G.R. No. L-273. March 29, 1947
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ZACARIAS ANDAL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
TUASON, J.:
Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother
and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of
land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas
cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel,
a portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A,
to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal’s wife in consideration of P860.
This portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger
parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made (time
not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but
which is not now important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold
to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she
offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to
that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez’s and Aquilina
Hernandez’s shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the
property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that
when the cause was called for trial on March 8, she announced in open court that
she was willing to repurchase her sister’s share from Andal for P860 and
reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th
stating that he had made other expenses; that on the 29th she brought P860 to
repurchase the land in question but the case was again postponed because the
plaintiff’s sisters had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal
resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for
P970 in favor of the intervenors, an amount which included Andal’s expenses as
well as the normal sale price. The document of repurchase gave as reason for the
transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble should
arise the sellers should return to the buyer what they had received and pay the
latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria end
Aquilina Hernandez had sold him their respective portions of the inherited land
for P860 and that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of
the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the
deed of sale amounting to P50, but that he was unwilling to accept P150, which
was all the plaintiff offered him besides his expenses.
On April 4,1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez’s answer in intervention was
filed. The intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among them and
their brother and sisters “with the share of each delineated and marked, and
after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and
independent possession of his portion in the partition.” They charged the
plaintiff with bad faith in that “it was upon her request for chance that the
sale to the defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed till
January of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they could
sell to the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise the amount
of P860 offered by the defendant.”
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her
own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints.
Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession
of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared
that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him long after he had
bought it, that is, when she was about lo file her action. He stated that after
he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he showed it to the
plaintiff: that was on the 23d of January. He was able to do this because he
lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He
said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the document merely exclaimed,
“Oh, so you already have a document.” When asked whether the land “described in
the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among the
co-owners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez,”
counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the best evidence was the
document of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same objection and
the same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was queried how it
was that the land he had bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been
specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did
not call any more witnesses but only announced that he had witnesses ready to
prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been made,
mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again
objected asserting that “under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real
estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person
against whom the proof is offered.” Upon this objection, the court ruled that
under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as
under article 1248 of the Civil Code, a parol evidence of partition was
inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony
and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of
the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal
and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact the
allegation that the resale was simulated. The court then made this judgment:
“(a) declarando nulo y sin valor alguno el documento de reventa
otorgado por el demandado Zacarias Andal en 26 de marzo de 1944, a favor de
Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el terreno cuestionado que se presento como
Exhibito 2 de dicho demandado, y consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas las
transacciones posteriores que las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan
hecho sobre el terreno cuestionado despues del 26 de marzo de 1944, asi como
tanibien cualquiera anotacion en la Oficina del Registrador de Titulos de
Batangas que haya anotado dicha reventa por el demandado Zacarias Andal a favor
de las terceristas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de
1944; y“(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue una
escritura de reventa a favor de la aqui demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las
participaciones de las terceristas en el terreno descrito en la demanda
suplementaria previo pago de P860 mas la cantidad de P50 como gastos de
documentacion. Se absuelve al demandado de los daños y perjuicios que reclama la
demandante. Se absuelve tambien a la demandante de la contra-demanda de las
terceristas.“Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.”
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision
and in their joint brief made one asignment of error:
“The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a
contract of partition among the heirs on the ground that it was not
admissible.”
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to
point up some seeming incongruities in the above-quoted judgment. Although
Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case, as far as the land is
concerned, and even though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners
and are now in full possession of the property, while Andal has already gotten
his money back, the judgment would have Andal execute a deed of resale in favor
of the plaintiff and receive from her the price of repurchase. The judgment is
silent as to the intervenors with reference to the execution of the deed of sale
or the receipt of the sale price. And the lower court made no finding and
expressed no opinion as to whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to
mention Andal’s expenses, by the plaintiff as price of repurchase was sufficient
compliance with article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the
plaintiff’s cause of action.
However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of
section 21 of Rule 123 and section 1 of Rule 74 both of the Rules of Court.
Article 1248 of the Civil Code has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is
such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One
line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The
reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of
frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and
designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. (27
C. J., 206.) The differences in the conclusions reached are “due perhaps to
varied phraseology of the statutes” in the several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.)
However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of
the former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the
Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases
to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.
J., 206.) In this jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the
operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485; Almirol and
Cariño vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not
declare the contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only
makes ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cariño
vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the United States, even in those states
where the affirmative view of the question has been followed, “the weight of
authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is effective when several
possession is taken under it by the respective parties to the agreement.” (27 C.
J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed.
“Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid
and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition
has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an
oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity
will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with
the possession in severalty.“In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to
be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.“A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise
recognizing the existence of the partition.“A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part
performance, or have stilted that a part performance is necessary, to take a
parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held
that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part
performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition
agreed to by the parties.” (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol
partition that there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members of this
Court. This section reads:
“If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after
the death of the decedent.”
