VICENTE PENUELA AND LUIS PEDREGOSA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ERNESTO HORNADA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On May 17, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered against
defendant Ernesto Hornada a decision (in Civil Case No. 2571), in favor of
plaintiffs Vicente Penuela and Luis Pedregosa, the dispositive part of which
reads:

“Por Tanto, el Juzgado falla este asunto:

“(a) Condenando al demandado que remueva el dique y la presa
construidos en la parte sur y sureste, respectivamente, de su terreno;

“(b) Condenando al demandado que pague al demandante Luis Pedregosa,
en concepto de daños actuales, 10 bultos de palay al año, equivalente a 20
cavanes, a contar desde 1949 a 1952, ambos inclusiva;

“(c) Condenando al demandado que pague al demandante Vicente Penuela,
en concepto de daños actuales, 10 bultos de palay al año, equivalente a 20
cavanes, contar desde 1953 hasta que este asunto este decidido
definitivamente;

“(d) Condenando al demandado que pague a los demandantes la suma de
P1,000.00 en concepto de daños morales; y

“(e) Condenando, dademás al demandado que pague las costas del
juicio.

“Asi se ordena.”

Dissatisfied with said decision, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA-G. R. No. 15871-R). Said court, on December 20, 1957, affirmed
said decision in toto, except as to paragraph (d) of the abovequoted
dispositive part, which it modified by eliminating the sum of P1,000.00 awarded
as moral damages by the trial court.

On January 27, 1959, plaintiffs filed with the trial court a motion for
execution (of said decision) and bill of costs. Said motion was set for the
court’s consideration on January 31, 1959. On said date, however, defendant
moved for postponement to February 7, 1959 on the ground that he would file a
written opposition thereto, and except to the bill of costs. Postponement was
duly granted by the court. Notwithstanding said postponement, however, the
court, on February 3, 1959, issued a writ of execution in favor of plaintiffs,
which states:

“To: The Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo or any of his lawful Deputies:

“GREETINGS:

“Pursuant to the Decision of this Honorable Court dated May 17, 1955 which
was modified by the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals dated December
20, 1957 eliminating payment of any moral damages, you are hereby commanded to
cause the defendant to remove the dike and dam constructed in the southern and
southeastern part of his land; to pay the plaintiff Luis Pedregosa, in concept
of actual damages, 10 bultos of palay per year, equivalent to 20 cavanes,
counting from 1949 to 1952, both inclusive; to pay plaintiff Vicente Penuela, in
concept of actual damages, 10 bultos of palay, equivalent to 20 cavanes,
counting from 1953 until this case is finally decided; and to pay the costs of
suit in the sum of P41.10 only in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo; and
return this writ into Court within 60 days from date with your proceedings
endorsed hereon;

“But, if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this
writ and lawful fees thereon, then we command you, that of the lands and
buildings of the said defendant, you make the said sums of money in the manner
required by law, and do likewise make return of your proceedings with this writ
into Court within 60 days after its receipt by you.”

Before receiving said writ of execution, defendant, on February 4, 1959,
within the time granted by the court, filed the following opposition to
plaintiffs’ aforesaid motion for execution and bill of coats (of January 27,
1959):

“Comes now defendant in the above-entitled case, by his undersigned counsel,
and in opposition to the motion for execution and bill of costs dated January
27, 1959, to this Honorable Court respectfully represents:

“1. That the decision of this Honorable Court requires the defendant to
remove ‘l dique y la presa construidos en la parte sur y sureste
respectivamente’, but the defendant does not know which dike or dam are to be
removed, because there is a ‘pilapil’ or ‘cajon’ which is the boundary line
between defendant’s property and that of Federico Hornada and that of defendant;
and that this dike cannot be removed or destroyed without the consent of
Federico Hornada;

“2. That the small dam which is opened and closed by means of a board which
is situated on the land of defendant will not impede the flow of the water to
the Abaangay River, but is opened and closed to utilize the water to irrigate
defendant’s rice land;

“3. That with regards to ten bultos of palay to be paid to Luis
Pedregosa beginning with the year 1949 to 1952, Luis Pedregosa is already dead,
and the defendants does not know who are his heirs administrators or assigns who
are not parties to this case, and Atty. Gemarino is not representing them;

“4. That as regards to the ten bultos of palay beginning with the year
1953 to be paid to Vicente Penuela, the latter ceased to be its lessee in the
year 1955 when the said property was sold to the brother and sister of Vicente
Penuela’s wife, and, therefore, he has no right to receive the said palay beyond
the crop year 1954-55; moreover, beginning with the crop year 1953-54, Vicente
Penuela had not suffered any demage because beginning that year there was little
water coming from his land to the property of the defendant due to the long
draught; and

“5. That the defendant is willing to present evidence to prove the
observation and objections above mentioned on the date that may be fixed by the
court.

