FELISA A. TARNATE, PETITIONER, VS. IÑIGO S. DAZA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, AND RAMON A. TARNANTE, RESPONDENTS.

MORAN, C.J.:


In 1937, civil case No. 3308 entitled “In re: Intestate Estate of Paula
Agoncillo, deceased,” was filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
wherein it is still pending to date.

On September 75 1942, Ramon Tarnate filed in the same Court of First Instance
of Batangas civil case No. 2 against Felisa A. Tarnate. claiming sole ownership
over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 13 which forms part of the estate of
Paula Agoncillo. The trial court rendered its judgment on July 19, 1944, holding
against Ramon Tarnate who appealed the case to the Court of Appeals , where the
records of the case were lost or destroyed during the period of reconquest of
the Philippines from the Japanese forces by the armies of the United States.

On December 2, 194?, Felisa-A. Tarnate, as administratrix of the estate of
deceased Paula Agoncillo in civil case No. 3308, filed a project of partition on
the controverted lot No. 13. This project was opposed by Ramon Tarnate on the
ground, basically, that there was still pending before the Court of Appeals a
suit over the ownership of said lot No. 13, and that if the records of said case
had been lost he would seek its reconstitution, hence the project of partition
should not be entertained until the question, of ownership were finally
adjudicated. This opposition was sustained by the trial court in an order issued
on January 4, 1946, with the condition, however, that within thirty days
thereof, Ramon Tarnate either inform the court of the whereabouts of the records
of said case involving the question of ownership or else bring another action as
a revival of said case, otherwise the project of partition “shall ‘be ipso facto
considered approved.”

Accordingly, on February 6, 1946, Ramon Tarnate filed before the same Court
of First Instance civil case No. 4010, wherein he reiterated his claim of
ownership over said lot No. 13 and designated the suit as a revival of his
previous case. To this new complaint, Felisa A. Tarnate filed a motion to
dismiss which, in essence, challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court to
take cognizance of the case on the ground that there was still a previous case
on the same subject-matter and between the same parties pending before the Court
of Appeals, referring to civil case No. 2 filed by Ramon Tarnate on September 7,
1942. The trial court denied this motion to dismiss, and also a subsequent
motion to reconsider its order of denial.

Hence, this petition for certiorari by Felis.a A. Tarnate seeking the
annulment of the proceeding had in civil case No. 4010.

In a petition for certiorari only questions of jurisdiction may be raised as
a general rule. And, certainly, the pendency of another action is not a proper
ground for attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court. The pendency of
another action and lack of jurisdiction are matters entirely different from each
other and are treated as different grounds for dismissal by the Rules of Court.
(Rule 8, sec. 1, paragraphs [a] and [d]). In the instant case,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the parties by the
filing of the complaint by plaintiff and service of summons upon defendant.
(Banco Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Slade Perkins
vs. Dizon et al.,69 Phil., 186; Ñg Si Chok vs. Vera, G. R. No.
45674) It has also jurisdiction over the subject-matter which is ownership of a
parcel of land. (Act No. I36, section 56, as aamended). Thus, the trial court
has jurisdiction to try and decide validly the case, and the pendency of another
action can in no wise affect that jurisdiction.

Petition for certiorari is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta desestimacion PARAS, M.,
conforme:

Estoy confer me con la desestimaclo’n del recurso por las razones
siguientess

Los autos damuestran que el expediente destruido o desaparecido del primer
aaunto, elevado en alzada para ante el Tribunal de Apelaoion, ya no se puede
reconstition porque las copias de los esoritos que tenfa el apelante, anora
recurrido, tambin se han perdido La apelada, ahora recurrente, podia tener algur
interes en la reconstitucion por Iiaber sido la vencedora en el pleito, pero los
autos tambien demuestran que no ha dado ningun paso para dioho efecto.

La alegacion, por tanto, sobre la pendencia de otro pleito anterior entre las
mismas partes y acerca de la misrna materia, carece enteramente de fundamento.
Asi que no nay aqui ni falta de jurisdiccidn de parte del tribunal inferior
sobre el segundo litigio, como se alega en el recurso, ni multiplicidad de
pleitos que prohibe la ley y la jurisprudencia. La segunda demanda este bien
incoada, a tenor de la Ley No. 3110 sobre reconstitucion de expediantes
destruidos o desaparecidos Desestimese el recourse.