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and
cannot be validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a
public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties,
are required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or
as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted
by the statute of frauds, for example, “is for evidential purposes only.”
(Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The decisions of this Court which
we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too,
requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in
order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that
after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound
may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs.
Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential
of partition? In other words, is writing the act that confers legal validity
upon the agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule
which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be noted that
where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential requisite
to the validity of the transaction, it says so in clear and unequivocal terms.
Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and as enacted in
some of the states, uses the words “utterly void” with reference to certain
transactions. Under the terms of such statute transactions required to be in
writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner
indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that donation may be
valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage
Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and
its registration in the registry indispensable to the validity of the contract
by using this phrase: “in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created
in a valid manner.” Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same
purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document:
“in order that mortgage may be validly constituted.” And with respect to the
formalities of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this
emphatic statement: “No will shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or
personal nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written etc.” Other
examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the
required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or
an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court
had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a
partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public
instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is not
without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the
proposition that a public document and its registration were contemplated as
necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without
them no oral partition can bind the parties.
- In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration
forms a part were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal
with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to be
a binding agreement between coheirs in the settlement of their private affairs
which in no way affect the rights of third parties would be to transcend its
rule-making power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court
to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of arriving at the
conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a rule of
substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical
implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court
realized the bounds of this court’s functions and did not intend to trespass on
purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the
execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements
to validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and
necessary; legitimate because decedents’ estates are placed under the
jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of third
parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and
practice and invades the realm of substantive law.Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 of Rule 74,
is enlightening and instructive. The former after stating that heirs may
apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words “and not
otherwise.” These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention to make
the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But
what is far more to the point is that by logical process of deduction the
elimination from the new rule of the words “and not otherwise” imports the
casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural character which
the document enjoyed in the former code. At the same time, the inclusion of the
aforesaid words in the old provision serves to emphasize the necessity of a
positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the
exclusive basis of the contract’s binding effect on the parties. It is of course
unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed
public instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending
that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act
No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been
enacted by the legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered
and untrammelled, except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects
of legislation. - The civil law looks upon the rote of public instruments in acts and
contracts with greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human
frailties and idiosyncrasies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in
their lack of experience and foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of
laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of an
air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating for
the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though
articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provision for public
instrument for all transactions and contracts whose object is the creation,
modification or extinction of real rights in immovables, it has been recognized
and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the parties. A leading
case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr.
Justice Willard writing the decision. It was said in that case that when the
essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract
is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article
1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action on the verbal
agreement without first bringing an action under article 1279 to compel the
execution of a written instrument. It says that “article 1279 does not impose an
obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact
that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action.” It further
says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract
dependent upon any special intrinsic form, recognizes its enforceability by the
mere act of granting the contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to
compel the execution of public writing or any other special form whenever such
form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect which is desired
according to whatever its object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a
series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal topic. And it
has been extended even to verbal contracts involving land registered under the
Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can
perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No
considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate
among coheirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which
operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If
as between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of
real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the
requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more
intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of
ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part which belongs to
each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and
this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs
of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law.
It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed
decision are not assigned as errors and that for this reason the appeal should
be dismissed. We do not think that the premise of this objection is exactly
correct. The evidence on parol partition tendered by the defendant and
intervenors was ruled out and they specifically complain of this exclusion as
error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely meets and attacks the
opinion and judgment of the trial court. A superficial analysis of the case will
show that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the
entire litigation, and on that validity depends in turn the competence of the
excluded evidence. These two inter-related points are the core of the whole
case. All other points are incidental to and revolve around them. If a completed
oral partition may be enforced, as the defendant and the intervenors contend and
as we opine, their evidence should be allowed, and if allowed and it establishes
their allegation, the plaintiff’s cause of action vanishes.
If the appellants’ assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge
to the decision of the court below, we still believe that the objection takes a
narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1,
section 2) is that they “shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” In line with the modern trends of
procedure, we are told that, “while an assignment of error which is required by
law or rule of court has been held essential to appellate review, and only those
assigned will be considered, there are a number of cases which appear to accord
to the appellate court a broad discretionary “power to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error
closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination
of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be
considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error.” (4 C. J. S., 1734; 3 C. J., 1341, footnote 77.) At the least, the
assignment of error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to examine and pass
upon the decision of the court below.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for
further proceeding and a new decision not incompatible with this decision, with
costs of this appeal against the appellee.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.
FERIA, J.:
I reserve the right to express my view and
write a dissenting opinion later.
