RADIOWEALTH INC., PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL AGREGADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, CASIMIRO L. DACANAY, MARIANO VASQUEZ, AND FERNANDO DIZON, AS CHAIRMAN A…

This is one more case which directly affects this court but which it
can not avoid. From necessity, we are forced, to our regret, to proceed
in deciding it, there being no other tribunal authorized to act. (2
Constitutional Limitations, Cooley, 870.) The question refers to the
purchase and installation charges:, totaling P585.00, of a Webster
Teletalk, Model 206 MA, and Webster Telehome speakers.

Under date of January 7, 1949, the Clerk of the Supreme Court
certified that the purchase of this apparatus and its installation on
the second and third floor of the Malacañan Annex, which houses the
Supreme Court, were of urgent character and necessary to public
service. On January 10, 1949, C.L. Dacanay, Chairman of the Property
Requisition Committee appointed by the, President, disapproved the
purchase and installation as “contrary to the provisions of paragraph
four (4) of Executive Order Ho. 302, series of 1940, and the policy
adopted by the Cabinet last year, discontinuing open market purchases,”
and “also a violation of the requirements of Executive Order No. 298,
series of 1940.” On February 7, 1949, Radio wealth, Inc., the vendor of
the equipment and its accessories, took the matter up with the Auditor
General with the request that the payment be approved. Radio wealth,
Inc. informed the Auditor General that treasury warrant No. V-116470
was in the process of issuance to cover this account but that the
auditor for the Supreme Court refused to countersign the warrant. The
Auditor General on February 11 referred the papers to the Chief Justice
with this comment:

“The purchase of emergency supplies, materials,
furniture and equipment for the use of the National Government is
governed by Section 2044 of the Revised Administrative Code, Executive
Order No. 298, series of 1940, Executive Order No. 302 (paragraph [6],
series of 1940, and Department of Finance Order No. 7, series of 1945.
It is alleged in the attached papers that the purchase by the Supreme
Court of one (1) Webster Teletalk Model 206 MA and six (6) Webster
Telehome Speakers, which includes installation, labor and materials, was
made because of their need for an emergency, but there ris no evidence
to show that the requirements of the law and/or regulations aforecited
had been complied with. This observation in audit has to be brought out
because the Constitution enjoins the Auditor General to audit “in
accordance with law.and administrative regulations.” In this
particular” case, Executive Order No. 302 constitutes one of the
administrative regulations covering the procedure to be followed in
making regular and emergency purchases of supplies, materials,
furniture and equipment for the National Government which, of course,
includes the Supreme Court.

“In this connection, attention
is invited to the enclosed copy of the 3rd indorsement and enclosure of
the Office of the President to the Supreme Court, dated October 12,
1947, on a similar case of emergency purchase made by the Supreme Court
from Bookman, Incorporated, which is self-explanatory.”

The offshoot of the Auditor General’s decision was the filing of the
present petition for review by Radio wealth, Inc. praying, upon the
facts above stated.

“(1) That the Property Requisition Committee be
declared dissolved, and its powers be left to be performed by the
Auditor General alone, as before under the Constitution; and that
Executive Order No. 43, dated February 7, 1947, and other Orders
effectuating such unlawful delegation of constitutional powers be
declared unconstitutional;

“(2) That the respondent Auditor
General be ordered to countersign the treasury warrant Annex F, in view
of the nullity and inapplicability of the Executive Orders under which
said respondent withholds countersignature.”

The Auditor General disclaims that his decision is in any way
premised on or influenced by the Property Requisition Committee
Chairman’s action. The Solicitor General appearing for the Auditor
General states that the property requisition committee’s actuation is
irrelevant to the disposal of this case and that it is only the Auditor
General’s ruling which should be reviewed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Nevertheless, as the Auditor General’s ruling is predicated on the
same legal provisions and executive and administrative orders which the
property requisition committee invokes as its authority to pass upon
the Court’s requisitions for supplies, this authority will inevitably
have to be dragged into the case. And it is just as well that we go
into it if only because cases of this kind which did not reach the
Auditor General, have arisen in the past, and such cases would arise in
the future if we did not expand this opinion to comprehend the property
requisition committee’s presumed authority to pass on the expenditure
under consideration.

