ANGELINA CANAYNAY, PRUDENCIA V. ASPREC AND CLETO ASPREC, PETITIONERS, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN AND FELICIANO SARMIENTO, RESPONDENTS.

Respondent Feliciano Sarmiento filed an action for illegal
detainer against petitioners Angelina Canaynay, Prudencia V. Asprec and Cleto
Asprec in the Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque, Rizal. Petitioners filed
an answer claiming ownership of the property and after trial asked for the
dismissal of the case upon the ground that it involved a question of title over
which the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction. The motion was denied and
judgment was rendered against petitioners, who appealed to the Court of First
Instance. Upon the docketting of the case in that court, petitioners filed what
they called a “Constancia”, wherein they impugned the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace and objected to the exercise by the Court of First Instance
of its original jurisdiction over the case and prayed that “after hearing the
above-entitled case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court.” According to the petitioners themselves, this “Constancia” was not
meant as a motion to dismiss but merely to make of record their objection to
both the jurisdiction of toe justice of the peace and the original jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, and their prayer was that “after the trial of
this case when this court (of First Instance) shall have found from the evidence
presented that the real question involved is one of ownership and not merely
possession, to declare that the justice of the peace court is without
jurisdiction, and, consequently, should dismiss the case.” But the prayer
contained in this “Constancia” was denied by the court.

In the meantime, petitioners failed to file their answer to the
complaint which was deemed reproduced in the Court of First Instance upon the
docketing of the case therein, and for that reason, the court, on motion of the
plaintiff, declared petitioners in default. Petitioners fled a motion for
reconsideration upon the ground that the answer filed in the justice of the
peace court should have been deemed reproduced also in the Court of First
Instance, but the motion was denied. The Court, after receiving the evidence for
the plaintiff, rendered judgment against petitioners ordering them to vacate the
property and to pay the rents thereof to plaintiff. Whereupon, petitioners,
instead of appealing from this decision and from the order of default filed this
special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

The only ground alleged by petitioners against the order of
default issued against them is that, upon the docketing of the case in the Court
of First Instance, not only the complaint but also the answer filed in the
justice of the peace court should have been deemed reproduced. However, this
contention is contrary to Rule 40, section 7, which reads as follows:

“Upon the docketing of the cause under appeal, the complaint
filed in the justice of the peace or municipal court shall be considered
reproduced in the Court of First Instance and it shall be the duty of the clerk
of the court to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail, and the
period for making an answer shall begin with the date of the receipt of such
notice by the defendant.”

According to this provision, what is deemed reproduced in the
Court of First Instance upon the docketing of the case therein, is only the
complaint, but not the answer, filed in the justice of the peace or municipal
court. The reason is that there may be no answer filed in the justice of the
peace court, or that if there is any filed therein, it may be changed in the
Court of First Instance where a trial de novo, is to be held. Although
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant may change on appeal in the Court of
First Instance the questions raised by the pleadings in the inferior court, a
denial that may have been made in the justice of the peace court may be changed
into an admission, or a special defense interposed therein may be withdrawn in
the Court of First Instance. It is then necessary for the defendant to re-define
his stand in the Court of First Instance by filing an answer in due time, and
his failure to do so is ground for default.

Petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

PERFECTO, J.:

We concur in the decision as a correct exposition and
interpretation of section 7 of Rule 40.

We feel, however, that it is our duty to express our opinion to
the effect that the said section should be amended as being unreasonable and
unfair to the defendant. We do not see any reason why the defendant should be
compelled to file a new answer or reproduce his answer as filed in the municipal
court, while plaintiff is relieved from the obligation of reproducing his
complaint.