SPOUSES VIOLETA S. VENTURANZA AND ROMY VENTURANZA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE BERNARDO P. PARDO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANC…

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision* of the Court of Appeals, dated 6 March 1987, in CA-G.R. No. SP-08971 entitled
“Spouses Violeta S. Venturanza
and Romy Venturanza,
petitioners, vs. Hon. Judge
Bernardo Pardo, et al., respondents”, affirming
the decision** of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XLIII.

On 22 May 1985, plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran
(now private respondent) filed a
complaint against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XVII, docketed
as Civil Case No. 109950, for collection of sums of money in the aggregate
amount of P9,711.50, representing several loans evidenced by promissory notes which
had become due and demandable but
unpaid despite repeated demands.^[1] On 10 June 1985, summons was issued against the petitioners
and served on Augusto Soan,
father of petitioner Victoria S. Venturanza, at 3412 B.A. Tan Street, Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila, the address of petitioners stated in the complaint.  The sheriff’s Return, states as follows^[2]:

“I certify that on this date I served a copy of this Summons
together with a copy of the corresponding Complaint on Violeta
Venturanza and Romy Venturanza at the address designated herein/at _________
Manila, personally/thru Mr./Miss/Mrs. Augusto Soan, father, a person
working/residing therein who is of sufficient age and discretion and/or duly
authorized to receive services of this nature and who signed/but who, however,
refused to sign for the receipt hereof, as evidenced by his/her/the latters’s signature appearing on the face of this summons.

Manila, Philippines, June 10, 1985.”

For failure of the petitioners to file their Answer, a decision
dated 12 August 1985 was rendered by the court a quo based on the
allegations of fact in the complaint, and ordering the petitioners to pay
jointly and severally the private respondent the sum of P9,711.50 with interest
thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from due date per
promissory notes until fully paid, to pay P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit^[3]. 
Considering that, as per sheriff’s Return, dated 17 August 1985, said
decision could not be served upon the petitioners at 3412 B.A. Tan St., Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila, on the
ground that they were no longer at said address, the same was served on 16
September 1985 upon Violeta S. Venturanza
in her office at Asian Development Bank, Roxas Blvd.,
Pasay City^[4].

On 22 September 1985,
petitioners filed a “Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past
Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction”, alleging that there
had been no proper and valid service of summons upon them in accordance with
either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court^[5] and that the court a quo never
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners, considering that the
address where the summons was served is the residence of Violeta
S. Venturanza’s father, Augusto
Soan, and not the residence or dwelling house of the
petitioners, and that since April 1985, petitioners had been already residing
at Aurora Street, Pasay City^[6].  In
an order dated 20 October 1985, the court a quo
denied the motion, for lack of merit,
stating thus:

“The preponderance of evidence weighs heavily in favor of an
affirmative resolution of the issue.

“In the affidavit of Deputy Sheriff, Jose L. Cruz, attached as
Annex “A” of plaintiff’s opposition to the motion under
consideration, he positively states that upon his service at defendants’
above-mentioned given address, he inquired from one Augusto
Soan, who identified himself to be defendant’s father
whether defendants were residents of the place. 
Upon confirming that defendants were in fact residents thereat, Jose L.
Cruz forthwith handed to said Augusto Soan the summons together with a copy of the complaint
requesting the latter to serve the same upon defendants.

“The Telephone Directory of Asian Development Bank for
February, 1984, attached and marked as Annex “B” of plaintiff’s
opposition clearly indicates therein that defendant Violeta
S. Venturanza is a resident of 3412 B.A. Tan, Bo. Obrero,
Tondo, Manila
(Annex “B”).  The Telephone
Directory of the same Asian Development Bank, where defendant, Violeta S. Venturanza is employed
for October, 1984 (Annex “C”), bears the same information (Annex
“C-1”).  Indeed the PLDT
Telephone Directory for 1985-1986 (Annex “F”) also bears a
substantial identical information as to defendant, Violeta
S. Venturanza’s residence.

In the light of all the foregoing evidence indubitably showing that
defendants have always been residents of 3412 B.A. Tan
St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila up to the present, the bare alllegation in defendants’ motion that they have been
residing at Aurora St., Pasay City since April 1985,
unsupported by any other independent competent evidence, is, utmost (sic),
self-serving, and devoid of any probative value.

WHEREFORE, let defendants’ motion be, as it is hereby denied, for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED”^[7].

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLIII,
the appeal being docketed as Civil Case No. 86-34319, the decision of the court
a quo was affirmed with a slight modification, i.e., lowering the
amount of attorney’s fees to P500.00^[8].  On 6
March 1987, a petition for review was filed with the Court of
Appeals.  Said RTC decision was affirmed in
toto^[9].  Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The issues raised and to be resolved in this instance, are the
following:

I.   
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court
validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners when the
summons was served upon Augusto Soan,
father of petitioner Violeta S. Venturanza
at 3412 B.A. Tan St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila,
which address is no longer the residence nor the place of business of
petitioners.

II. 
Whether or not the provisions of Section 8, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court was legally complied with by the Sheriff in serving
the summons upon the father of one of the petitioners^[10].

