ANG LIN CHI, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR CASTELO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, VALENTIN TECH, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, AND GENARO S. PAZ, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to annul the order of the respondent judge
directing the issuance of a writ of execution against Jose Ang and the
petitioner Ang Lin Chi for P1,800 jointly and severally.

It appears that in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
civil case No. 181 Genaro S. Paz vs. Jose Ang, et al., the Honorable Oscar
Castelo, Judge, rendered on June 30, 1948, a decision, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:

“En su virtud se dicta sentencia ordenando a los demandados
Jose Ang y Ang Lin Chi devuelvan al aqui demandante dicho automovil, o en su
defecto la cantidad de mil ochocientos (P1,800) pesos, con las costas a cargo de
dichos demandados.”

That decision having become final, a writ of execution was
issued by the clerk on August 21, 1948. It turned out that the automobile was
entirely useless, and the sheriff so reported. Whereupon the attorney for the
plaintiff Genaro S. Paz asked for another writ “ordering the defendants Jose Ang
and Ang Lin Chi to pay jointly and severally to plaintiff the value of the
automobile in question, in accordance with the decision promulgated” in the
case. The defendants’ attorney objected to the motion on two grounds, the second
of which maintained that their liability under the judgment was only joint—not
solidary. The motion was heard, and on September 18, 1948, the court directed
the issuance of a new writ “ordenando a los demandados Jose Ang y Ang Lin Chi
para que paguen mancomunada y solidariamente al demandante Genaro Paz la suma de
P1,800 como precio del automovil en cuestion”. A motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence this special civil action hurriedly instituted because the
sheriff, pursuant to the order, had attached real properties of petitioner for
sale on execution. At the petitioner’s request an injunction was issued by this
Court on October 11, 1948, to prevent the carrying out of the aforesaid judicial
directive.

Petitioner’s case is clearly meritorious. The tenor of the writ
of execution may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. In
decreeing that Jose Ang and Ang Lin Chi shall pay the sum of P1,800 the original
judgment did not specify that they shall do it solidarily. Under the law the
liability thus imposed on defendants was joint (mancomunada). After that
judgment had become final, the court had no power to amend it to convert
defendants’ liability into a solidary obligation. Much less could it issue an
order of execution charging the defeated parties with solidary responsibility
the latter having possibly chosen not to appeal in view of the joint obligation
(not solidary) declared by the decision.

Our views in Contreras, vs. Felix, (78 Phil., 570) are quite
decisive of this litigation.

This Court in that case rendered judgment the dispositive part
of which was in these words and phrases:

“For all the foregoing, the deed of mortgage dated November 8,
1930, is declared null and void as to the one-half of the mortgaged property
belonging to Jerusalem Gingco and rescinded as to the remaining one-half
belonging to the spouses Molina, and the appealed decision is modified by
ordering all the defendants to pay Jerusalem Gingco the amount of P30 monthly
from September 4, 1934, to September 4, 1941, and to continue paying the same
monthly amount thereafter until the two new doors of the accesoria in question
are delivered to said Jerusalem Gingco. The defendants shall also pay the filing
fees of the complaint in the lower court and the costs in both
instances”.

The defendants were the China Banking Corporation, Juan B.
Molina and his wife. On execution proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance the Honorable Alfonso Felix, Judge, declared that under the judgment
the Bank’s liability was only one-third. Upon a suit for mandamus, we sustained
his view saying in part:

“There is no dispute, and it can be said with confidence, that
the China Banking Corporation’s liability under the terms of the judgment of
this court is merely joint, joint in the sense in which the word is understood
in the civil law. ‘It is already a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction
that, when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to
pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled
to satisfy in full said judgment’. (Oriental Commercial Co. Inc. vs. Abeto and
Mabanag, 60 Phil., 723, citing De Leon vs. Nepomuceno and De Jesus, 37 Phil.,
180, and Sharuff vs. Tayabas Land Co. and Ginainati, 37 Phil., 655). That ruling
is in entire harmony with arts. 1137 and 1133 of the Civil Code.

“Under that doctrine the lower court has no legal authority
under any circumstances to make the change sought by the plaintiffs; and this
court itself may not make the change after the judgment has become executory.
According to that decision a mistake such as that here alleged, if it be a
mistake, is not clerical; it goes to the very substance of the controversy.

“Only clerical errors, or mistakes or omissions plainly due to
inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied after the judgment has
been entered.”

Respondents, however, maintain that Judge Castelo did nothing
more than to clarify his decision as was done and approved in Lacson vs.
Paredes, 63 Phil., 87. But the facts in that precedent are distinguishable from
those presently before us, because there it was obvious that the omission of the
word “severally” from the dispositive part of the judgment was an inadvertence,
“the parties as well as the trial judge” having understood all the time that the
obligation was joint and several; whereas here the petitioner disclaimed any
obligation to the respondent Genaro S. Paz, and there is no positive indication
in the original decision that the intention of His Honor was to impose a joint
and several liability.

Wherefore, the disputed order is hereby set aside, and the
injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. Petitioner will have costs. So
ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.

Briones, M., Conforme con la parte dispositiva.

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DISSENTING

PERFECTO, J.:

Aside from the views we have expressed in Contreras vs. Felix,
L-884,^[1] there are other strong reasons
to deny the petition. Upon the facts on record, it appears that Ang Lin Chi is
the father of Jose Ang, with whom he appears to be, guilty, of imposture, in
relation with fradulent maneuvers, regarding the automobile in question. Said
Jose Ang has been investigated for forgery in relation with the same automobile.
As declared by the trial court, the automobile in question was seen, after
liberation, by the owner in the possession, of Jose Ang. A police officer of
Manila took possession of the automobile as involved in a criminal action for
falsification against Jose Ang. But the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissed the information, because the Jose Ang that appeared as such before the
investigator Vicente Ilagan, Chief of Division of Automobile, Bureau of Public
Works and Communication, was in fact petitioner Ang Lin Chi.

Upon the facts on record, there cannot be any question as to
the solidarity between Jose Ang and Ang Lin Chi and as to the solidarity of
their obligation to return the automobile to the owner Genaro S. Paz and,
failing thereof, to indemnify, him in the sum of P1,800.

Petitioner Ang Lin Chi being one of the principals in the
fraudulent and criminal maneuvers to deprive the owner of his automobile cannot
now hide behind an insubstantial technicality so as to elude the corresponding,
civil liability.

The petition, should be denied as, otherwise, is tantamount to
rewarding fraud.

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[1] 78 Phil., 570.