ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS GENERAL MANAGER OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, THE HON. JAC…

On 14 October 1976,
the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to
private respondent Yuson advising that the required
improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting
resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15.  For his part, Mr. Yuson
replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify
the truth of the representa­tion in the notice.

In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo
Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume
payment of his monthly installments,
citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25
October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled “Jose B. Viado
Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent”) declaring Antipolo Realty to
have “substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers
pursuant to the Contract to Sell, executed by and between the lot buyers and
the respondent”. In addition, a
formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of
P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo
Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being
completed — i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.

Mr. Yuson
refused to pay the September 1972 – October 1976 monthly installments but
agreed to pay the post October
1976 installments.  Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the
forfeiture of all installment
payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.

Aggrieved by the
rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought
his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public
respondent NHA through a letter-complaint dated 10 May
1977 which complaint
was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.

Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
heard on 2 September 1977.  Antipolo
Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the consolidation of Case
No. 2123 with several other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot
buyers, then pending before the NHA.  In
an Order issued on 7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and
scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.

After hearing, the NHA
rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell under the following conditions:

“1) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of account for the monthly
amortizations from November 1976 to the present;

2) No penalty interest shall
be charged for the period from November
1976 to the date of the statement of account; and

3) Virgilio
Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the
arrears shown in the statement of account.”^[2]

Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration
asserting:  (a) that it had been denied
due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled
hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson’s complaint was lodged in the regular courts,
not in
the NHA, since that complaint involved
the interpreta­tion and application of the Contract to Sell.

The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA General Manager
G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint.  He
also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact
been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had
failed to attend the hearing.^[3]
The case was submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the
evidence presented by the complainant.

On 2 October 1978, Antipolo
Realty came to this Court with a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051.  Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was assailed. 
Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to
Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence thereof,
retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter^[4].

This Court denied certiorari
in a minute resolution issued on
11
December 1978,
“without prejudice to peti­tioner’s pursuing the administrative
remedy.”^[5] A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29
January 1979.

Thereafter, petitioner
interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President
which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through public
respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C.
Clave.^[6]

In the present petition, Antipolo
Realty again asserts that, in hearing the complaint of private respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to
Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its
competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform.

We find the petitioner’s
arguments lacking in merit.

It is by now commonplace learning that many adminis­trative
agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a
limited extent only.  Limited delegation
of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission)
is well recognized in our jurisdiction,^[7]
basically because the need for special competence and experience has been
recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or
specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets
of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged.  In Spouses Jose Abejo
and Aurora Abejo, et al., vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et. al.,^[8]
the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:

“In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to
vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve
specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public
transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the
Industrial Court’s intervention in the resolution of labor-management
controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be
exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law.  The Court held that under the
‘sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction … the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered‘ (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers
v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954)].

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse
of discretion, has become well high indispensable.  Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that ‘between
the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable
trend has been to refer it to the former. 
“Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly
and unequivocably, the choice should fall on
[an administrative agency]”‘ (NFL v. Eisma, 127
SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents).  The
Court in the
earlier case of Ebon vs De Guzman (113 SCRA
52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and
the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as
against the previous P.D. amendment
splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, ‘evidently, . . . had
second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean
duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting
findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.’ “

In an even more recent case, Tropical
Homes, Inc. vs, National Housing Authority, et al.,^[9]
Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that:

“There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive
original jurisdiction in an adminis­trative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency’s special expertise.  The very definition of an adminis­trative agency includes its being
vested with quasi-judicial powers. 
The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.”

In general, the quantum
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling
act of such agency.  In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency.^[10] In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret
and apply contracts and determine
the rights of private parties under such contracts. 
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder
is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts.

Thus, the extent to which
the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by
referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957,
known as “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Decree”.^[11] Section
3 of this statute provides as follows:

“National Housing Authority. – The National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this decree.”  (Underscoring supplied)

The
need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in
the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular
paragraphs of the statute which provide:

“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on
their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems and
other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming
magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipula­tions
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure  to deliver titles to
the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same 
subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers  for value – – -” (Underscoring
supplied)

Presidential Decree No. 1344^[12] clarified and spelled out
the quasi-judicial dimensions of the
grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms:

“SECTION 1.  In the
exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business
and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;
and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision 
lots or condominium
units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.” (Underscoring supplied.)

The substantive
provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found
in Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 which reads:

“Sec. 23. –– Non-Forfeiture
of Payments. — No installment
payment made by a buyer
in a  subdivision or condominium project
for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further
payment due to the failure of  the owner
or developer to develop the subdivision  or condominium project according to the
approved  plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same.  Such
buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including
amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest
thereon at the legal rate.” (Underscoring
supplied.)

Having
failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the
Contract to Sell, petitioner was not
entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the
Contract.  Hence, petitioner could
neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by
the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the
general Civil Law,^[13] in view of petitioner’s breach of its
contract with private respondent,
it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of all installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in
question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had
fulfilled its obligations to the
buyer.  The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent’s prior
installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.

