RAMON A. TARNATE, PETITIONER, VS. IÑIGO S. DAZA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, MODESTO CASTILLO, EX-JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, AND VICENTE A. TARNATE, …

PARAS, J.:


On April 18, 1944, the respondent Judge, Hon. Modesto Castillo, ordered the
heirs of the intestate Paula Agoncillo to pay to the respondent Vicente A.
Tarnate, in equal parts, the sum of p1,204. On ex-parte motion of
Vicente A. Tarnate, the respondent Judge, Hon. Iñigo S. Daza, issued an order
dated January 17, 1946, directing the petitioner Ramon A. Tarnate to pay to
Vicente A. Tarnate the sum of P235.64 within fifteen days, and authorizing the
issuance of a writ of execution in case of default on the part of the
petitioner. The said amount of P235.64 represents the alleged share of the
petitioner (as an heir of Paula Agonoillo) in the obligation created in favor of
Vicente A. Tarnate by the order of Judge Modesto Castillo dated April 18, 1944.
Invoking moratorium, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order
of Judge Daza who, in another order dated February 6, 1946, ruled that Executive
Order No. 52 of the President of the Philippines, dated March 10, 1945, is not
applicable at least in so far as the amount of P200.80 was concerned, because
the same became due to Vicente A. Tarnate for services rendered before the
outbreak of the war on December 8, 1941. As the respondent Judge, Hon. Iñigo S.
Daza, in his later order of February 6, 1946, enjoined the petitioner Ramon A.
Tarnate to pay P200.80 immediately and ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution against him after the lapse of five days, this original petition for
certiorari and prohibition was instituted by said petitioner. The respondents
have not filed any answer. Neither did any of the parties appear on the uate set
for oral argument.

Executive Order No. 32 provides that “enforcement of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other
monetary obligations entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential
Proclamation that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is
temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.” (41 Off.
Gaz., 56.) Thereunder, all debts and other monetary obligations, regardless of
the dates of their creation, provided they were not entered Into in any place
after the same had been declared by the President of the Philippines to have
been liberated, may not be enforced. See Palacios vs. Daza and Provincial
Government of Batangas, 75 Phil., 279.) This ban—which has not as yet been
lifted—is clearly infringed by the orders of January 17 and February 6, 1946,
Issued by the -respondent Judge, Hon. Inigo S. Daza, compelling the petitioner
Ramon A. Tarnate to pay the amount due from him to the respondent Vicente A.
Tarnate, as previously adjudged in the order of the respondent Judge, Hon.
Modesto Castillo, dated April 18, 1944. Whether the monetary obligation of the
petitioner be considered as having accrued prior to the commencement of the last
war or on the date of the order of Judge Castillo (April 18, 1944), its
enforcement is suspended, inasmuch as it is not a debt or monetary obligation
alleged to have been contracted in an area after it had been declared by
Presidential Proclamation to be free from enemy occupation and control.

It follows that the present petition should be, as the same is hereby,
granted and the aforesaid orders of January 17 and February 6, 1946, set aside,
with costs against the respondent Vicente A. Tarnate. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.