The distribution of powers is a fundamental maxim of constitutional
law and essential to the separation of the three branches of
government, separation which, though incomplete, is one of the chief
characteristics of our Constitution. This principle is too well known
to require elucidation. It suffices to say that in accordance with this
principle the Supreme Court is independent of executive or legislative
control as the Executive and the Congress are of the judiciary.

But it is said that the Court’s independence is limited to the
exercise of judicial functions and that purchase of property does not
belong to this category. This contention formulates the respondents’
major premise on which the following discussion will largely center.

This court had occasion to intervene, in Province of Tarlac, etc. vs.
Gale, 26 Phil. 338, in a conflict between a judge of first instance and
provincial officers over the disposition of the courthouse and other
equipment. As that case is analogous to the case at bar in its
fundamental and animating features, it will be appropriate to quote at
length from it. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moreland, said:

“2. Department of Government; Judiciary.—The
judiciary being one of the coordinate branches of the Government, its
preservation in its integrity and effectiveness is necessary in.the
present form of government.

“3. Executive and
Legislative.—The three departments of Government, the executive,
legislative, and judicial, are not only coordinate, they are coequal
and coimportant. While interdependent, in the sense that each is unable
to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other, they
are, nevertheless, in the most important sense independent of each
other; that is to say, one department may not control or even interfere
with another in the exercise of its special functions. The quality of
government consists in their remaining thus independent.

“4.
Powers.—Under the acts of the Legislature of the Philippine Islands,
the judiciary has the power to maintain its existence, and whatever is
reasonably necessary to that end courts constituting the judiciary nay
do or order done. They have power to preserve their integrity, maintain
their dignity, and to insure effectiveness in the administration of
justice.

“5. Duties of Provincial Officers.—The judiciary
may not be deprived of any of its essential attributes and none of them
may be seriously weakened by the act of any person or official. The
power to interfere is the power to control, and the power to control is
the power to abrogate. Officials of the Government who owe a duty to
the courts under the law cannot deprive the courts of anything which is
vital to their functions, nor can such officials by the exercise of any
judgment or discretion of their own escape an obligation to the courts
which the law lays upon them.

“6. Powers of Courts of Fiscal
Insatance; Court Room, Furnituers, etc.—Provincial officials who, by
virtue of the statute, are under an obligation to the Court of First
Instances of their province to furnish court room, furniture, fixtures,
supplies, equipment, etc., when, in the serious and deliberate judgment
of the court, they, or any of them, are necessary for the adequate
administration of justice, cannot escape that obligation except by
permission of the court.

“7. Duties of Provincial Boards and
Provincial Officers.—Section 13 of Act No. 83, which provides that it
shall be the duty of the provincial board to provide by construction
or purchase or renting suitable offices for the provincial officers,
and a courthouse containing a room or rooms suitable for the holding of
court and for offices for the court officials * * *,’ is mandatory and
imposes upon the provincial board or provincial officials, as the case
may be, a duty which they cannot evade at their pleasure.

“8. Id.; Id.; Id.—While, under said section, the provincial board may
exercise certain discretion in regulating the size of the court room,
or the cost of the same, or the material of which it is constructed,
and the kind and quantity of furniture which is placed therein,
nevertheless, the court room and offices, and the furniture
and.fixtures therein must be of such a character as to permit the court
to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner, and must
not be such as to impede in a material manner the administration of
justice. When a conflict in judgment arises between the provincial
officials and the court that of the provincial officials must yield,
the court being the only official which, in the last analysis, may
determine under the law quoted what is necessary for its efficiency.

