim on a
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in an entirely separate action in
which title over a large tract of land — of which the plaintiff’s once formed
a part — had been annulled, and the land ordered reverted to the public
domain.  But neither the plaintiff nor
the defendants are parties to this action. 
The judgment has moreover been appealed. 
And the defendants’ connection with the case rests on nothing more
substantial than their their alleged membership in an
association at whose relation the reversion suit had supposedly been instituted
by the Republic, and which association would presumably have preferential
rights to occupy or acquire the land once finally reverted to the public
domain.  It is apparent that defendants’
claim of title to the particular lot of the plaintiff is so tenuous and
conjectural as to be practically inexistent. 
In any event, the claim is utterly irrelevant to the ejectment
suit at bar, which involves merely the question of whether or not their
possession of the plaintiff’s premises had become illegal in virtue of their
extended failure to pay rentals and their refusal to vacate the premises and
pay those arrears despite due demand.

They are moreover estopped
to dispute the plaintiff’s title. 
“The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them.”1

Under the circumstances herein set forth at some length, the
fitness and propriety of a summary judgment cannot be disputed.  The failure of the respondent Judge to render
such a judgment was due solely to his unfortunate unfamiliarity with the
concept of a summary judgment.  It is a
failure which we have it in our power to remedy.  No genuine issue having been tendered by the
defendants, judgment should be directed as a matter of right in the plaintiff’s
favor.  To yet require a trial
notwithstanding the pertinent allegations of the pleadings and the other facts
indubitably appearing on record would be a waste of time, and an injustice to
the plaintiff whose obtention of the relief to which
he is plainly and patently entitled would be further delayed.  As it is, the delay has already been
considerable.

The remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises,
however, is not the writ of mandamus. 
Well known is the rule that mandamus issues only to compel
performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty.2 The determination that under the
facts and circumstances obtaining in a case a summary judgment is proper, and
the motion therefor should be granted and summary
judgment consequently rendered, rests in the sound discretion of a trial court
and can not be regarded as a duty or ministerial function compellable by the
extraordinary writ of mandamus. 
In this case, the respondent Judge had discretion to make that
determination.  What happened was that
His Honor made that determination with grave abuse of discretion.  Despite the plain and patent propriety of a
summary judgment, he declined to render such a verdict.  The writ of certiorari will lie to
correct that grave abuse of discretion.3

We turn now to the second question posed in the opening paragraph
of this opinion, as to the propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the
remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a municipal
court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional
Trial Court of the district or the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals
share this Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ.  As a matter of policy such a direct recourse
to this Court should not be allowed.  The
Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition.  It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance.  Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.  Hence,
that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. 
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either
of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented.  This is and should continue
to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.

In the case at bar, however, to apply the policy by referring the
action to the Regional Trial Court of the district would serve no useful
purpose.  It would on the contrary work
injustice to the petitioner to whom the relief rightly due has already been
withheld for many years.  The case having
been filed before this Court as early as 1986, and having already been subject
of an extensive exchange of pleadings, it should and will now be decided
without further delay.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Judge dated April 15, 1986 denying the
petitioner’s (plaintiff’s) motion for summary judgment, and that dated April 30, 1986 declining to
reconsider the same, are hereby annulled and set aside.  Said respondent Judge is hereby commanded
forthwith to render a summary judgment in favor of the petitioner (plaintiff)
against the private respondents (defendants), namely:  Manolito Guinoo, Romeo Montebon and Porferio Cabase, in accordance
with the prayer of the former’s motion for summary
judgment dated March 7, 1986.  The appropriateness and correctness of a
summary judgment in the premises having already been adjudged by this Court,
His Honor is further commanded to direct execution of the judgment immediately
upon its rendition.  This decision is
immediately executory and no motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.  Costs against private respondents.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 343-D-M

^[2] Rollo, pp 21-34

1
Id., pp. 34-37

1
Id., pp. 38-39; joined to
the reply was his answer to counterclaim

2
Id., pp. 40-49

3
Id., pp. 50-61

1
Citing Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., v. Reyes, et al., 55 O.G.
3109-3111

2
Rollo, pp. 62-68

1
Id., pp. 69-74

2 See footnote 2 at page 4, supra

3 Rollo, p. 75

4 Id.,
p. 76

5 Emphasis supplied

1 Set out in their Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, etc.:  rollo,
pp. 62, 63

2 See Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration:  rollo, pp.
88-89

3 Emphasis supplied

4 Section 1, Rule 9

1 Sec. 1, Rule 34. N.B. A defendant may also move for
summary judgment in his favor on the theory that the plaintiff’s complaint
raises no genuine issue (Sec. 2, Rule 34)

2 See Cadirao v. Estenzo, 132 SCRA 93, citing Viajar
v. v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684; Gorospe v. Santos,
69 SCRA 191, 203; de Leon v. Faustino, G.R. NO. L-15804, Nov. 29, 1960; PNB v.
Philippine Leather Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. L-10884, Mar. 31, 1959; Bautista, et al. v.
Gonzalez, 78 Phil. 390; Jugador v. de Vera,
G.R. No. L-6308, March 30, 1954

3 Sec. 3, Rule 34; Cadirao v.
Estenzo, 132 SCRA 93, 100, supra

4 Rollo, p. 35-36

1 Id.,
pp. 23, 30, 42

2 Id.,
pp. 24, 57-58

3 See cases collated: 
Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1970 ed., Vol. 1, p. 335; J.P. Juan &
Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc., 28 SCRA
807; Phil. Advertising Counsellors, Inc. v. Revilla, 52 SCRA 26; Gutierrez v. CA, 74 SCRA 127

1 Sec. 3 (b), Rule 131, Rules of Court

2 Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Marcelo vs.
Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439, 440, 445 citing PAL
Employees’ Association vs. PAL, 111 SCRA 758; Reparations Commission vs.
Morfe, 120 SCRA 460, 461; Darnoc
Realty Dev. Corp. v. Ayala Corporation, 117 SCRA 538, 539

3 Silverio vs. Court
of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527, 539 citing Herrera vs. Barreto,
25 Phil. 245; Albert vs. CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948; De Castro vs.
Delta Motor Sales Corp.; L-34971, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 344; Aguilar Tan, 31
SCRA 205; Ilacad vs. Court of Appeals and
Prudential Bank & Trust Co., L-24435, Aug. 20, 1977, 78 SCRA 301