MARIETA J. ROTEA AND SANTIAGO ROTEA, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. LEVY HERMANOS, INC., ET AL., CLAIMANTS AND APPELLEES.

On August 6, 1943, Marieta J. Rotea and her husband Santiago
Rotea applied for voluntary insolvency in the court of First Instance of
Manila.

On October 27, 1943, the court by an order subsequently
amended, granted the petition, ordered the sheriff of Manila to take possession
of and safely keep, until the appointment of an assignee, all the goods, papers,
books of account, and all real and personal property of the debtors, except such
as may be exempt from execution. It set December 11, 1943 as the day for the
meeting of the creditors of the insolvent for the election of an assignee.

On the above designated day no creditors attended the meeting
and no assignee was elected.

Upon motion of some creditors the court designated the Bank of
the Philippine Islands as the assignee; but this institution declined the
appointment for reasons which need not be mentioned. And so far as the record
shows no assignee has up to this time qualified.

In the meantime certain creditors either filed their claims or
joined the proceedings, namely, the Finance and Investment Corporation, the
Ipekdjian Brothers, Inc., the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, the Levy
Hermanos, Inc., and the Levy & Blum, Inc.

About the end of the year 1944, the insolvents, allegedly by
“dint of hard work and through the help of relatives”, acquired funds sufficient
to cover their full indebtedness and made tender of payment. The first three
creditors received the money. The last two refused payment. Wherefore the
debtors purchased two manager’s checks of the Philippine National Bank payable
to the said two creditors in the amount of their credits and deposited such
checks with the clerk of the court of first instance of Manila. That was on
January 2, 1945. At the same time the debtors petitioned the court to order the
said two creditors to collect and receive from the clerk their respective
manager’s checks in satisfaction of their claims. As the motion was not acted
upon until January 22, 1945, the debtors with the permission of the court
withdrew the checks from the clerk, cashed them and deposited the proceeds with
the sheriff on the theory that he was acting in the place of the assignee who
had not yet been selected.

Thereafter liberation came.

On October 31, 1946, the insolvent debtors submitted a petition
for the arrest and final dismissal of the insolvency proceedings, because “with
the full payment of three creditors mentioned in the schedule” and the payment
to the sheriff of the claims of those who rejected the amounts tendered, all the
credits against the petitioners had become fully paid, and there was no longer
any necessity for the continuation of the insolvency proceedings. Levy Hermanos,
Inc. and Levy & Blum, Inc. opposed the petition, which was consequently
denied by Judge Emilio Peña on December 27, 1946.

The petitioners appealed.

This appeal may not be entertained. In the first place, the
petition for dismissal of the proceedings was filed under Section 81 of the
Insolvency Law which clearly says that “if no creditor files written objections”
the court may grant the application.

In the second place, the statute specifically mentions the
cases in which appeal may be taken (Sec. 82), namely:

“1. From an order granting or refusing an adjudication of
insolvency and, in the latter case, from the order fixing the amount of costs,
expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, allowed the debtor.

“2. From an order made at the hearing of any account of an
assignee, allowing or rejecting a creditor’s claim in whole or in part, when the
amount in dispute exceeds three hundred pesos.

“3. From an order allowing or denying a claim for property not
belonging to the insolvent, presented under section forty-eight of this Act.

“4. From an order settling an account of an assignee.

“5. From an order against or in favor of setting apart
homestead or other property claimed as exempt from execution.

“6. From an order granting or refusing a discharge to the
debtor.”

This appeal does not fall within any of the above classes. It
may not be contended that it is an appeal from an order refusing a discharge;
because the petition was specifically made under section 81 of the Insolvency
Law, and because upon a petition for discharge (secs. 64-69 of the insolvency)
other issues might be involved.

With the dismissal of this appeal, the insolvency proceedings
will proceed in accordance with law. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.