NAPOLEON LANDICHO, PETITIONER, VS. BEINVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY BRANCH, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition to compel respondent to admit the appeal
interposed by petitioner and to enjoin the former from executing the
judgment he rendered against the latter on January 9, 1950.

Napoleon Landicho was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the crime of estafa.
After trial, the respondent Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, then
presiding the court, then and there found the defendant guilty and
sentenced him to one (1) year, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P435 and
to pay the costs, without prejudice to writing a more detailed
decision, thereafter, counsel for the defendant manifested in open
court that he was appealing from the decision, and requested the Court
to fix the appeal bond for his temporary release. The respondent judge
fixed the bond at P5,000, which was reduced to P3,000 upon request of
counsel. The bond having been perfected, the defendant was released on
January 10, 1950.

On January 24, 1950, the fifteenth day from the promulgation of the
oral judgment, defense counsel caused a written notice of appeal to be
filed with the Clerk of Court, through one Jovencio Alfaro, When Alfaro
reached the office of the clerk of court at 3:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, he found the office closed, and so he went to the Office of
the City Attorney, which is just adjacent, to serve the copy
corresponding to this official, entrusting the original to a clerk who
gave him (Alfaro) the assurance that it would be filed with the clerk
of court the next morning. In the meantime, copy of the written
decision was sent to the defendant by registered mail and was received
by the latter on January 26, 1950. On August 25, 1950, the defendant
was notified through his bondsman to appear In court on September 9,
1950 for the promulgation of the decision, and it was then that he
learned for the first time that his written notice of appeal was never
filed with the Clerk of Court. Believing that the steps he had taken
are sufficient to perfect his appeal, defendant filed this petition
praying that he be granted the relief already pointed out above.

The only question to be determined in this case is whether the
petitioner has perfected his appeal as required by the Rules of Court,
or whether he has already lost his right to appeal as claimed by
respondent.

It appears that right after trial on January 9, 1950, the
respondent judge passed judgment upon the defendant in open court
without prejudice to writing a detailed decision. This he did and a
copy of the decision was served upon the defendant. This copy was
received on January 26, 1950. On January 24, 1950, the fifteenth day
from the promulgation of the oral judgment, defendant caused a written
notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk of court, which he failed
to do, because at about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon, his office was
already closed. Although this was denied by the clerk of court,
however, we are inclined to believe the statement of Jovencio Alfaro,
the messenger, because of the undisputed fact that he served the copy
for the City Attorney at 3:55 in the afternoon of the same day, whose
office is just adjacent to that of the clerk of court. If Alfaro was
able to serve that copy on time, and he went there with the only
purpose of filing the notice of appeal, there is no valid reason why
he could not file on time the notice of appeal with the clerk of court.
Considering that the Inability of the defendant to file the notice of
appeal cannot be attributed to his fault, and the fact that right after
the promulgation of the oral judgment he manifested in open court,
through his counsel, his desire to appeal from the decision, and in
fact he put up the necessary bond on appeal for his provisional
liberty, we hold that, in the light of the concurring circumstances,
the defendant should be considered as having perfected his appeal
within the reglementary period. (Section 6, Rule 118, of the Rules of
Court). The attention of the Clerk of Court of Rizal should be called
to the necessity of observing office hours more scrupulously in order
that the rights of the litigants may not be prejudiced and the incident
that has given rise to this petition may be avoided.

We have noticed that a copy of the written decision of the
respondent judge was sent to the defendant by registered mail and was
received by him on January 26, 1950, and subsequently, or on February
7, 1950, defendant filed a motion for.a new trial which was denied by
the court for lack of jurisdiction. Undoubtedly this step was taken by
the defendant on the belief that the period of fifteen days within
which he may appeal from the decision should be counted from the date
he received copy of the decision. We believe it to be opportune to
clarify this matter so as to avoid misinterpretation of the rule
regarding the manner of how an appeal should be taken.

According to section 6, rule 118, of the Rules of Court, an appeal
must be taken within fifteen days from the rendition of the judgment or
order appealed from. The words”rendition of the judgment” have given
rise to some misunderstanding which should be clarified. Do those words
mean that the period of fifteen days should be computed from the date
the decision is signed by the judge, or from the date copy of the
decision is served on the defendant, or from the date the decision is
announced or promulgated? The words under consideration have a legal
meaning of their own. These words appear in many remedial statutes of
the states of America and they have been interpreted in a number of
cases. Thus, in one case, it was held that ‘rendition’ of judgment
means the annunciation or declaring of the decision of the court, and
not the entry of the judgment on the record.” (The Washington,
C.C.A.N.Y., 16 F. 2d 206, 208.) In another case, it was held that
“rendering judgment, as used in a statute requiring a writ of error to
be brought within two years after rendering judgment, in its more
obvious and national import means the announcing or declaring of the
decision of the court, indicated by the rule for judgment.” (Fleet vs.
Youngs, N.Y. 11 Wend, 522, 527, 528.) And, still in another case, it
was held that “under Civil Code 1913, par. 1233, providing that appeal
may be taken from a final judgment of the superior court in the.civil
action within ‘six months after rendition of such judgment1 means by the
term ‘rendering judgment’ the court’s announcement of its final
determination of the rights of the parties, and not formal written
judgment signed by the judge and filed.” (Moulton vs. Smith, 203 P. 562, 563, 23 Ariz. 319). (See also
authorities on the matter cited in “Words and Phrases”, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 36, pp. 872-874). These authorities have persuasive force
in this jurisdiction because of the origin of our remedial statute.

It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a
criminal case must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days
from the date the decision is announced or promulgated to the
defendant. And this can be done by the court either by announcing the
judgment in open court as was done in this ease, or by promulgating the
Judgment in the manner set forth in section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court. This we have impliedly indicated in Agustin Dayoan vs.
Manuel Blanco, 77 Phil., 1085. The above rule does not require that a
copy of the decision be served on the parties in criminal cases. This
is only required in cases decided by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. (Sec. 7, Rule 53, id).

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. Respondent is required to give course to the appeal interposed by petitioner.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., in the result.