MARIANO S. FLORENDO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. BERNARDINA E. VDA. DE GONZALES ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

In civil case No« 180 of the Court of First Instance the plaintiffs
are Mariano S. Florendo and R. Subido and the defendants are Bernardina
Vda. de Gonzales (for herself and as administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Pedro Gonzales), Paula Bernardo, Loreto E. Gonzales,
Demetrio Pozon, and Oscar L. Uy. The complaint in substance alleges
that the first four defendants had sold to Mariano S. Florendo about
325 hectares of agricultural land, through the agency of R. O. Subido,
but that, in breach thereof, said defendants not only failed to execute
the necessary deed of sale and deliver the corresponding certificates
of title to Mariano S. Florendo, but also sold the same property to
their confendant Oscar L. Uy, with the result that R. O. Subido, the
agent, was deprived of his commission of not less thin P6,000, and
Mariano S. Florendo was damaged in the sun of about P48,000 which he
would have realized from a resale of the property, plus P1,000 as
attorney’s fees. The complaint accordingly prays that the defendants be
ordered to execute the necessary conveyance in favor of Mariano S.
Florendo and deliver the corresponding certificates of title, and to
pay the sum of P55,000 as damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, which motions were denied by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, with the exception of the motion to dismiss filed by
the defendant Oscar L. Uy which was sustained in the order of May 7,
1947, The remaining defendants in due time filed their answers with
counterclaim. On October 17, 1947, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the order of May 7, 1947, and for the admission
of an amended complaint, and this was granted in the order of. October
20, 1947. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by defendant
Oscar L. Uy, the Court, in its order of November 26, 1947, set aside
the order of October 20, 1947. This order of November 26, 1947, was the
subject of a petition for certiorari filed by R. O. Subido and Mariano
S. Florendo in this Court, (G. r; No. L-2023) but said petition was
dismissed by resolution of March 2, 19I+8, on the ground that the
proper remedy was appeal.

On May 18, 1948, Mariano S. Florendo, one of the plaintiffs in
civil case No. 180, instituted another action in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (civil case No. 525) against if the five defendants in
civil case No. 180 together with the children of Bernardina Vda. de
Gonzales and Gregorio S. Velasquez, the latter in his capacity as
register of deeds of Rizal. The complaint prays that the defendants be
ordered to execute the necessary documents of transfer in favor of the
plaintiff covering the same land which is the subject matter of civil
case No, 180, that deed of sale in favor of the defendant Oscar L. Uy
be annulled and the transfer certificates of title in his name
cancelled, that new transfer certificates of title be issued in favor
of the plaintiff, and that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiff the sum of P48,750 as damages.

On May 20, 1948, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 180 filed a
motion to dismiss said case in view of the institution of civil case
No. 525, intended to consolidate allied causes of action in one
complaint against common defendants and to join all necessary and
indispensable parties, This motion was denied by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on June 5, 1948, and the order of denial became the
subject of a petition for certiorari instituted in this Court on August
27, 1948, (G. R. No. L-2454), but this was dismissed By resolution of
September 17, 1948.

On June 4, 1948, an amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff in civil case No. 525, and its admission is still pending. The defendants
in this case filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint all based
on the ground that there is another pending action (civil ease No. 180)
with the same parties and the same cause, with the exception of the
motion to dismiss of defendant Oscar L. Uy which was based on the
ground that civil case No. 525 is barred by a prior judgment. These
motions to dismiss were all sustained by the Court in separate orders,
from which the present appeal was taken by the plaintiff.

In civil case No. 180 the allegation pertinent to Oscar L. Uy is as follows:

“That, lately, under date of March 31, 1947,
defendant Bernardina Vda. de Gonzales addressed a letter to plaintiff
Rosendo O. Subido, informing that the property had been sold to
defendant Oscar L. Uy, with the pretension that the option of the
plaintiffs to buy the property had expired on March 16, 1947, when in
truth and in fact the sale was consummated earlier with the plaintiff
Mariano S. Florendo, and if the balance of the purchase price, has not
yet been paid it is for the precise reason that the defendants have not
yet delivered the necessary deed of sale and certificates of title to
the property and through no fault of the plaintiffs.”

Upon the other hand, the principal allegation against Oscar L. Uy in civil case No, 525 is as follows:

“That subsequent to the acceptance by the defendants
of the original offer to purchase the real properties, made by the
plaintiff, as more specifically alleged in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11
hereof, and of the said plaintiff’s subsequent offer to purchase the
shares of Paula Bernardo and Loreto E. Gonzales for P300 per hectare as
pore.specifically alleged in paragraphs Nos.. 12, 13, 14, 15 and Id
hereof, ore more specifically on or about March 24, 1947, the defendant Oscar L. Uy, an agent and broker entrusted by the co-owners of the said
properties to sell said properties, fraudulently and maliciously
induced the said co-owners to execute in his favor a simulated deed of
sale, not only in gross breach of his trust as an agent of said
co-owners. but also with full knowledge of the fact, which had been
transmitted to him verbally and in writing by the real-estate broker R.O. Subido and by the defendant Bernardina Vda. of Gonzales, in a
letter dated March 15, 1947, that said Bernardina Vda. de Gonzales, as
administratrix and as the person duly authorized to sell all the said
325 hectares pertaining to her and her co-owners, had already ‘accepted
an offer accompanied with a check-as part payment * * * before the
expiration’ of the authority granted to the broker: which said accepted
offer was that of the herein plaintiff.”

