G.R. No. L-3595. May 22, 1950
ANG LAM, PETITIONER, VS. POTENCIANO ROSILLOSA AND VICENTE SANTIAGO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, RESPONDENTS.
OZAETA, J.:
respondent judge, denying the petitioner’s motion to set aside a
judgment in civil ease No. 4820 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon Province, entitled Potenciano Rosillosa vs. Maximo
Alpay and Eugenia Peregrina, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant Eugenia Peregrina, and to declare said
judgment null and void.
The herein respondent, Potenciano Rosillosa, was the owner of a
parcel of land, planted to coconuts, containing an area of 145,957
square meters, and located in the municipality of Unisan, province of
Quezon, which parcel of land he had acquired by homestead and for which
he had obtained homestead title No..3201, patent No. 18102, issued
January 30, 1932. On May 22, 1944, he sold said parcel of land to
Maximo Alpay for P10,000. In the month of July, 1944, Maximo Alpay in
turn sold said parcel of land to Eugenia Peregrina for the sum of
P25,000 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19539 was duly issued in
her name on July 29, 1944.
On or about October 22, 1947, Potenciano Rosillosa instituted said
civil case No. 4320 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against
Maximo Alpay and Eugenia Faregrina to redeem the said property under
the provisions of the Public Land Act. The complaint was amended on
October 21, 1943. In the meantime the plaintiff asked for the dismissal
of the case against the defendant Maximo Alpay on the ground that the
latter had ceased to have any interest in the property sought to be
redeemed.
On December 4, 1943, upon petition of the plaintiff Potenciano
Rosillosa, who alleged that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina could not
be found and served with summons at her known address, the respondent
judge ordered that said defendant be served with summons by publication
in The Manila Chronicle. Thereafter said defendant, having
failed to appear within the period fixed in the summons, was declared
in default; and the court, after hearing the evidence for the
plaintiff, rendered a decision on April 2, 1949, ordering the defendant
Eugenia Peregrina to execute a deed of resale of the land in question
in favor of the plaintiff Potenciano Rosillosa upon payment to her of
the sum of P50, which the court found as the equivalent in Philippine
currency of the original price of P10,000 in Japanese military notes
(which the original buyer Maximo Alpay had paid to the said plaintiff)
at the rate of P1, Philippine currency, for every P200 of Japanese fiat
money.
It turned out, however, that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina had
died in the city of Manila as early as April 1, 1945, that is to say,
several years before said civil case No. 4820 was commenced. On
September 22, 1949, the present petitioner Ang Lam, who alleged under
oath that on September 21, 1949, he was appointed by the Court of First
Instance of Manila administrator of the estate of the deceased Eugenia
Peregrina, filed a petition in said civil case No. 4820, praying that
the judgment theretofore rendered therein be set aside on the ground
that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Eugenia Baregrina. That petition was denied by the
respondent judge on the grounds (1) that plaintiff’s action was by its
nature one in rein; (2) that the petitioner Ang Lam is the surviving
husband of the defendant Eugenia Peregrina and had the administration
of the land in litigation; and (3) that the decision of the court was
handed down on April 2, 1949, whereas the petition to set it aside was
presented only on September 26, 1949, that is to say, after the lapse
(sic.) of the periods mentioned in section 3 of Rule 3# of the Rules of
Court.
We are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment in question is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. At the time the action was commenced said defendant had long
passed to another world. Hence the publication of the summons against
her was absolutely vain and of no validity whatsoever.
The attempt of the respondent judge to hold the said summons by
publication binding upon the petitioner Ang Lam on the theory that the
action was one in rem and that said petitioner is the
surviving husband of the defendant and is the administrator of the
property in question, is, in our opinion, untenable. An action to
redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not
an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam,
so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. (See Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 393-394.)
“Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in
that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property
or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as
against the whole world.” (1 C.J.S. 1148.)
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but it is an action in personam,
for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing. An action for resolution of a contract of
sale of real property is an action in personam (Sandejas vs. Robles, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 203 [1]).
If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might
be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to
be established, and if any one in the world has a right to be heard on
an allegation of facts which, if true, shows an inconsistent interest,
the proceeding is in rem (Grey Alba vs. Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 62). For instance, an application for the registration of land under Act No. 496 is an action in rem, for the judgment which may be rendered therein is binding upon the whole world (Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480, 482). The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, because the order of probate is effective against all persons wherever residing (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). (See Moran, Rules of Court, 2d. Ed. Vol. 1, p. 9.)
With regard to the other reason adduced by the respondent judge,
that the petition to set aside the judgment was presented after the
lapse of the six months’ period provided in Rule 38, we think said rule
is not applicable.[2] That
rule provides for relief from a judgment, order or other proceeding
taken against a party to the case, who “by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein,
or has been prevented from taking an appeal.” The petitioner herein was
not a party to the original case, and he did not seek relief from the
judgment upon any of the grounds mentioned in section 1 of Rule 38, but
sought the annulment of said judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, who had long deceased before the action was
commenced. A judgment rendered by a court which had not acquired
jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant, is void. A void judgment may be assailed or impugned at any
time either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in
the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.
The order of the respondent judge of November 18, 1949, is set
aside and the decision rendered in civil case No. 4820 on April 2,
1949, is declared null and void, with costs against the respondent
Potenciano Rosillosa.
Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] 81 Phil., p. 421.
[2] Although immaterial
to our conclusion, we note that the petition was presented within 60
days after petitioner learned of the judgment, and within six months
after the judgment was entered.