CO CHIONG, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE MAYOR OF MANILA, THE CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, THE MEMBERS OF THE MARKET COMMITTEE OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE MARKET MASTERS OF DIVISORIA…

Petitioners allege that they are lessees of public market
stalls in the City of Manila by virtue of contracts of lease expressly
understood to be of continuous duration until the City Mayor, for any reasonable
or just cause or any violation of the provisions of the market code or any
ordinance, or any rules relating to the administration of public markets,
revokes the same; that on October 1, 1946, Republic Act No. 37 was promulgated
and, to carry into effect its purposes, the Secretary of Finance issued
Department Order No. 32 on November 29, 1946; that petitioners filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 37 and of Department of Finance Order No. 32 and praying for
injunction to restrain their ejection from the leased public market stalls; that
on April 19, 1947, the trial court rendered judgment annulling Section 2 of
Department of Finance Order No. 32 and commanding respondents to desist from
enforcing the provisions thereof, from which decision respondents appealed to
the Supreme Court; that on June 26, 1947, Ordinance No. 3051, amending Ordinance
No. 2995, was promulgated, providing for the termination of the occupancy of
public market stalls by the Chinese petitioners; that petitioners are entitled
to a writ of injunction to command respondents to desist from enforcing said
Ordinance No. 3051 because it was returned by the mayor with a qualified
approval which, therefore, operated as a veto and avoided the promulgation of a
valid ordinance, as the mayor has no right to qualify his approval and thereby
amend the ordinances adopted by the municipal board; that while Ordinance No.
3051 provided for the termination on June 30, 1947 of any existing permission
granted for the occupancy of public market stalls, the mayor approved the same
subject to his interpretation that licenses paid, up to December 31, 1947 would
not terminate until the latter date; that Ordinance No. 3051 is null and void,
being inconsistent with the public policy of the state as declared in Republic
Act No. 37; that said ordinance is unconstitutional in that it impairs the
obligation of contracts, it nullifies the substantial protection of due process,
it denies petitioners and aliens the equal protection of the law, is
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, partial, and discriminatory, and is in
conflict with common right, it prohibits trade by Chinese stallholders, is
violative of the generally accepted principles of international law and of the
treaty obligations of the Philippines with respect to commercial activities by
Chinese and other aliens, and of the basic principles laid down in the United
Nations Organization Charter; that said ordinance cannot be enforced while the
question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 is pending before the
courts; and that the ordinance is obviously an attempt by an inferior
legislative body to evade the decision rendered by the trial court in civil case
No. 1436.

Petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction which was denied on January 8, 1948.

Petitioners filed an urgent petition for preliminary injunction
and motion for reconsideration of said resolution of January 8, but they were
also denied by resolution issued on January 21, 1948.

Respondents deny petitioners’ allegation with respect to the
conditions of the contracts of lease, conceding arguendo that petitioners
were lessees for the occupancy of the public market stalls in question, and
allege that the fees of stallholders were collected either daily, weekly or
monthly and, therefore, the contracts of lease which had no definite period had
expired on December 31, 1947; that petitioners’ claim, that said leases are of
continuous and indefinite duration, is contrary to law and would nullify the
purpose of Republic Act No. 37, as well as Ordinance No. 3051 independently
intended to put into effect the provisions of said act; that Ordinance No. 3051
does not impair the obligation of contracts because the licenses granted to
petitioners to occupy public market stalls were not contracts but lease
privileges which may be withdrawn at will; that the establishment, maintenance
and operation of markets, admittedly governmental in nature, are non-separable
from the regulation as regards the leasing thereof, and the occupants have which
no such interest in the stall which a lessee of a store or dwelling has, and
that the municipal corporation may provide for the revocation of the permit or
licenses; that petitioners are mere licensees and their licenses are not
contracts which would create in their favor vested rights protected against
future and subsequent enactments; that Ordinance No. 3051 does not deprive
petitioners of the equal protection of law, which does not limit the police
power of the state to legislate for the promotion of the general welfare and
prosperity, and the nationalization of retail trade; that the ordinance is not
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, partial and discriminatory and it is not made
the subject of civil case No. 1436 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and,
by its nature, may be enforced independently of Republic Act No. 37; and that no
generally accepted principle in international law is violated by its enactment,
while, on the other hand, the right of a state to self-determination is
respected by the Charter of the United Nations.

There is no question that the establishment, maintenance and
operation of public markets are governmental in nature, being among the public
functions of the state and, therefore, the opportunity of occupying stalls in
public markets is a privilege that can be granted or withdrawn without impairing
any one of the guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. In
the case of Co Chiong, et al. vs. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., et al., L-1440, we have
already declared:

“Public markets are public services or utilities as much as the
public supply and sale of gas, gasoline, electricity, water and public
transportation are. Under the Constitution, the operation of all public services
are reserved to Filipino citizens and to corporations or associations sixty
per centum of the capital of which belongs to Filipino citizens.

” ‘No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under
the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation,
except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.’

“Foodstuffs sold in public markets demand, at least, as much
official control and supervision as the commodities sold and distributed in
other public utilities. They affect the life and health of the people, the
safeguarding of which is one of the basic obligations of a constituted
government. Official control and supervision can be exercised more effectively
if public market stalls are occupied by citizens rather than by aliens.

“In impugning the validity of Republic Act No. 37, appellees
invoke general guarantees in the Bill of Rights, such as the due process of law
and the equal protection of the laws. Even if their position could be supported
under said general guarantees, a hypothesis the validity of which we consider
unnecessary to decide, said guarantees have to give way to the specific
provision above quoted, which reserves to Filipino citizens the operation of
public services or utilities.

“Furthermore, the establishment, maintenance, and operation of
public markets, as much as public works, are part of the functions of
government. The privilege of participating in said functions, such as that of
occupying public market stalls, is not among the fundamental rights or even
among the general civil rights protected by the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. The exercise or enjoyment of public functions are reserved to a class of
persons possessing the specific qualifications required by law. Such is the case
of the privilege to vote, to occupy a government position, or to participate in
public works. They are reserved exclusively to citizens. Public functions are
powers of national sovereignty and it is elementary that such sovereignty be
exercised exclusively by nationals.

“Although foreigners are entitled to all the rights and
privileges of friendly guests, they can not claim the right to enjoy privileges
which by their nature belong exclusively to the hosts.”

With the above pronouncements the whole controversy is disposed
of against petitioners. Ordinance No. 3051 offends neither, the constitutional
clause guranteeing the obligation of contracts nor the guarantees of due process
of law and equal protection of the law. Neither does it violate any principle of
international law nor any of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
Organization. It does not impair any treaty commitment, as the treaties
mentioned by petitioners have no binding effect upon the Republic of the
Philippines, which is not a party to said treaties. The Philippines is bound
only by treaties concluded and ratified in accordance with our Constitution.
Ordinance No. 3051 of the City of Manila is valid.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.
Paras, and Feria, JJ., concur in the
result.