In explaining the differences, as regards parties and causes of action, between the two suits, appellant points out:

“In Civil Case No. 180, the plaintiffs are R. O.
Subido and Mariano Florendo, whereas only the latter is plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 525. “While in the former, there are only four
defendants—Bernardina Vda. de Gonzales, Paula Bernardo, Loreto E.
Gonzales de Monosco and Demetrio Pozon—in the latter, there are, aside
from these four original defendants, Lorenzo, Severino, Cesar, Vilma,
Dalisay and Rustico, all surnamed Gonzales, as well as Oscar L. Uy and
Gregorio Velasquez.” (Appellant’s-brief, p. 54.)

“In Civil Case No. l80, plaintiffs Subido and Florendo Seek to recover (a) the former’s commission as broker; (b) the properties themselves under the prefeeted sale in the latter’s favors and (c)
the damages suffered by both plaintiffs due to the breach of contract
committed by the defendants.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 55.)

“In Civil Case No. 525, on the other hand, the sole plaintiff Mariano S. Florendo. seeks the recovery only of (a) the properties subject of the sale in his favor, and (b)
the damages he suffered by reason of the bad faith, and the breach of
contract committed by the defendants therein named.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 55.)

Under section 4, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, “unless
otherwise ordered by the court, any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.” In view of this reglementary provision,
the contention of appellant that a dismissal upon motion to dismiss
grounded on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action is
not res judicata, is without merit.

We are of the opinion that the lower court correctly dismissed the
action in the case at bar (No. 525) on the ground, with respect to the
defendant Oscar L. Uy, that said action is barred by a prior judgment
and, as regards the other defendants, that said action is barred by the
pendency of another action.

The appellant admits that the order of the trial court in civil
case No. 180 dismissing the complaint as against Oscar L. Uy is final
and that said court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties therein. As already stated, the order of dismissal was an
adjudication upon the merits under section h of Rule 30. The only
important point that remains to be disposed of is whether there is
identity of parties and of causes of action.

There can be no doubt that there is identity of parties plaintiff.
The omission of R.O. Subido in civil case No. 525 is of no moment,
because in civil case No. 180 he seeks to recover his commission as
broker for the alleged sale of the properties in question in favor of
appellant, while the latter seeks to compel performance of said sale
and to recover damages»’ In other words, the cause of action of Subido
is separable, and distinct from appellant’s claim or demand. In so far
as appellant is affected, there is therefore identity of parties
plaintiff in both cases.

There can be no doubt also that there is identity of parties
defendant, because the inclusion in the present ease of the children of
Bernardina Vda. de Gonzales has not resulted in a substantial change,
Bernardina Vda. de Gonzales being sued in civil case No. 180 “for
herself and as Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Pedro
Gonzales,” with the result that the interest of her children are
already affected. Neither is the inclusion of Gregorio S. Velasquez a
substantial difference, because lie is sued merely in his capacity as
register of deeds of Rizal.

That there is identity of causes of action is obvious. In both
cases appellant’s claim or demand is for specific performance of a
contract of sale allegedly executed in favor of Mariano S. Florendo by
the defendants, other than Oscar L. Uy and Gregorio S. Velasquez, plus
damages for breach of contract, the only difference brought about by
civil case No. 525 being the inclusion of an additional ground of
recovery, namely, defendants1 alleged bad faith in the premises.

In Peñalosa vs. Tuason, (22 Phil. 303, 311-313), this Court, quoting Cromwell vs. Sac County, (94 U.S. 351), pointed out the two main rules governing the subject of res judicata in the following manner:

“In considering the operation of this judgment, it
should be borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a
difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel
against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or
demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the
same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. It is a
finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose, Thus for example; adjudgment rendered upon a promissory note
is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the amount due
upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that perfect defenses
actually existed, of which no proof was offered, such as forgery,
want of consideration, or payments If such defenses were not presented
in the action, and established by competent evidence, the subsequent
allegation of their existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment
is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as
though the defenses never existed. The language. therefore, which is so
often used, that a Judgment estops not only as to every ground of
recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to
every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate,
when applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or
claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground
whatever.

“But where the second action between the same
parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or
points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or
verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to
apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to
matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry
must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and
determined in the original action; not what might have been.thus
litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment
conclusive in another, action.”

In our opinion the case at bar is covered by the rule the effect of
a judgment as bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim or demand.. Accordingly, the order of
dismissal in civil case No. 180 is a finality, as regards the defendant
Oscar L. Uy, “not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.”

There can be no question that the additional ground of recovery,
namely, defendants’ bad faith, existed and was known to the appellant
at the time of the filing of civil case No. 180 on April 10, 1947,
because in paragraph 20 of the complaint in civil case No. 525 it is
admitted that Oscar L. Dy, prior to the sale of the properties in
question to him on March 24, 1947, was informed verbally and in writing
by R.O. Subido and the defendant Bernadina Vda. Gonzales that the
latter had already accepted the,previous offer of appellant.

The rule of res judicata herein applied is very sound. To
permit a litigant to renew a suit on the same claim or demand, invoking
a ground of recovery which, though different from that relied upon in
the first suit, existed on the date of the filing thereof, would be
harassing. As aptly remarked in the case of Little vs. Smith, (47 Cal.
A. 8, 189 Pac.1059), “If a party is allowed to urge one ground at a
time, or even all grounds except one or two, it would result in
piecemeal and endless litigation, which the law seeks to avoid.” That
is why the rule is well settled that “a party cannot,, by varying the
form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies.” (Peñalosa vs. Tuason, supra, p. 321.)

The appellant invokes the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
L-2454, wherein it was stated that “the denial of the motion to dismiss
does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion, since the decision on
the merits of the case, in which the action was dismissed in so far as
the defendant Oscar L. Uy was concerned, will not be a bar to an action
by the petitioner against said Oscar L. Uy.” This statement was
certainly not meant to nullify the proper effects of res judicata.

Wherefore, the appealed orders are affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista, JJ., concur.