DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE T. SUELTO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN DAVAO CITY, BRANCH IV, MANOLITO GUINOO, ROMEO MONTEBON AND PORFERIO CA…

Vergara versus Suelto

The Case

This is Vergara versus Suelto, a special civil action of mandamus brought by a landlord against a municipal trial judge and his tenants. The landlord, Domingo Vergara, Sr., asked the Supreme Court to compel the judge to render a summary judgment in his ejectment suit after the judge refused to do so. The case matters for two reasons: it teaches when a summary judgment is proper even though the answer on its face tenders issues, and it teaches the correct extraordinary remedy and the correct court when a judge gravely abuses his discretion.

Procedural History

Vergara filed a complaint for illegal detainer against his three tenants in the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City. The tenants answered, denying the material allegations and setting up affirmative defenses. Vergara then filed a verified motion for summary judgment, supported by documents. The tenants opposed it and moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The respondent judge issued two orders on the same day, April 15, 1986. The first denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the case was a proper unlawful detainer action and that the court could resolve the issue of ownership only to determine possession. The second denied the motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the answer specifically denied the material allegations and raised affirmative defenses, and that the court's sole function on such a motion was to determine whether an issue of fact existed. Vergara's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. He then came directly to the Supreme Court by a special civil action of mandamus against the municipal trial court.

Facts

Vergara owned a commercial building of three sections, each occupied by a tenant under a lease on a month to month basis, originally at 350 pesos monthly and later at 450 pesos. All three tenants defaulted in paying rentals for many months. Vergara's lawyer sent each of them a letter demanding payment of the unpaid rentals, terminating the lease contracts effective at the end of December 1985 on two grounds, non-payment of rentals and the owner's need of the property for another purpose, and demanding that they vacate not later than the end of that month.

The tenants replied jointly, confirming their verbal commitment to leave the premises as soon as Vergara needed them, but asking for an extension of three months to enable them to find new space. One tenant, Montebon, even paid part of his arrearage. Later, however, the tenants wrote another letter. While acknowledging Vergara's ownership of the building and their status as lessees, they announced their refusal to vacate. They claimed that the lot on which the building stood, though titled in Vergara's name, was part of a larger tract ordered reverted to the public domain in a separate reversion case to which neither Vergara nor they were parties.

Vergara wrote back, reiterating his demand. When the barangay conciliation failed, he filed the ejectment suit. In their answer the tenants denied Vergara's ownership of the building, denied having paid rentals and then defaulted, claimed they occupied the premises in the concept of an owner as members of a landless association, and invoked the reversion judgment. Vergara replied that neither he nor the tenants were parties to that case, and that it was irrelevant to the ejectment suit.

Issues

• Whether or not the appropriateness of a summary judgment may be so self-evident that the trial judge is duty bound to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
• Whether or not it is proper to file directly with the Supreme Court an application for a writ of mandamus against a municipal trial court, when the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court also possess jurisdiction to issue the writ.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, on judgment on the pleadings, provides:

Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.

The Court uses this to distinguish a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment, and to show that the respondent judge confused the two.

Section 1 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, on summary judgment, provides:

Except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

This is the standard the Court applies: a summary judgment lies even where the answer tenders issues, provided the issues are not genuine.

Article 1436 of the Civil Code, invoked by the petitioner, provides:

The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

This estops the tenants from disputing Vergara's title to the building they leased from him.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the summary judgment was plainly proper, and that the respondent judge's refusal flowed from his unfamiliarity with the concept. The essential question is not whether the answer controverts the material allegations, but whether that controversion is in good faith. The fundamental issue is not whether the answer tenders valid issues, but whether the issues tendered are genuine, or fictitious, sham, and characterized by bad faith. The Court examined the answer point by point and found every denial sham: the denial of the parties' own personal circumstances, the disavowal of Vergara's ownership of the building they had long rented, the professed ignorance of their own joint letter, the denial of having paid rentals, and the affirmative defense of title based on a reversion judgment in a case to which they were not parties and which was moreover appealed. The Court also held them estopped to dispute Vergara's title under Article 1436.

But the Court held that mandamus was not the proper remedy, because mandamus issues only to compel the performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty, and the determination that a summary judgment is proper rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. What happened here was that the judge made that determination with grave abuse of discretion, and the writ of certiorari lies to correct it.

On the second issue, the Court held that as a matter of policy a direct recourse to the Supreme Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and should not be burdened with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist. Where the writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the action must be presented. In this case, however, referring the action to the Regional Trial Court would serve no useful purpose and would work injustice, the case having been filed as early as 1986 and extensively pleaded. The Court therefore decided it without further delay.

Doctrine

A summary judgment may be rendered on the plaintiff's motion even if the answer tenders issues, so long as the plaintiff shows that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The test is not whether the answer specifically denies the material allegations, but whether the controversion is in good faith. Issues that are sham, fictitious, contrived, or set up in bad faith are not genuine issues. A judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19 is distinct from a summary judgment under Rule 34. Mandamus lies only to compel a ministerial duty, not to correct a discretionary act; grave abuse of discretion in denying a summary judgment is corrected by certiorari. And direct resort to the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ is disallowed where the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court shares jurisdiction, save where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist.

Disposition

The Court annulled and set aside the orders denying the motion for summary judgment and the motion for reconsideration, and commanded the respondent judge to render a summary judgment in Vergara's favor against the three tenants in accordance with his motion, and to direct immediate execution, with costs against the private respondents.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the question is not whether the answer tenders issues, but whether the issues tendered are genuine, and sham denials are no denials at all. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a judgment on the pleadings and a summary judgment, and the rule that certiorari, not mandamus, corrects grave abuse of discretion in denying a summary judgment.