G.R. No. L-2954. November 16, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO ALMAZORA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
People’s Court but which, with the abolition of said Tribunal, were
subsequently indorsed to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where
the acts of treason charged were allegedly committed. The appellant
Alejandro Almazora was found guilty and sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Laguna to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay a fine of P5,000, with costs. Half of the
period of his provisional imprisonment was credited to him.
Because of the nature of the penalty imposed, the appeal should
ordinarily go to the Court of Appeals. Appellant Alejandro Almazora
however, was tried with several treason indictees in a mass trial altho
under different and separate indictments. The evidence presented during
the mass trial applies to all the treason defendants including the
appellant. What is more, the acts of treason charged against the
several accused were supposed to have been committed on or about the
same time or occasion. At least one of those defendants was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and his appeal including the record of the
evidence naturally came to this Tribunal. That is the reason why the
appeal of Alejandro Almazora also found its way to this Court, under
the provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act 296 otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The appellant was charged under five counts. During the trial no
evidence, was presented to substantiate counts 4 and 5 which were
apparently abandoned by the prosecution.
The defendant ha§ admittedly always been a Filipino citizen, a native and resident of the Philippines.
Under the first count, the defendant is accused of having acted as
informer or agent of the Japanese forces, going with them arid
participating in their raids, and of having joined and served in the
organization “Makabayang Katipunan Ng Mga Filipino” otherwise known as
the Makapili. To prove this count, three witnesses Federico Baylon,
Tranquilino Martinez and Briccio Malitic testified to the effect that
sometime in December, 1944, a chapter of the Makapili organization was
established in Calauan, Laguna by one Proceso Delgado; that the accused
became a member of that organization which was composed mostly of
Ganaps and Sakdalistas; that some members including the accused, armed
with rifles used to accompany Japanese soldiers in raids against
guerrillas and that on several occasions5 the accused and his fellow
Makapilis actually arrested suspected guerrillas and turned them
over to the Japanese. After examining the evidence we agree with the
trial court that the charge under the first count was duly proven. We,
however, disagree with the lower court when it held that although the
evidence of the prosecution is definite, conclusive.and convincing that
the accused together with former members of the Sakdalista and Ganap
organizations in Calauan attached themselves to and cooperated with the
enemy invaders, and that armed with a rifle he took direct part in
raids against the guerrillas conducted by the Japanese soldiers, there
is no drect and conclusive proof that he was actually appointed or
inducted into the Makapili organization, and that consequently, the
accused could not be considered as having joined the Makapili
organization. In the case of People vs. Alitagtag, (45 Off. Gaz., 715[1]),
we have held that appointment to enemy forces need not be proven by any
enlistment or appointment, but may be inferred from circumstances. We
are satisfied that from the acts of the accused in being seen
frequently at the headquarters of the Makapili organisation at Calauan,
associating with well-known Makapili members, joining them in their
raids against the guerrillas either by themselves or in company with
Japanese soldiers, being armed with a rifle like the other Makapili
members and otherwise conducting himself like any other member of that
military organization, we can infer and find as we do find that he
joined the Makapili organization,
Under count 2, the appellant is charged with having taken part on
December 23, 1944, in the arrest in Calauan, Laguna of Norberto
Ungkiatco who was suspected of being a guerrilla and who after the
arrest was taken to the Japanese garrison where he was confined and
tortured. To establish this count, Matias Mendoza testified to the
effect that as a member of the guerrillas, he had orders to go to the
poblacion of Calauan on December 23, 1944, to observe; that he entered
a movie house where he was arrested by a group of armed men composed of
appellant Alejandro Almazora and other Makapilis like his (appellant’s)
brother Mareelo Almazora, Proceso Delgado and others; that on the way
to the Japanese garrison he witnessed the arrest of Norberto Ungkiatco
by the same group of Makapilis; that he and Ungkiatco were taken to
Makalauang Spring, then being used as a garrison by the Japanese
soldiers though at the time there were no Japanese soldiers there; that
at the said Makalauang Spring they were investigated by the same group,
especially by Proceso Delgado. After five days Mendoza was released.