DISSENTING
PARAS, J., with whom concurs PERFECTO,
J.:
Is oral evidence admissible to prove partition of land? The answer of the
appellants is in the affirmative. Thus their only assignment of error is as
follows: “The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a
contract of partition of the land among the heirs on the ground that it was not
admissible.” Since no other question, cither of fact or of law, is raised by the
appellants, I deem it unnecessary, under the circumstances of this case, to pass
upon said assignment.
A small parcel of land containing some 5,568 square meters was inherited by
four sisters and a brother. It was surveyed and is still assessed as a single
lot, not in the name of the co-owners, but in that of an uncle. It appears that
on January 23, 1944, two of the sisters sold a portion of the lot to the
defendant Andal who was neither a relative nor an adjoining owner. The vendors
stated:
“Este terreno es parte del terreno referido en la declaracion Tax No. 53379
en nombre de nuestro tio Juan Dimasacat y esta amillarado todo el terreno en
P290. El referido terreno ya se vio en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Batangas en 29 de Septiembre de 1941, at nagcaro-on ng decreto noong ika 6 ng
Noviembre, 1941, na doon ay ipinasiya ang pagbibigay ng Titulo sa aming
magcacapatid.” (Exhibit A.)
Upon learning of the sale one week thereafter, a third sister expressed her
desire to repurchase said portion of land and, upon refusal of the buyer, she
filed a complaint for the purpose of being subrogated to the rights acquired by
Andal. The latter, in his answer, is agreeable to the prayer provided that he be
reimbursed in the total sum of P910 which he had actually paid. In the meantime,
the other two sisters (vendors) intervened in the case, alleging that, before
the sale was made to Andal, the plaintiff had been given the option to acquire
the lot in question. By way of counterclaim, it was alleged that they had
repurchased the lot from Andal at a higher price.
After hearing, the lower court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff is willing
to buy, and Andal to sell, the lot at the price fixed by the latter, there is no
reason why the former’s complaint should not prosper, and Andal was accordingly
ordered to convey the property to the plaintiff upon payment by the latter of
the total sum of P910. As regards the contention of the intervenors, the court
held that their alleged repurchase was fraudulent and, therefore, null and
void.
As these pronouncements, necessarily based on findings of fact, have not been
assailed, they should be considered final. Hence, it is absolutely futile to
decide the question of law raised in appellants’ assignment of error, the same
having become academic.
Even so, the point whether the sale to Andal took place after a partition is
immaterial, in view of his willingness to resell to the plaintiff, not to
mention the fact that the latter’s right to redeem, as an adjoining owner, maybe
based on article 1523 of the Civil Code which provides: “The owners of the
adjacent lands shall also have the right of redemption in case of the sale of a
rural estate whose area does not exceed one hectare.”
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Judgment reversed; case remanded with instructions.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
July 30, 1947
TUASON, J.:
Plaintiff and appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration. She maintains
that she is entitled to judgment because the defendant has no objection to
reselling her the land and she is, on the other hand, ready to reimburse him the
purchase price. She argues that the buyer having led her to believe that he
would make the resale in her favor is estopped from going against his own
acts.
Superficially, the decision is obscure as to the relation which Andal’s
signification in his answer, that he was willing to sell the land to the
plaintiff, bears to the dispositive part or judgment. But read in its entirety,
analyzed closely, the decision reveals in no uncertain manner that it is
anchored on articles 1067 and 1522 of the Civil Code and that all other matters
discussed therein revolve around this basic conclusion. With particular
reference to Andal’s signification above mentioned, the court does not appear to
have made or intended to make it an affirmative, separate basis of the judgment.
Roughly, the judgment was evolved along this process of reasoning: the
plaintiff’s right to repurchase the land under the above-cited provisions of the
Civil Code was evident, in the court’s opinion. But, the court said in the same
breath, a complication emerged. The confusion was brought about by the resale of
the property by Andal to the original owners. The court seemed puzzled. Then it
saw a way out of the perplexity; the resale was illegal and mala fide and
hence ineffective. It was illegal, mala fide and ineffective because the
defendant had stated in his answer that he had no objection to allowing the
plaintiff to buy the land, and because the resale to the intervenors had been
consummated during the pendency of the action. Andal’s signification in his
answer estopped him from alienating the land in favor of others.
It was as estoppel that the court invoked Andal’s expression of his
willingness to sell the land, citing section 68 (a), Rule 123, Rules of
Court. The court looked upon this expression not as a cause of action standing
on its own feet but merely as an equitable aid to keep the defendant and
intervenors from making a mockery of the plaintiff’s right under the aforecited
articles of the Civil Code. The Court found that the transaction between the
defendant and intervenors had been entered into “con el proposito de desorientar
al Juzgado y frustrar en cierto modo la administracion de justicia.” The
appellee both in her brief and motion for reconsideration treats Andal’s
willingness to sell in the same light.
