COUNCILOR RAFAEL A. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JAIME N. FERRER, SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NEMESIO L. RASGO, JR. AND HONORABLE AUGUSTO V. BREVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC 1…

The petitioner, Rafael A.
Reyes, Jr. was appointed member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao
City on November 25, 1985 to represent the Kabataang
Barangay Federation in Davao
City of which he had been elected president (Local Government Code, [B.P. Blg. 337] sec. 173) for a term of three years unless sooner
removed for cause as provided by law, permanently incapacitated, dies, or resigns from
office.  (Sec. 123).  The Provisional Constitution of 1986 provides
that “all elective and appointive employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986“.

On February
23, 1987, respondent
Jaime N. Ferrer designated Nemesio
L. Rasgo, Jr. to replace the petitioner as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Davao City representing the youth sector.

Reyes, alleging that he is
entitled to hold office until 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order.  In considering
his prayer for preliminary injunction, the respondent judge required the
simultaneous filing of memoranda of the parties and then denied the injunction,
virtually disposing of the petition for quo warranto,
on the ground that the petitioner had no cause of action.  Hence, this special civil
action for certiorari with injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

After
the parties had filed their pleadings including the Comments of the public and private respondents, the
petitioner’s Reply and Manifestations, the private respondent’s Motions and the
Rejoinders of respondents, the Court considered the issues joined and the case
submitted for decision.

The
petitioner contends that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the
Provisional Constitution (Proclamation No. 3) did not at all “change the
complexion or character of the terms of office of all elective and appointive officials and employees under the
1973 Constitution” to that of “hold-over” capacities unless
their terms of office already expired. 
Citing B. P. Blg. 337, petitioner claims that
his term of office lasts up to 1988.

The
Solicitor General countered that petitioner’s replacement on February 23, 1987 was in accordance with
the limitation imposed by Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional
Constitution – that the appointment or designation of successors be made within
a period of one year from February
25, 1986.  He states that contrary to the
claim of petitioner, his term of office as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod had already expired by virtue of the Omnibus Election
Code (B. P. Blg. 881) which provides that “all
incumbent officials whose terms of office shall expire on March 28, 1986 shall
hold office until June 30, 1986 or until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified.” The Solicitor General also invokes a memorandum dated August 15, 1986 issued by the then
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. that “all operations of Kabataang Barangay shall cease
effective August 20, 1986, until further
notice.”

There
is no question that the designation of petitioner’s successor on February 23, 1987 was within the
one-year limitation set in the Provisional Constitution.  On that date, however, the 1987 Constitution
was already in effect [Alfredo de Leon, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin Esguerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987], Section
27, Article XVIII of which provides:

Sec. 27.  – This
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.  (Emphasis supplied).

This
Court applies by analogy the following ruling in the De Leon case:

The 1987 Constitution was
ratified in a plebiscite on February 2,
1987.  By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.  Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Thus,
from February 2, 1987, all acts of the public
respondent must be consistent with the 1987 Constitution which ensures the
autonomy of local governments (Art. II, sec. 25 and Art. X, secs. 2, 14, among others); guarantees
security of tenure in the civil service (Art. IX-B, sec. 2[3]); and
limits the President’s power to “general supervision” over local
governments (Art. X, sec. 4).  It likewise provides that “(A)ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked,” one such law being The Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which declares
as a State Policy the guarantee
and promotion of the autonomy of local government units (Sec. 2), and limits
Presidential power over local governments to the exercise of general
supervision “to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law” (Sec. 14).

It
also makes special provision regarding representation of the youth sector by
specifying their qualification, term of office, etc., as follows:

Sec.  173.  Composition and Compensation.  – (1) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall be composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang panlungsod
members, and the members who may be appointed by the President of the
Philippines consisting of the presidents of
the katipunang panlungsod
ng mga barangay
and the kabataang barangay city federation.  (Underscoring supplied).

*        *           *

Even assuming that the
replacement of petitioner Reyes could have been made, the appointing power is
bound by the said law to observe the qualifications of the appointee to the Sangguniang Panlungsod.  In the case at bar, private respondent Rasgo was never the president of the Kabataang
Barangay city federation, hence he lacks the
eligibility and qualification required by law to be the representative of the
youth sector to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City.  Inasmuch as Rasgo’s appointment
is not valid, the tenure of Reyes could not be terminated. 
(Ignacio v. Banate, et al.,
G.R. No. 74720, August 31, 1987).

To support his claim that
petitioner’s terms of office had already expired, the Solicitor General invokes
a memorandum dated August 15, 1986 issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio Factoran to the effect
that the Kabataang Barangay
had become an “extinct” organization and that therefore, petitioner
has no legal basis to claim title to the seat in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City
for the youth sector.

The Court finds no merit to
this claim.  The Kabataang
Barangay organization is still an existent entity as
shown by Memorandum Circular No. 87-18 of the Ministry of Local Government
issued by the public respondent on April 27, 1987, which states:

MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR

No. 87-18

TO                        :           All Local Chief Executives, DLG
Regional Directors and All Others Concerned

SUBJECT            :           SUSPENSION OF APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS
OF THE KABATAANG BARANGAY

Pending the final decision of
the President on the status of the Kabataang Barangay organization, all Provincial Governors, City and
Municipal Mayors are hereby directed to refrain from extending any appointment
to a member of the Kabataang Barangay
Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan, as the case
may be, pursuant to Sections 205(a), 173 and 146, respectively, of the Local
Government Code.

*        *           *

(Rollo, p. 117)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The order of respondent Judge denying the
prayer of herein petitioner for a writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE and the respondent Nemesio
L. Rasgo, Jr. is ENJOINED from continuing to perform the functions of the office of the member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod
representing the youth of Davao City.  Petitioner Rafael A. Reyes,
Jr. is ordered immediately REINSTATED to such office.

SO
ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., in the result.