Neither did the NHA
commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse, of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties.
Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of
the NHA’s correct ruling, just noted, that the
petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell.  There is, in any case, no question that under
Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine
and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it
and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their
obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

We turn to petitioner’s
assertion that it had been
denied the right to due process.  This
assertion lacks substance.  The record
shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the
hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy
indicating that such service had been effected.^[14]
But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the
petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what
the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.^[15] In the instant case peti­tioner was given ample opportunity to present its side
and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence
sound even more hollow.^[16]

We turn finally to the
question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had accrued
during the period from September 1972 to October 1976, when private respondent
had suspended payment of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision
lot.  The NHA in its 9 March
1978 resolution
ruled that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not
accrue during the September 1972 — October 1976 period:

“[R]espondent allowed the
complainant to suspend payment of his monthly installments until the
improvements in the subdivision shall have been completed.  Respondent informed complainant on November
1976 that the improvements have been completed. 
Monthly installments during the period of suspension of payment did
not become due and demandable.  Neither
did they accrue.  Such must be the case,
otherwise, there is no sense in suspending
payments.  If the suspension is lifted,
the debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur any arrears.

Such being the case, the
demand of respondent for complainant to pay the arrears due during the period
of suspension of payment is null and void. 
Consequently, the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the
arrears that were not due and demandable is also null and void.”^[17]

The NHA resolution is
probably too terse and in need of clarification and amplification.  The NHA correctly held that no installment
payments should be considered as having accrued during the period
of suspension of payments.  Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments which
would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no
default on the part of the petitioner intervened.  To our mind, the NHA resolution is most
appropriately read as directing that the original period of payment in the
Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time equal to the period of suspension (i.e.,
by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked on
to the original  contract period) private
respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until
the entire original contract price shall have been paid.  We think that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that
“[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor shall
resume payments” and that such is the most equitable and just reading that
may be given to the NHA resolution.  To
permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount
in a lump sum after it had
defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat the
purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957, supra)
to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. 
As the NHA resolution pointed out, “[s]uch
must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments.”
Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount that would have become due
would be an excessively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in
the unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner.  It should be recalled that the latter had
already fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under
their Contracts to Sell.  At the same
time, the lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest.  The suspension of installment payments was
attributable to the petitioner, not the private respondent.  The
tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of the original period
precisely prevents default on the part of the lot buyer.  In the words of the NHA resolution,
“never would [the buyer] incur any arrears.”

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED.  The NHA decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the
lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under
the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which
extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been
paid.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 26-29, Annex “D” of Petition.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 20, Annex “A” of Petition.

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 21-22, Annex “B” of Petition.

^[4]
Clause 7 provides:  “In case the BUYER fails to satisfy any monthly installments, or any
other payments, herein agreed upon, he is granted a month of grace within which
to make the retarded payment, it is understood, however, that should the month
of grace herein granted to the BUYER expire, without the payments corresponding
to both months having been satisfied, an interest of 12% per annum will be
charged on the amounts he should have paid; it is understood
further, that should a period of 60 days elapse, to begin from the expiration
of the month of grace herein mentioned, and the BUYER has not paid all the
amounts he should have paid, with
the corresponding interest, up to that date, the SELLER has the right to
declare this contract cancelled, ex parte, and of no effect, and
as consequence thereof, the SELLER may dispose of the parcel or parcels of land
covered by this contract, without notice
to the BUYER, in favor of other
persons, as if this contract had never been entered into.  In case of such cancellation of this contract, all the amounts paid in accordance with this agreement, together with all the improvements made on the premises, shall be considered as
rents and charges paid for the use and occupation of the above-mentioned
premises, and as payment for the damages suffered by failure of the BUYER to
fulfill his part of this agreement, and the BUYER hereby renounces all his
right to demand or reclaim the return of the same and obliges himself to
peacefully and immediately vacate the premises and deliver the same to the
SELLER without delay.”

^[5]
Rollo of G.R. No. 49051, p. 63.

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 23-25, Annex “C” of Petition.

^[7]
See, e.g., National Federation
of Labor v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419 (1984) and Philex Mining Corporation v. Reyes, 118 SCRA 602
(1982).

^[8]
G.R. No. L-63558, promulgated 19 May
1987; under­scoring supplied.

^[9]
G.R. No. L-48672, promulgated 31 July
1987; underscoring
supplied.

^[10]
See, in this connection, DMRC Enterprises v. Este
del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 132 SCRA
293 (1984); Union Glass and Container Corporation v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 126 SCRA 31 (1983); and Philex
Mining Corporation v. Reyes, supra.

^[11]
Promulgated on 12 July
1976.

^[12]
Promulgated on 2 April
1978.

^[13]
Articles 1191 and 1169, Civil Code.

^[14]
Rollo of
G.R. No. 49051, p. 58; Annex
“A” of Comment.

^[15]
Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 (1971) and Asprec
v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921 (1966).

^[16]
See, BLTB Co. v. Cadiao,
22 SCRA 987 (1968).

^[17]
Rollo, p. 20; underscoring supplied.