To put it differently, the central principle of the case, as the court saw
it, was that the evidence on the oral partition was inadmissible and so the
plaintiff’s right to repurchase the land under articles 1067 and 1522 of the
Civil Code was in order. Andal’s expression of willingness to sell the land to
the plaintiff came into play not as generator of a new obligation in favor of
the plaintiff, separate and distinct from the right of coheirs to repurchase
shares in property inherited in common and sold to strangers by other heirs, but
simply as a factor to prevent the defendant’s and intervenors’ attempt to
nullify that right.
Estoppel, in the sense in which the court regarded Andal’s manifestation that
he was willing to sell the land to the plaintiff, partakes of the nature of the
rule of evidence. Certainly, it belongs to the adjective branch of the law, and
the court regarded it under this criterion. The court’s reference in its
decision to Andal’s signification can not have a meaning other than that the
court assigned thereto a subordinate role, subordinate to the asserted right of
the plaintiff under the provisions of the Civil Code referred to.
The sole assignment of error in appellant’s brief thus inevitably comprehends
that part of the appealed decision and judgment which relates to the defendant’s
expression of willingness to sell the land to the plaintiff. A review of the
error specifically assigned necessarily carries with it the consideration of all
matters related to and dependent upon that error. Specifically, if there was a
lawful partition and the partition bars the plaintiff’s right to repurchase the
land under the articles relied upon,—the proposition formulated in the
assignment of error—then Andal’s previous willingness to sell loses its
raison d’etre as estoppel; it disappears with the right which it was
intended to uphold and with which it was inextricably bound up.
It should be made clear that we are only construing the decision of the lower
court. We have explained the ratio decidendi as it appeared to the court,
not the theory of the parties in their pleadings. If the supplemental complaint
was intended to present Andal’s offer to sell the laud to the plaintiff as
constituting a new and separate cause of action—a point which cannot be
determined with a fair degree of certainty from a reading of that complaint—the
court did not see or consider it in that light. And, it should be remembered, it
is what the court decided or how the court decided a case that we have to look
to as a test for judging whether the questions for review have been formulated
in the right manner.
If Andal’s statement in his answer was alleged by the plaintiff to serve as
an independent cause of action, that is all the more reason, for his own
benefit, why the case should be remanded for further proceeding. The new trial
as ordered in our decision leaves the door open for the admission of evidence on
the allegations in the supplementary complaint as well as on the alleged parol
partition. As matters now stand, the plaintiff could ask for judgment on the
supplementary complaint only on the untenable hypothesis that no assignment of
error has been made relative to this feature of the case. Without the benefit of
this technicality, the plaintiff has not made out a case on the supplementary
complaint. The evidence is very meager to the point of nullity; many of the
allegations have been left untouched, and there are essential points that badly
need amplification or clarification. It would be extremely improper, for obvious
reasons, to go into these defects and deficiencies in detail in this resolution
in anticipation of the new trial.
The motion is denied.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones,
Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., reserves
his vote.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
We are of opinion that, as suggested by plaintiff-appellee in her motion for
reconsideration, dated April 5, 1947, there is no need of ordering a new trial
of the case, and that rather the appealed decision should be affirmed.
This litigation is about a parcel of land very much less than two hectares in
area located in a barrio, and assessed for taxation purposes at P290 only, and
the amount for redemption of said land is much less than P1,000 of worthless
Japanese paper money. The litigation started on February 3, 1944, more than
three years ago, and the case had been submitted for our decision about a year
ago. It is high time that we put an end to such a litigation, to fight which the
parties might have spent more money than the value of the thing in
litigation.
Plaintiff and appellee Cresencia Hernandez filed the complaint to compel
defendant Zacarias Andal to sell the property to her. In his answer of February
14, 1944, Zacarias Andal stated that he was willing to soil the property to
plaintiff, provided the latter would pay him P800 plus expenses amounting to
P50. The appealed decision ordered Zacarias Andal to sell the property to
plaintiff who was ordered to pay P860, plus P50 for expenses, which is P60 more
than the amount demanded by Andal in his answer of February 14, 1944. Plaintiff
did not appeal, thus showing her willingness to pay the amount.
Under the circumstances, we do not see any reason why ununderstandable legal
technicalities should block the ending of a litigation which, in substance
ceased to exist since plaintiff and appellee manifested her willingness to pay
to defendant Andal even move than the amount he demanded.
The legal discussion entered into the majority opinion to support the further
delay in finishing the suit might be highly interesting in a law academy, but it
will never satisfy the simple sense of justice of the common man.
We vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
PARAS, J.:
I concur in the foregoing dissenting
opinion.