The court a quo, in its
findings of fact, reached the conclusion that the address at 3412
B.A. Tan St., Bo. Obrero,
Tondo, Manila, where summons was served by the branch
sheriff, Jose L. Cruz, was the place of residence of the petitioners, after the
latter allegedly failed to submit any evidence to prove their allegation that
they were no longer residents of said address and had transfered
to 2511 Aurora St., Pasay
City^[11].  The
court a quo relied heavily on what appeared in the 1984 Telephone Directory of
Asian Development Bank, where defendant Violeta S. Venturanza is employed, in the PLDT Telephone Directory for
1985-1986, and the sheriff’s affidavit dated 16 October 1985 stating that, upon
inquiry from Augusto Soan
on whether the defendants were residents of the above-said address, the latter
confirmed the same^[12].

It is the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals when supported by substantial evidence, are beyond this Court’s power
of review^[13].  However, in the instant case, we cannot but
consider that the address of defendant Victoria S. Venturanza
found in the 1984 Asian Development Bank Directory and the PLDT Telephone
Directory for 1985-86, together with the affidavit of the branch sheriff, are
not sufficient to substantiate the findings of the court a quo that petitioners were bona fide
residents of 3412 B.A. Tan St., Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila at the time summons was served on Augusto Soan.

There is no question, and in fact it was admitted by the
petitioners, that in 1984 they were actual residents of 3412
B.A. Tan St., Borrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila
and, as correctly reflected in the 1984 Asian Development Bank Directory.  However, the change of their address, upon
their transfer to Pasay
City in April 1985, could not be reflected in the 1985-86 PLDT Telephone
Directory, because this directory had already been printed and circulated to
the public before their transfer in April 1985 to Aurora St. in Pasay City.  Moreover,
the copy of the contract of lease dated April 1985 between petitioner Romualdo Venturanza as lessee and
Linda Galvez as lessor over
an apartment unit located at 2511 Aurora St., Pasay
City^[14] and the affidavit of Augusto
Soan dated 29 April 1986 stating that he never told
the sheriff that the defendants were residing in his house at 3412 B.A. Tan
St., Barrio Obrero, Tondo,
Manila, sufficiently negate the conclusion of the court a quo^[15].

Under Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, there are three (3) methods of service of summons in civil
actions, namely:  1) personal service
(Sec. 7); 2) substituted service (Sec. 8); and 3) service by publication^[16]. 
Strict compliance with these modes of service is required in order that
the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant^[17]. 
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person. 
This process is for the benefit of the defendant, and is intended to
afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him^[18].  In
the absence of valid waiver, trial and judgment, without such service, are null
and void.

There is no question that
the case at bar which is an action for collection of sum of money is an action in
personam thereby requiring personal service of
summons on the defendants.

“In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons within the forum is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court”.  (Pantaleon
vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761; Sequito vs. Letrondo, 10 Phil.
1139).

It is only when a defendant can not be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time that a substituted service may be availed of, the same to be effected in
the following manner:  a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants’ dwelling house or residence, with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business, with some
competent person in charge thereof^[19].  For
a substituted service to be valid, summons served at the defendant’s residence
must be served at his residence at the time of such service and not at his
former place of residence.

“The terms “dwelling house”
or “residence” are generally held to refer to the time of service,
hence it is not sufficient” to leave the copy at defendant’s former
dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his
removal therefrom“.  They refer to the place where the person
named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time.” (Keister
v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209, May 31, 1977)

It
is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to
personally serve the summons and after this has failed, a substituted service
may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in the proof
of service^[20].

“The substituted service should be
availed of only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person.  Impossibility of prompt service should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
failure of such efforts.  The statement should be made in the proof of
service.  This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.  It has been held that it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as
prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute.  Thus, the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is considered
ineffective”.  x x
x (Arevalo vs. Quitalon, 166 SCRA 707)

Upon careful examination
of the sheriff’s Return in this case, dated 10 June 1985, which purports to
serve as proof that summons had been served upon the defendants, together with
a copy of the complaint, through Augusto Soan, no statement is made that an effort or attempt was
exerted to personally serve the summons on the defendants and that the same had
failed.  In fact, said Return does not
even indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to
have been served.  The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff’s return is
defective.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 
The case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, including a valid
service of summons.  No Costs.

SO ORDERED

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Justice Jorge S.
Imperial with the concurrence of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Manuel C.
Herrera.

** Rendered by Judge Bernardo P. Pardo

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 16-17

^[2]
Rollo, p. 15 (Annex A of the Petition)

^[3] Rollo, pp.
16-17 (Penned by Judge Ernesto A. Madamba, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Br. XVII)

^[4]
Rollo, p. 30

^[5]
Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court state:

SEC. 7.  Personal service of
summons.  – The summons shall be
served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses
to receive it, by tendering it to him.

SEC. 8.  Substituted service.  – If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

^[6]
 Rollo, 18-21

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 23-24

^[8]
Id., pp. 25-26

^[9]
Rollo, pp. 28-35

^[10]
Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 75-76

^[11]
Order dated 29 October 1985, MTC of Manila, Branch XVII, Rollo, pp. 23-24

^[12]
Affidavit of Jose L. Cruz, Rollo, p. 36

^[13]
Rizal Cement Co., Inc., vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 22, February 28, 1985

^[14]
Annex H of the Petition, Rollo, p. 37

^[15]
Rollo, p. 40

^[16]
Rule of Court in the Phil. by Ruperto G. Martin, 1986 Ed., p. 485

^[17]
Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761; Sequito
vs. Letrondo, 10 Phil. 1139

^[18]
Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209, May 31, 1977

^[19]
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court

^[20]
Ibid