JOSE CHING AND CARIDAD CHING, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CFI OF LAGUNA, BRANCH IV, HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, AS PRES­IDING JUDGE OF THE…

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeks a reversal of the decision of the respondent court
nullifying the judgment of the municipal court in a forcible entry case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that
the private respondents had forced their way into the disputed premises without
any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same despite repeated
demands. These demands were based on
the petitioners’ claim that they were the owners of the said property, having
acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The private respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed
sale, arguing that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance. At any rate, they had argued, as the basic
question was one of ownership and not of mere possession, the municipal court
had no jurisdiction and should dismiss the complaint.

The municipal court,* affirming
its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered judgment order­ing
the private respondents to vacate the disputed pro­perty. It also required them to pay the petitioners
back and current rentals at P1,000.00 a month until actual surrender of the
premises, as well as a P3,000.00 attorney’s fee plus the costs of the suit.^[1]
On appeal, this deci­sion was set aside by the respondent judge, who held that
the municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a
question of ownership.^[2] The
petitioners, disagreeing then came to us.

At the outset, we reject the private respondents’ submission that
this petition is improper because the ques­tions involved are merely
factual. Of course they are not. What we have to decide here is whether or
not, in the light of the records of the case, and particularly the ad­verse
assertions of ownership over the property in issue, the municipal court had the
authority to try and decide the same in the first instance. This may be raised on certiorari.

As the original complaint was filed on January 6, 1979, the
question before us should be examined under the provisions of R.A. No. 296, as
amended, which was the law then in force. That law allowed the municipal court to receive evidence upon the
question of ownership in eject­ment cases, but only whenever it was necessary
to do so for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession
and damages for detention.

The pertinent provisions of that law read as follows:

“Sec. 88. Original
jurisdiction in civil cases. – In
all civil actions, including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two
(now Rules 57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or
city, and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the
justice of the peace (now municipal judge) and the judge of a municipal court
(now city court) shall have exclusive original jurisdiction x x x x. In forcible entry and detainer proceedings,
the justice of the peace or judge of the municipal court shall have original
jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may receive evidence upon the
question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely
for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention.”

There should be no question by now that what determines the
nature of an action – and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over
it – is the allega­tion made by the plaintiff in his complaint.^[3]
Accord­ingly, the present case being one for forcible entry, it should normally
come under the jurisdiction of the munic­ipal court, before which it was in
fact filed. There was a complication,
however, as in their respective primary pleadings, the parties both injected
the issue of ownership to support their adversary claims to the possession of
the property. This issue of ownership,
in the view of the respondent court, had removed the case from the juris­diction
of the municipal court.

It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership by the
defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary
jurisdiction.^[4]
This has to be so, for “were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice
would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of actions depend upon
the defendant in all cases.”^[5]
Accordingly, we have repeatedly held:

“The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of
ownership, had been introduced during the trial before the Municipal Court
would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had
the prior physical possession.”^[6]

“Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges
title to the property in his answer, it is declared in a great number of cases
that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on appeal will not
be divested of its juris­diction by such allegations alone.”^[7]

There is one exception, however, and that is where it appears
during the trial that, by the nature of the evi­dence presented, the issue of
possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue of ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the
municipal court is lost and the action should be dismissed.^[8] An
illustration is the case of Teodoro v. Balatbat, where the defendant claimed
possession by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by the plaintiff, who
in turn denied its authenticity. As
there was no indication that the defendant’s claim was unfounded, the municipal
court could not continue with the case because it had lost the competence to
decide it.^[9]

After examining the facts of this present case, the Court finds
that it does not come under the exception to the rule.

The property in question consists of a residential house and lot
covered by TCT No. T-85126 and registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching
in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.^[10] The
basis of the registration is a deed of sale executed in his favor by Felix
Carpio, the former owner, who had acquired it from Brigido Alvarado, Cesar
Alvarado’s supposed father.^[11] The
record does not show that such registration has been challenged since the
issuance in 1978 of the said certificate of title, which in the absence of
evidence to the contrary should be presumed valid. There is no encumbrance on the land, and there is no adverse
claim or notice of lis pendens anno­tated in the certificate.^[12]
Such registration, it may be added, is binding against the whole world unless
annulled for cause in proper cases.

It is true that petitioner Cesar Alvarado had filed a complaint
in the court of first instance of Laguna against the petitioners and several
others for the annulment of the deed of sale invoked by the petitioners.^[13]
However, that fact alone could not divest the municipal court of juris­diction
to continue trying the question of possession, more so since the question of
ownership was appropriately being litigated in the annulment suit. Significantly, the deed of sale being
challenged in that action was different from the contract involved in the
exception just cited.

In the Balatbat case, the deed of sale invoked by the defendant
was allegedly executed by the plaintiff, who denied its authenticity. In other words, the transaction in question
was purportedly between the plaintiff and the defendant as vendor and
vendee. In the instant case, the
private respondents were not a party to the contract of sale invoked by the
petitioners. It was being challenged by
respondent Cesar Alvarado only as an alleged heir of Brigido Alvarado, who had
transferred it to Felix Carpio, who in turn had sold it to the petitioners.