G.R. No. L-3472. November 28, 1950
ERNESTO VILLANUEVA ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. EULALIO CHAVEZ ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.
BENGZON, J.:
in the night of May 16, 1949 between Paterno Biseocho on one side and
Ernesto Villanueva and companions on the other. Biseocho suffered some
injuries even as Villanueva received a stab wound in the stomach.
Before the justice of the peace of that town, the Chief of Police
filed against Paterno Biscocho a complaint for frustrated homicide,
which after the corresponding preliminary investigation was forwarded
to the superior court. There the fiscal filed the appropriate
information for the same offense, and the case is numbered 11611.
Subsequently, i.e. on July 28, 1949, presumably at the suggestion of
Paterno Biscocho, the police of the aforesaid municipality of Batangas
initiated another investigation of the encounter and presented a
complaint for less serious physical injuries against Ernesto Villanueva
and his companions. At the trial of this second case the defendants’
attorney moved that it be dismissed or that at least it be suspended
until the other case No. 11611 in the court of first instance shall
have been terminated. He earnestly argued that the prosecution could
not possibly maintain two inconsistent positions. Denial of that motion
prompted the institution in the court of first instance, of prohibition
proceedings against the justice of the peace, the chief of police and
other officers. That court, Judge E. Soriano presiding, denied the
petition after hearing the parties, holding mainly that the justice of
the peace court had jurisdiction, and that the petitioners had an
adequate remedy by appeal should they be convicted by the judge thereof.
We are now asked to review and reverse that order of denial.
Although at first glance the prosecution’s stand in the second case
seems to be inconsistent with the information it had previously filed
against Paterno Biscocho,[1]
it should be clear that such circumstance alone does not operate to
deprive the justice of the peace of its jurisdiction to try the
prosecution for physical injuries. As to abuse of discretion, we do not
believe the respondent justice of the peace gravely erred in refusing to
suspend, because he either expected that such apparent inconsistency
will be explained at the trial or otherwise he thought that such
contradictory stand may and should be taken into account in passing
judgment on the culpability of the accused.
Anyway, as His Honor correctly observed, the remedy of the
petitioners is to defend themselves before the justice of the peace,
and to appeal in case they are convicted. Writs of prohibition have
generally been denied where there is a remedy by appeal. Because
petitions of the kind besides unnecessarily clogging the docket, have
often been employed either to delay the proceedings or otherwise to
obtain undue advantage.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista, JJ., concur.
[1] Not necessarily, because
both sides may be criminally responsible if they had previously agreed
to fight. (People vs. Macaspac, 60 Phil., 683; People vs. Bauden, 43 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2020; People vs. Marasigan, 51 Phil.,. 701).