SATURNINA ZAPANTA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VIRGILIO BARTOLOME AND ASUNCION CHANLIONGCO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is a forcible entry and detainer case that was commenced
in the Municipal Court of the City of Manila, wherein judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff Saturnina Zapanta and against the defendants Virgilio
Bartolome and Asuncion Chanliongco, plaintiff’s son-in-law and daughter,
respectively, who were ordered to vacate the premises, subject matter of the
complaint, namely, the house known as and located at No. 138 Endaya Street,
Tondo, Manila, and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P565, the aggregate of
rentals in arrears from March 1946 to February 1947, inclusive, plus the sum of
P100 monthly as the fair rental value of said house beginning March 1947 until
the defendants vacate and surrender the house to the plaintiff, and to pay the
costs. On appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila, judgment was again
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to vacate the
premises, but reducing to P50 monthly the amount of rentals to be paid by them.
The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. After receiving the
briefs of both parties and on the basis of the first assignment of error made by
the appellants in their brief which reads as follows:

“The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint for
ejectment appealed from the municipal court of Manila, involving the ownership
of the house in question, which is raised not only in the pleadings but also in
the evidence, introduced in the trial, in the Court of First Instance and in the
municipal court of Manila, which also failed to dismiss said complaint after
hearing the evidence and in spite of the defendants’ motion for dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint, for ejectment, because it involves the question of’
ownership of house No. 138 Endaya, Tondo, Manila, of which the municipal court
has no jurisdiction.”

And because the question of jurisdiction was said to have been
previously raised in the Municipal Court as well as in the Court of First
Instance, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution promulgated on March 16,
1949, ordering the transmittal of the records of this case to the Supreme Court
for decision, pursuant to section 17, No. 4 (3) and section 31, of Republic Act
No. 296.

Ordinarily, the Supreme Court assumes exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in cases
in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. It is to be
understood, however, that the issue of jurisdiction be justifiably and properly
made; that a prima facie case of lack of jurisdiction of the inferior
court concerned be made out; and that the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
inferior court be possible of ascertainment and determination from the record of
the case, particularly, the pleadings, or from facts not disputed, and not from
any finding of fact to be made by this Tribunal from a consideration of the
evidence. In the present case, however, reasons more than one seem to militate
against the issue of jurisdiction being raised before this Court for
determination, or the question even being raised at all, on appeal. The mere
allegation by the defendants in their answer in the Municipal Court of Manila,
of claim of ownership over the house in question, was not sufficient to stop the
Municipal Court from proceeding with the hearing and disposal of the case. It
has repeatedly been held by the Supreme Court that the mere fact that the
defendant, in his answer, claims to be the owner of the property from which the
plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest a justice of the peace
or a municipal court of its summary jurisdiction in actions of forcible entry
and detainer, because, were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would
be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of actions depend upon the
defendant in all cases. Exception may be made when the evidence during the trial
in aid court shows that the question of title is actually involved in the
litigation and that the defendant’s contention, according to said evidence, is
meritorious. (Supia and Batiaco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 321;
Aquino vs. Deala, 63 Phil., 582, 593; Torres vs. Peña, 78 Phil., 231; Peñalosa
vs. Garcia, 81 Phil., 245).

Whether or not the Municipal Court had jurisdiction, and the
Court of First Instance could properly hear and decide the case in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, depends upon the merit or lack of merit of this
claim of ownership by the defendant. For purposes of making out a prima
facie case, it is apparent that this claim of ownership is greatly weakened
by the fact that the Municipal Court in its decision unhesitatingly held it to
be unfounded; consequently, the defendants were ordered as mere tenants to
vacate the house. The Court of First Instance, after hearing, also rejected this
claim of ownership by the defendants.

But if the consideration of the meritoriousness or lack of it,
of the claim of ownership by the defendants, is to be pursued further in an
endeavor to determine if the Municipal Court had jurisdiction, it is apparent
that the proceedings will have to be had in the Court of Appeals, the appellate
fact finding Judicial body. In other words, in an appeal where the jurisdiction
of an inferior court is correctly and properly in issue, and the determination
of said jurisdiction depends upon facts yet to be ascertained and found from the
evidence, it is the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court that shall assume
appellate jurisdiction.

But there is another aspect to this case. Even assuming for a
moment that the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to try and decide the case
because of the question of ownership raised, and that, consequently, the Court
of First Instance of Manila also lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide it on
appeal, nevertheless, in the said Court of First Instance, the parties,
particularly the defendants, without questioning the court’s jurisdiction,
submitted their pleadings and took part in the trial. Under such circumstances,
the Court of First Instance may be regarded as having tried and decided the case
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. (See the case of Amor vs.
Gonzales, 76 Phil., 484, applying Rule 40, sec. 11, of the Rules of Court.)^[1] It is because of this incident or phase of
the case that in the first part of this resolution we expressed our doubt,
though indirectly, that the question of jurisdiction is properly and justifiably
raised on appeal.

In view of the foregoing, and on the ground that the present
case does not come under the provisions of section 17, No. 4 (3) and section 31,
of Republic Act No. 296, this case is hereby returned to the Court of Appeals
which has jurisdiction over the same.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason,
and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Moran, C.J., I concur upon the ground that the question of jurisdiction is
unsubstantial.

---

[1] Rule 40, section 11, Rules of Court, reads as
follows:

“Lack of jurisdiction.—A case tried by an inferior court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be dismissed on appeal by the
Court of First Instance. But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try the case on the
merits if the parties therein file their pleadings and go to the trial without
any objection to such jurisdiction.”