G.R. No. L-11499. April 29, 1961
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. GO BON LEE, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
DIZON, J.:
petition filed by the Government, through the Solicitor General, for the
cancellation of the certificate of naturalization issued to Go Bon
Lee—hereinafter referred to as Go.
Go was granted Philippine citizenship by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
on November 26, 1941 and on February 11, 1942 he took his oath of allegiance,
and naturalization certificate No. 4 was issued to him thereafter.
On August 15, 1951 the Solicitor General filed a petition for the
cancellation of Go’s certificate of naturalization on the following grounds: (1)
that the same was obtained illegally or contrary to law because Go did not then
have all the necessary qualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines;
(2) that at the time he was granted Philippine citizenship, he had not enrolled
all his minor children of school age in any public or private school recognized
by the Office of Private Education where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum; (3) that he
did not reside continuously in the Philippines for ten years; (4) and finally,
that he filed his petition for naturalization on April 18, 1941 in violation of
Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law, because at that time one year had
not yet elapsed since he filed with the Bureau of Justice a sworn declaration of
his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.
It is not denied that Go, bound as he was by the law requiring the filing of
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, complied with
said requirement on May 23, 1940 (Exh. C). Neither is it disputed that his
petition for naturalization was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
on April 18, 1941 (Exh. C)—clearly in violation of the provision of Section 5 of
the Revised Naturalization Law to the effect that the petition for
naturalization must be filed after one year from the filing of the aforesaid
declaration of intention.
The lower court, however, held the view that Go had substantially complied
with this requirement because, after all, the hearing of his petition was held
more than one year after the filing of his declaration of intention to become a
citizen. We disagree with this view. The language of the law on the matter being
express and explicit, it is beyond the province of the courts to take into
account questions of expediency, good faith and other similar reasons in the
construction of its provisions (De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil,
289; 48 Off. Gaz., 1787). Were we to j accept the view of the lower court on
this matter, there would be no good reason why a petition for naturalization ,
cannot be filed one week after or simultaneously with the filing of the required
declaration of intention as long as the hearing is delayed to a date after t. e
expiration 01 the period of one year. The ruling of the lower court amounts, in
our opinion, to a substantial change in the law, something which courts can not
do, their duty being to apply the law and not tamper with it (Uy Chin Hua
vs. Dinglasan, 86 Phil., 617; 47 Off. Gaz. 12 Supp. p. 233; Orestoff
vs. Government etc., 71 Phil., 240). In U. S. vs. Ginsberg,
243 U. S. 472, 475; 61 L. Ed. 853, 856, cited in Bautista vs. Republic,
etc., 87 Phil., 818; it was held:
“An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can rightly
obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are
without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to
enforce the legislative will in respect of the matter so vital to the public,
welfare.”
In connection with the question of appellee’s failure to enroll all his minor
children of school age in a public or private school recognized by the Office of
Private Education of the Philippines, etc.—which is mandatory, failure to comply
with it constituting a valid ground for the denial of the petition for
citizenship (Tan vs. Republic, etc. 92 Phil., 915; 49 Off. Gaz., p.
1409) or for the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization already
issued—it appears that when Go filed his petition for naturalization in 1941 he
had five minor children of school age, four of whom were then living in China,
where they were born, and had never been enrolled in any recognized public or
private schpol in the Philippines. It has been held in this connection that the
fact that applicant’s minor children were born and have lived since infancy in
China does noV excuse him from complying with this particular requirement of the
law (Lim vs. Republic etc., G. R. No. L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950; Hao Lian
Chu vs. Republic etc., 87 Phil., 668; 48 Off. Gaz., p. 1780). Go’s
claim that his failure to comply with this legal requirement was due to
different factors beyond his control, such as the unsettled conditions in China
and the strictness of Philippine Immigration Laws, do not constitute valid
excuses for non-compliance (Hao Lian Chu vs. Republic etc.,
supra). Moreover, according to appellee’s own testimony, in 1930 he
took his daughter Juanita—who was born in Cebu—to China where she remained until
she was brought back to the Philippines in 1938. No satisfactory proof has been
presented to show that Go had exerted efforts at that time to bring to the
Philippines his other four minor children.
In denying the petition of the Government the lower court expressed the view
that the matter of Go’s citizenship was already res judicata and that
the Government was in estoppel to question his status aa a citizen upon any
ground which could have been raised before or during the hearing of the petition
for naturalization. This we find to be untenable.
It is settled that the doctrine of estoppel or of laches does not apply
against the Government suing in its capacity as Sovereign or asserting
governmental rights. It has been held that the Government is never estopped by
mistakes or errors on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil., 803, 807), and that estoppel eannot give validity
to an act that is prohibited by law or is against public policy (Benguet
Consolidated etc. vs. Pineda etc., 96 Phil., 711; 52 Off. Gaz., [4]
1961; Eugenio vs. Perdido, 97 Phil., 41).
Furthermore, unlike final decisions in actions and other proceedings in
court, a decision or order granting citizenship to the applicant does not really
become executory, and a naturalization proceeding not being a judicial adversary
proceeding, the decision rendered therein is not res judicata as to any
of the reasons or matters which would support a judgment cancelling the
certificate of naturalization for illegal or fraudulent procurement. As a matter
of fact, it is settled in this jurisdiction that a certificate of naturalization
may be cancelled upon grounds or conditions subsequent to the granting of the
certificate of naturalization. Thus in Bell vs. Attorney General, 56
Phil., 667, it was held that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if
it is found subsequently that the applicant for citizenship secured the same by
misleading the Courts on any material fact. Finally, the following was said in
U. S. vs. Spohrer, 175 Fed. 440:
“An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with
the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with the
acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege ia hound, therefore, to
conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is
his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which
the grant is predicated actually exist, and if they do not he takes nothing by
this paper grant.* * * *
* * *“Congress having limited, this privilege to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to
grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive
it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as against
the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of
law.”
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another is rendered cancelling. Certificate of Naturalization No. 4 heretofore
issued to appellee Go Bon Lee, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur.