QUINTIN CHAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN B. ESPE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On August 24, 1957, a house belonging to Juan B. Espe was sold at public
auction by virtue of an order of execution issued by the Court of First Instance
of La Union. It was bought by Quintfa .Chan. The land where the house is erected
also belonged to Espe. Espe failed to redeem the house within the period of one
year from the date of sale hence, on August 27, 1958, the sheriff executed a
certificate of definite sale of said house in favor of Chan. During the
redemption period of one year, Espe collected from the tenants of the house the
sum of P2,340.00 representing rentals that accrued during the year, and
notwithstanding the demands made by Chan for the delivery of said amount, Espe
failed to pay the same to Chan.

Whereupon, on September 12, 1958, Chan commenced the present action before
the Court of First Instance of La Union praying that Espe be ordered to pay him
the sum of P2,304.00, plus P500.00 as attorney’s fees, and that a period be
fixed for the lease of the lot on which the house is erected belonging to Espe,
as well as the rental to be paid therefor.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of cause
of action, and when the same was denied he filed an answer praying for the
dismissal of the complaint. Thereupon, the parties agreed to submit the case for
decision upon the pleadings. On January 1, 1959, the court rendered judgment the
dispositive part of which reads:

“(1) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,304.00 with
legal rate of interest from August 27, 1958 until the same shall have been fully
paid, plus attorney’s fees in the sum of P170.00 and costs;

“(2) Fixing the period of three years from August 27, 1958, within which rthe
plaintiff shall remove the house or building from the lot of the defendant;

“(3) Fixing the amount of FIFTY (P50.00) PESOS as the monthly rental for the
lot of the defendant, effective from August 24, 1957, until the said building
shall have been removed by the plaintiff, and for this purpose, the total amount
of the rentals for the lot from August 24, 1957 up to the present shall be
deducted from the amount due the plaintiff in accordance with this
decision.”

Defendant has appealed.

The question to be determined is: Who is entitled to the rentals of the house
bought by plaintiff during the one year period of redemption? Is it the
purchaser or the judgment-debtor?

The law governing the matter are Sections 29 and 30, Rule 39, which in part
provide:

“SEC. 29. Manner of using premises pending redemption. Waste
restrained.—Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the
court may, as in other proper cases, restrain the commission of waste on the
property by injunction, on the application of the purchaser or the .judgment
creditor, with or without notice: but it is not waste for the person in
possession of the property at the time of the sale, or entitled to possession
afterwards, during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in
the same manner in which it was previously used; or to use it in the ordinary
course of husbandry; or to make the necessary repairs of buildings thereon; or
reasonably to use wood or timber on the property therefor, or for fuel for his
family, while he occupies the property.”

“SEC. 30. Rents and profits pending redemption. Statement thereof and
credit therefor on redemption.—The purchaser, from the time of the sale
until a redemption, and a redemptioner, from the time of his redemption until
another redemption, is entitled to receive the rents of the property sold or the
value of the use and occupation thereof when such property is in the possession
of a tenant. But when any such rents and profits have been received by the
judgment creditor or purchaser, or by a redemptioner, or by the assignee of
either of them, from property thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts
of such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be
paid, * * *.”

Commenting on the import of the two sections quoted above, former Chief
Justice Moran says the following in the light of the decisions rendered by this
Court:

“From the wording of these two sections, it is clear that, during the time in
which a redemption may be made, if the judgment debtor is in possession of the
property sold, he is entitled to retain it and receive the fruits, the purchaser
not being entitled to such possession.^[1]
It is, on motion of the purchaser of the judgment creditor, that an injunction
may be issued toi, avoid waste, according to section 29, and certainly the
purchaser “would not have to file such motion if be is entitled to possession.
If the property is in the hands of the judgment debtor, the purchaser has no
right to collect from him the rents or the reasonable value of the use and
occupation thereof.^[2] It is only when tlie
property is in possession of a tenant that the purchaser, or a redemptioner, is
entitled to receive from him the rents or the reasonable value of the use and
occupation thereof, according to section 30; tbut even in such case, the
purchaser or redemptioner is accountable for the amount he has thus received if
requested by the judgment debtor or a later redemptioner wishing to
redeem.”^[3] (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 596-597.)

The rule, therefore, is dear that if during the period of redemption the
judgment-debtor is in possession of the property sold, he is entitled to retain
it and to receive its fruits, the purchaser not being entitled to its
possession; but if the property is in the possession of a tenant, it is only
then that the purchaser is entitled to receive its rents or the reasonable value
of its use and occupation. In such a case, the purchaser is accountable for the
amount thus received to the judgment-debtor when he effects the redemption.
Since in the instant case the house in question is leased to different tenants
and was not possessed by appellant, it follows, that, following the above rule,
appellee is entitled to the rentals that had accrued during the period of
redemption, and is not accountable therefor to appellant because of the latter’s
failure to redeem it within said period. ‘ The lower court, therefore, committed
no error in adjudicating said rentals to appellee.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Riosa vs. Verzosa, 26 Phil., 86;
Velasco vs. Rosenberg’s, Inc., 32 Phil., 72; Pabico vs. Ong Pauco,
43 Phil., 572; Powell vs. Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil., 54.

^[2] De la Rosa vs. Revita Santos,
10 Phil., 148; Riosa vs. Verzosa, supra; Velasco vs.
Rosenberg’s Inc., 32 Phil., 72.

^[3]
See Vda. de Syquia vs. Jacinto, 60 Phil., 861, 863.