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the issuance of execution in
consonance with the decision of this Court be deferred until the above
observations and objections can be passed upon by the Court.”

On February 7, 1959, the date to which the consideration of plaintiffs’
motion for execution and bill of costs (of January 27, 1959), has been
postponed, the court suggested to defendant that he file a motion for
reconsideration, in view of the fact that it (court) had already issued the
aforementioned writ of execution (dated February 3, 1959). Complying with the
court’s suggestion, defendant on February 11, 1959, filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging, inter alia, that when plaintiffs’ motion for
execution and bill of costs (of January 27, 1959) and defendant’s opposition
thereto (of January 4, 1959) were called for consideration and resolution of the
court on February 7, 1959, “the court refused to resolve the same, on the ground
that the Writ of Execution has already been issued”; that considering the
grounds of his opposition (as stated in paragraph 4 thereof), “the consideration
of plaintiff’s motion should have been deferred, or the writ of execution should
have been stayed until the matters stated in defendant’s opposition shall have
been resolved first”; and that he “is willing to present evidence to prove and
substantiate the observations and objections” mentioned on the date which may be
fixed by the Court. On February 17, 1959, said motion for reconsideration was
denied by the court, in an order of this tenor:

“No encontrandola bien fundada, se deniega la moción de reconsideración del
demandado de fecha 11 de febrero de 1958 y se mantiene la orden de este Juzgado
de fecha 3 de febrero de 1957.

“Asi se ordena.”

Hence, this appeal.^[1]

The appeal is meritorious. It is not disputed that on January 27, 1959,
plaintiffs filed with the trial court a motion for execution of its decision of
May 17, 1955 (affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
15871-R on December 20, 1957) and bill of costs. Said motion was set for hearing
on January 31, 1959. On said date, defendant moved for postponement of the
hearing to February 7, 1959 as he would file a written opposition to the motion
for execution and bill of costs. The court duly granted defendant’s petition.
Despite this grant of postponement, however, and before defendant could file his
announced written opposition, the trial court issued the writ of execution
prayed for by plaintiffs on February 3, 1959, i.e., one (1) day prior to the
filing by defendant of his written opposition on February 4, 1959. On February
7, 1959, when the motion for execution and the opposition thereto came up for
hearing, the court suggested that a motion for reconsideration of the order of
execution already issued be filed by defendant, which the latter did, only to be
denied on February 17, 1959. This actuation of the trial court is, to our mind,
a reversible error considering that the opposition and the motion for
reconsideration aver facts which, if established as defendant offered to do,
would constitute equitable grounds for stay of execution. The defendant sought
clarification of the precise dam and water gate (“presa”) he was ordered to
remove, there being: another dike (“pilapil” or “cajon”) on the same portion of
his land mentioned in the decision. He, likewise, informed the court of the
death of plaintiff Luis Pedregosa subsequent to the decision, and the fact that
his heirs or administrator are unknown, for which reason there was uncertainty
as to whom to pay the ten bultos of palay mentioned in the decision.
Finally, defendant submitted that the other plaintiff, Vicente Penuela, in whose
favor as lessee of the land defendant was also sentenced to pay ten
bultos of palay annually from 1953 up to the date the case is definitely
decided^[2] (“hasta que este asunto este
decidido definitivamente”) had ceased to be such lessee since 1955, long before
the case has been definitely decided. Certainly, these facts, especially the
last two which have occurred after the decision of the trial court which
was affirmed (except for the grant of moral damages) by the Court of Appeals,
fully justify the stay of execution until the matter shall have been determined
by the court after due hearing thereon.

For all the foregoing, the writ of execution dated February 3, 1959, as well
as the order of the trial court dated February 17, 1959 denying defendant’s
motion for reconsideration of the said writ, are hereby set aside. The case is
remanded to the lower court, with direction to receive evidence on and,
accordingly, decide defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s petition for
execution. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.

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^[1] Originally appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but certified to us by said court on January 30, 1960, on
jurisdictional ground.

^[2] Decided by the trial court on May
17, 1955 and affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals on December 20,
1957.