“9. Id.; Id.; Id.—If the provincial officials furnish to a court a room
which, in the judgment of the court, is clearly inadequate and its use
would seriously interfere with the orderly and dignified administration
of justice, the court may refuse to accept it, and, on the refusal of
the provincial officials to furnish accommodations which the court
considers adequate, it has the power to procure them either directly by
renting or by order to the officials whose duty it is, under the law,
to furnish them. The power lies with the judge, and with him alone, to
determine ultimately what is really essential for the administration of
justice.

“10. Id.; Id.; Id.—When an adequate court room has
once been furnished and is in the possession of the court, the court
has power to prevent its occupation, in whole or in part, by other
persons to the serious detriment of the court business; and if such
occupation occurs, the court may order the intruders ejected and all
partitions which have been erected, dividing the court room into parts,
removed.

“11. Id.; Id.; Id.—The provincial board has power
to assign a particular room or rooms to a Court of First Instance, and
may change the assignment after the same has been made when such
change is reasonably necessary, provided the new rooms are reasonably
adequate for the purposes of the cototo The court may, however, refuse
to be dispossessed of its old rooms until it has been furnished with
others reasonably fit and proper for the due administration of justice.

“12. Id.; Id.; Id.—Section 10 of Act No. 83, which requires the
provincial officials to furnish to the court such furniture, fixtures,
and supplies as may be necessary for the proper administration of
justice, is mandatory; and while a certain discretion lies with the
officials who furnish the articles referred to, such as deals with
color, form, style, quantity, etc., that discretion is always subject
to the paramount authority of the court which, as in the case of
quarters, is always the final authority determining what is necessary
and essential for the proper administration of justice.

“13.Id.; Id.; Id.— If the provincial officials refuse to furnish the
articles mentioned in the statute in sufficient quantity or at the
proper time, the court has power either to purchase those things
directly or, by proper proceedings, to compel the officials to perform
the duty imposed upon them by law. In either case, the purchase price
of the articles thus found necessary will be a legal charge on the
province.” (Syllabus)

We reiterate this rule. If there is any difference between the Gale
case and the case before us it is that the reasoning in the former
applies with peculiar and greater force in the latter because the
Supreme Court derives its powers directly and immediately from the
Constitution whose “distributive clause” deals mainly with the central
government and finds little observance in municipal corporations or in
other units of local governments. (12 C. J. 804.)

Contrary to the respondents’ theory, the prerogatives of this Court
which the Constitution secures against interference includes not only
the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice. So, we believe, it is
within its power free from encroachment by the Executive to acquire
books and other office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient
transaction of its business. These implied, inherent, or incidental
powers are as essential to the existence of the Court as the powers
specifically granted. Without the power to provide itself with
appropriate instruments for the performance of its duties, the express
powers which the Constitution endows it with would become useless. The
Court could not maintain its independence and dignity as the
Constitution intends if the Executive personally or through subordinate
officials could determine for the Court what it should have or use in
the discharge of its functions, and when and how it should obtain them.

The Court’s independence of the legislative branch with regard to
the acquisition of fixtures, supplies and equipment is bound up with
and subject to its dependence upon the Congress for appropriation. The
interrelation between the Court and the Congress in this regard is not
so easy to define. (Fortunately there is no conflict between the
Legislature and the Court to complicate the issues in this case.) But
it is our considered opinion that this Court is supreme and independent
of the Executive in this sphere. In the requisition for fixtures,
equipment and supplies both the executive and judicial departments are
on the same footing. They derive their authority from the same source
and represent the sovereignty in equal degree. It stands to reason that
the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the Supreme
Court in the choice of the instruments needed to carry on its functions
than the Court has to dictate to the Executive what, when and how to
get his.

An interesting question might present itself if the Congress should
invest the executive department with power to make regulations for the
Supreme Court as well as for the former’s offices regarding the
purchase and acquisiton of materials. That question again is not here,
as will be seen shortly. The several executive and administrative
orders which the Auditor General gives as basis for refusing to
countersign the warrant proposed to be issued, are not based on
express legislation. Parenthetically} we understand that these
executive and administrative orders are not being applied to the
legislative department. If our information is correct, this one more
argument against the respondents’ insistence in extending the operation
of those orders to the Supreme Court. The Legislature’s independence of
the Executive is no greater than the Court’s.

Section 2041 of the Revised Administrative Code regulates the
purchase of government supplies and directs that such purchase should
be effected through the Bureau of Supply. Section 204 creates general
exceptions to the provisions of the preceding section by authorizing
purchase in the open market and without the interference of the Bureau
of Supply when the materials or supplies are to be used in
the.construction, repair or maintenance of a public work upon the
occasion of any emergency involving danger to life or property, or in
any case where the location of the work is remote from Manila.

Sections 2041-2044 speak of departments, bureaus, and offices. They
do not speak of the legislature or the Supreme Court, and it is our
understanding that they were not intended to embrace either of these
branches of the government. We take the word “departments” in these
sections to mean the several divisions among which are distributed the
functions and duties deriving upon the Chief Executive. The Supreme
Court is neither a department, a bureau nor an office within the
meaning of the said sections. This is a strict construction. But being
in “derogation of the independence of one of the two coordinate
departments of government, these sections must be interpreted strictly
and doubts must be resolved in favor of that construction which would
be more in harmony with the” tenets of the fundamental law.

It is argued that Sections 2041 et seq of the Revised
Administrative Code and the executive and administrative orders above,
mentioned are not being enforced upon the court but upon the clerk of
court. The fallacy of this argument is that it overlooks the fact that
the clerk is not an officer separate and distinct from the court. The
clerk of court is an officer of the court entirely subordinate thereto
and working under its orders. He has no functions or duties conferred
by law independent of the court.

No one denies the power of the Auditor General to audit, in
accordance with law and administrative regulations, expenditures of
funds or property pertaining to or,held in trust by the government or
the provinces or municipalities thereof. (Section 2, Article XI,
Constitution of the Philippines.) Neither does the Court claim
exemption from the authority vested ujina the Auditor General by the
Constitution to examine, audit and settle all accounts of the
government or to bring to the attention of the proper administrative
officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant. (Section 3, Article
XI, Constitution of the Philippines.)

On the other hand, it can not be pretended that this authority is
absolute. The constitutional provisions herein cited themselves defines
the limits of the Auditor General’s powers, and the Constitution
provides a remedy against his actions when they transcend those bounds.
The Auditor General’s decisions in cases affecting an executive
department, bureau, office or officer are appealable to the President,
and In those affecting the rights of private citizens to the Supreme
Court. The Auditor General’s authority to audit and disapprove.this
Court’s expenditures has to be limited to the conditions prescribed fay
the Constitution, or statute, if there be one, which did not invade the
Court’s independence. Executive and administrative orders and
regulations promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction under the
law or the Constitution over the Court, can give no justification or
validity to the Auditor General’s decisions. In the absence of express
and valid legislation, (and by valid legislation we mean one which does
not unreasonably infringe upon the legitimate prerogatives of the
Supreme Court), the Auditor General may not question the court’s
expenditures except when they are, in the words of the organic law,
“irregular, unnecessary, excessive and.extravagant.” Outside of these
exceptions his duty to approve the payments is mandatory; and even when
the objection, is that the expenditures are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant, his decisions are not final.

The Auditor General’s ruling under review does not criticize the
expenditure in question on any of the above grounds. In reality, the
reasonable necessity of the purchase and installation of a teletalk and
telehome speakers in the offices of the Chief Justice and of the clerk
of court has been explained in the clerk’s statement; the cost of the
equipment and labor has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on
the market, and there is appropriation from which the items may
lawfully be paid for.

The petition is granted, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.