Ungkiatco stated that he was a member of the R.O.T.C. guerrillas;
that he was arrested at the time and in the manner tesitifed to by
Mendoza, by the group composed of the appellant, his (appellant’s)
brother Marcelo Almazora, Proceso Delgado and others; that after being
taken to Makalauang Spring he was investigated and tortured by Proceso
Delgado; that as a result of the clubbing and torture to which he was
subjected, he lost some of his teeth and one of his ribs was fractured,
and that he was released after a week of confinement. We also agree
with the trial court that count No. 2 was proven.
Under count 3, which refers to the arrest of Andres Ramos, Aurora
Azucena told the court that on January 15, 1945, a group of armed
Makapilis composed of the appellant Alejandro Almazora, his brother
Marcelo Almazora, Proceso Delgado and a few others, all armed with
rifles and in company with Japanese soldiers went to her house in the
barrio of San Isidro, Calauan; that Proceso Delgado ordered her husband
Andres Ramos to come down his house, which he did; that Proceso Delgado
immediately struck him on the back of the head with the butt of his
revolver, inflicting a wound; that her husband, Andres Ramos, was taken
away by the group and was thereafter never heard from.
Crispin Aniceta stated in court that on the same occasion he was
also arrested by the same group which included the appellant Alejandro
Almazora, all of the members of which were armed with rifles; that he
(Crispin) witnessed the arrest of Andres Ramos; that he and Andres
Ramos and other barrio residents who had likewise been arrested were
taken to the convent of the town of Calauan which was then occupied by
the Makapilis and their families; that after some investigations
Crispin was released but Andres Ramos was retained in the convent and
was never heard from up to the date of the trial.
The trial court equally found that count 3 was duly proven. We
agree with the Laguna court that two witnesses have satisfactorily
established the arrest of Andres Ramos on January 15, 1945, by a group
composed of the appellant and other Makapilis all of whom were armed;
that after the arrest, Andres Ramos was taken to the convent in the
poblacion then occupied by Makapilis where he was detained, and that
thereafter Ramos did not return to his house and was never heard from.
The appellant was the only witness presented to prove his
innocence. He denied the charges made against him and said that he was
not at the places and on the occasions where and when he was alleged to
have helped in the arrests and investigations of guerrilla suspects
like Matias Mendoza, Norberto Ungkiato, Andres Ramos and Crispin
Aniceta. He equally denied that he ever joined the Makapili
organization. He claims that the witnesses who testified against him
hated his father who was a Ganap before the war and that after his
death, which occurred while he was confined in Bilibid awaiting trial
as a treason indictee, said witnesses tried to heap all their
animosity, hatred and feeling of revenge on him (appellant) as the son
of the man they hated. It has been proven however that the affidavits
of these witnesses who testified against the appellant had been made
and filed long before the death of his father, so that it cannot be
true that in testifying against the accused they merely wanted to send
him to jail in place of his father, the object of their hatred, who was
already dead. The trial court did not believe the defense of the
appellant. Neither are we inclined to give it serious consideration. We
quote a pertinent portion of the decision of the trial court:
“The Court had the opportunity to watch the
witnesses for the prosecution, while they were testifying, and finds no
reason to doubt their testimony.“The acts of the defendant,
conclusively established by the evidence presented, constitute both
adherence to the enemy and overt acts of treason. The defense of alibi
put up by the accused cannot be taken seriously. As between his sole,
unsupported declaration, and the logical, straight-forward, and
unbiased testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, the choice is
not hard to make.”
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of the charge of
treason. The Solicitor General recommends the affirmance of the
decision appealed from. Finding no reversible error in it, the same is
hereby affirmed with costs.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
[1] 79 Phil., p. 138.